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Ostrowski: The Moral and Practical Case for Drug Legalization

THE MORAL AND PRACTICAL CASE FOR
DRUG LEGALIZATION
James Ostrowski*
INTRODUCTION

This article presents a comprehensive argument for the legalization of consciousness-altering drugs. In Part I, the methodology of
drug policy analysis is explored, drug prohibition is defined as the
initiation of physical force against persons engaged in non-violent actions and voluntary transactions involving prohibited drugs, and legalization is defined as the removal of such force to a greater or
lesser degree depending upon the form of legalization adopted in a
particular state or nation.1
In Part II, a moral argument for drug legalization is presented.2
The theories of two contemporary philosophers, Douglas Rasmussen3
and Hans-Hermann Hoppe4 are discussed. Despite the fact that Rasmussen and Hoppe start from different premises, both arrive at the
conclusion that individuals have a moral right of self-ownership. 5
Part III presents a cost-benefit analysis of drug prohibition. The
major costs of prohibition include categories of crime costs, medical
costs, economic costs, and miscellaneous costs.6 Prohibition stimulates a tremendous amount of crime and reduces the ability of the
criminal justice system to deal with truly violent criminals. Prohibition, by its very nature, threatens civil liberties and destroys the social structure of the poorest neighborhoods.
* Associate Policy Analyst, Cato Institute, Washington, D.C.; B.A. State University of
New York at Buffalo, 1980; J.D. Brooklyn Law School, 1983. The author wishes to acknowledge the research assistance of Mark Phillips, Gilbert Moore Fellow in Law & Philosophy;

M.A. New York University 1984; J.D./Ph.D. candidate, State University of New York at
Buffalo, and Rachel M. Kane, B.A. State University of New York at Buffalo, 1986.

I. See infra notes 12-75 and accompanying text.
2. See infra notes 76-154 and accompanying text.

3. See infra notes 89-99 and accompanying text.
4.

See infra notes 100-13 and accompanying text.

5. See infra notes 114-22 and accompanying text.
6. See infra notes 155-98 and accompanying text.
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The paradox of prohibition is that it fails to deter those who
need it most-the hard core users. The "protection" it provides the
rest of the population is redundant; they do not need it. The illusion
of prohibition is that it takes from us the responsibility to make the
choice to use or not to use. But in fact, the drugs are there if we
want them and the media is constantly and inadvertently advertising
them. Technology is continually creating new and potent mind-altering drugs. As individuals, we must exercise responsible choice in
these matters - with or without drug laws. We must awaken out of
our child-like slumber and accept the fact that one of the difficult
tasks adult human beings must perform is to decide the role that
drugs will play in their lives.
Wars against drugs fail because drugs and drug profits are more
powerful motivators than drug laws.' Drug dealers usually prevail
because they are ruthless entrepreneurs fighting government bureaucrats who are paid whether they stop drug dealing or not. While the
police struggle with the paperwork from the last bust, the dealers
busily market new drugs produced by the latest technology.
Policy alternatives to prohibition are diverse, ranging from the
medical model of Great Britain to the alcohol model.' If the goal of
reform is elimination of the black market in drugs, the best option
for reform is non-prescription adult availability which leaves very little room for a black market. If we repeal prohibition, the benefits
would be immediate and substantial: streets would become safer, law
enforcement would become unburdened, and the black market in
drugs, together with its many ill effects, would be destroyed. The
risk of legalization is significantly less than the risk of continuing the
availability of cigarettes,9 alcohol ° and cholesterol. Many innocent
victims of prohibition-including many drug abstainers-would no
longer be sacrificed in the futile attempt to protect self-destructive
people from themselves.
7. See infra notes 349-50 and accompanying text.
8.

See infra notes 351-70 and accompanying text (discussing legalization and the other

policy alternatives).
9. See U.S.

DEP'T. OF HEALTH AND HuM. SERV., THE HEALTH CONSEQUENCES OF

SMOKING, NICOTINE ADDICTION, A REPORT OF THE SURGEON GENERAL (1988); see also Appendix, infra notes 380-85 and accompanying text.
10. See Patterns of Alcohol Consumption and Alcohol-Related Morbidity and Mortality, 35 MORBIDITY AND MORTALITY WEEKLY REP. 2SS (1986) (detailing alcohol related
health problems); US. DEP'T. OF HEALTH AND HUM. SERV., SIXTH SPECIAL REPORT TO THE
U.S. CONGRESS ON ALCOHOL AND HEALTH FROM THE SECRETARY OF HEALTH AND HUMAN

SERVICES (1987) (stating that in 1980 there were 97,000 deaths attributable to alcohol abuse);
see also Appendix, infra notes 380-85 and accompanying text.
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I.
A.

METHODOLOGY

The Rules of the Game

When two football teams take the field to play a game, there is
usually animosity between them. Regardless of the dislike each team
feels for the other, they agree on one thing-the rules of the game;
each team can field eleven players at one time; a field goal is worth
three points; the team with the most points wins.
Even this minimal level of agreement is lacking between the opposing "teams" in the drug legalization debate. There is yet no
agreement on the rules of the game, that is, how the debate is to be
conducted and what will determine the winner. As a result, there has
been much talk and much shouting about legalization, but less careful analysis than needed. It seems that many talk about legalization,
yet fewer actually think about it. Thus, before presenting an argument for legalization, it is necessary to propose some rules of the
game.
B.

Defining Prohibition and Legalization

Drug prohibition is the lawful restriction of the production, distribution, sale, and use of certain mind- and mood-altering drugs
("drugs"). Laws are enforceable rules of conduct designed to promote certain values. Drug laws prohibit actions in which individuals
desire to engage and prohibit transactions to which both parties consent. The purpose of drug laws is to prevent drug users from doing
harm to themselves or others. Persons suspected of violating criminal
drug laws ("drug suspects") are forcibly arrested, at gun point if
necessary, and brought before courts of law. If convicted of drug law
violations, these persons ("drug convicts") are forcibly penalized by
fine, imprisonment or coercive supervision.
Drug prohibition is, therefore, the initiation of physical force
against persons engaging in non-violent actions and voluntary transactions involving prohibited drugs. By definition, drug suspects and
drug convicts have not been arrested or convicted for having initiated
force against the police or private citizens. They would be suspected
or convicted of robbery, rape, murder, etc. if they had initiated force
against others.
Legalization is simply the repeal of drug prohibition. The repeal
of prohibition would leave adult drug users or sellers relatively or
absolutely free from the initiation of physical force by the state, depending upon the form of legalization adopted in a particular state
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or nation."'
C.

Approaches to the Issue

The rules of the game differ depending upon the basis of one's
position either in favor of or in opposition to prohibition. There are
two main bases for supporting prohibition or opposing it-the moral
and the practical. 12 "Prohibitionists" support drug prohibition because they believe that drug use is immoral and that the state should
enforce this rule of morality." Most of those who morally oppose
legalization also believe that, as a practical matter, it would cause
14
more problems than it would solve.
Those who take a moral position against legalization must prove
three propositions; first, drug use is immoral; second, government has
the right to prohibit immoral conduct even when such conduct does
not directly harm others; and third, that government is effective in
this effort without generating problems more serious than drug use
per se.
Proponents of legalization ("legalizers") fall into two groups.
Some favor legalization because they believe prohibition violates the
individual's right to liberty. 15 Others support legalization because
they believe that prohibition causes more harm than it prevents., 6 In
general, the moral opponents of prohibition rely on the practical failure of prohibition, but consider the moral argument more weighty
than the practical argument.
For simplification in the discussion that follows, I assume that
prohibitionists adopt both a moral and practical stance against legalization, and that legalizers adopt both a moral and practical stance
11.

See infra notes (Part III Policy Alternative) and accompanying text.

12. See generally E.J. DELATTRE, CHARACTER AND Cops: ETHICS IN POLICING 123-37
(1989) (discussing moral and public policy arguments for and against the legalization of
drugs).
13. See, e.g., id. at 128. This argument is based, in part, on the proposition that the
negative effects of drug use on families and society in general gives the government "a rightful
interest in prohibition." Id.
14. See, e.g., id. at 128-29. Prohibitionists point to such problems as the failure of legalization to reduce illegal trafficking, widespread increases in drug use and-the resulting consequences, and the negative message that might be sent to the youth about drug use. Id.
15. See, e.g., ld. at 125-26. Advocates of legalization point to such problems as the intrusive conduct of drug investigators, the advent of drug testing, and the corruption of government officials. Id.; see also notes 76-154 and accompanying text (presenting a moral argument
for legalization).
16. See, e.g., E.J. DELATTRE, supra note 12, at 126-27 (listing some of the benefits cited
by legalization advocates); infra notes 155-236 (presenting a cost-benefit analysis of drug
prohibition).
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against prohibition.
D.

The Burden of Proof

Burden of proof is a useful principle in law and debate that
specifies which party in a lawsuit or debate will prevail in the event
of a "tie." Generally, the burden of proof lies with the party who
urges a change in the status quo. Since legalizers seek to change the
status quo, it is reasonable to place the burden of proof upon them.
As a practical matter, there is no way around this since most people
oppose legalization. Legalizers must either concede defeat or convince many of these persons to change their minds-and most people
will not change their minds if the evidence on each side appears
even.
Assuming legalizers have the burden of proof, there is good reason to believe they have already met it. In the last few years, a number of books, reports and articles have detailed the failure of prohibition and the merits of legalization.1" A prior study by the author
concluded that drug prohibition is responsible for at least 8,250
deaths18 and eighty billion dollars in economic loss each year, 9 as
well as pervasive corruption, systematic destruction of civil liberties,
clogged courts and prisons, and a general breakdown of social order
and community, particularly in the cities. 20 The benefits of legalization would outweigh any conceivable increase in drug use which
might occur as a result.2 This study was widely distributed to public
officials and the media, and "challenge[d] advocates of prohibition to
rise above the level of platitudes and good intentions and to present
hard evidence that prohibition, in actual practice, does more good
than harm. 22 After the study was published, one commentator
wrote: "[this study] clearly demands an answer;"' 23 while another
wrote "it demands a response from those favoring the drug status
17. See e.g., DEALING WITH DRUGS: CONSEQUENCES OF GOVERNMENT CONTROL (R.
Hamowy ed. 1987) [hereinafter DEALING WITH DRUGS] (presenting a number of essays on
the topic); A. TREBACH, THE GREAT DRUG WAR (1987); S. WISOTSKY, BREAKING THE INIPASSE IN THE WAR ON DRUGS (1986); Nadelmann, Drug Prohibition in the United States:
Costs, Consequences, and Alternatives, 245 Sci. 939.
18. See infra note 225 and accompanying text; infra Table 1.
19. See infra notes 229-36 and accompanying text.
20. See infra notes 237-82 and accompanying text.
21. See infra notes 293-330 and accompanying text.
22. Ostrowski, Thinking About Drug Legalization, in CATO INSTITUTE POLICY ANALYSIS 8 (1989).
23. Wolf, Thinking About Drug Legalization, Fin. Times, Sept. 4, 1989, at 19.
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quo."'2 4 To date, no response has been forthcoming. There is simply

no comprehensive cost-benefit analysis supporting prohibition.
Thus, legalizers have met their burden of proof while prohibitionists have failed to rebut the case for legalization using proper
methodology. 5 In September 1989, The Economist noted that
"[t]wo senior politicians, Mr. William Bennett (President Bush's
drug tsar) and Mr. Douglas Hurd (Britain's home secretary), have
been stirred to join the [drug legalization] debate," but that "neither
Mr. Bennett 2nor
Mr. Hurd offers any positive evidence that prohibi0
tion works." 6
Notwithstanding that legalizers have met their burden of proof,
there is ample reason to doubt that the burden of proof ever really
shifted away from those who support prohibition. While longstanding policies which were well considered initially may deserve respect,
drug prohibition is not such a policy. Why was prohibition put into
effect in the first place? Surely, before-prohibition, American society
had been marked by drug-crazed criminals and drug-paralyzed
workers. Actually, the opposite was true. Drugs in one form or another were legal for thousands of years before they became the subject of regulation under the Harrison Act of 1914.27 However, the
period of greatest availability was the 19th century, during which
opium, morphine, and cocaine were legal and inexpensively available
without a prescription through the mail or at drug and grocery
stores.28
Regarding the impact of pre-prohibition drug 'use in the United
States, Edward Brecher has stated the following:
[T]here was very little popular support for a law banning these
substances. "Powerful organizations for the suppression... of alcoholic stimulants exist throughout the land

...

"

but there were no

similar anti-opiate organizations.
The reason for this lack of demand for opiate prohibition was
quite simple: the drugs were not viewed
as a menace to society and
29
...they were not in fact a menace.
24. Scates, Provocative Report Calls for End to Prohibitionof Drugs, Seattle PostIntelligencer, June 29, 1989, at A14, col. 2.

25. See infra Elements of the Case.
26.
27.

Talking of Drugs, The Economist, Sept. 16, 1989, Editorials, at 13.
Harrison Act of 1914, ch. 1, 38 Stat. 785 (amended 1918).

28. E. BRECHER, LICIT AND ILLICIT DRUGS 3-7 (1972) (discussing drug availability during the nineteenth century). Brecher noted that the nineteenth century has been referred to as
a "dope fiend's paradise." Id. at 3.
29. Id., at 7 (quoting The Opium Habit, 33 CATHOLIC WORLD 828-34 (1881)).
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A search through the New York Times Index for 1895-1904-years
of peak drug use and minimum legal controls-for articles about the
negative effects of cocaine use, found none.30 In contrast, there were
1,657 articles about the cocaine problem during the peak years of
the drug war-1979-1988.3 1 The situation in 19th-century England
was remarkably similar:
[Clonsumption under conditions of free supply in effect plateaued
out ....[I]ncapacity from use of opium was not seen as a problem
of such frequency and severity as to be a leading cause for social
anxiety. The prime image of the opium user was dissimilar to that
of the wastrel and disruptive drunkard. Opium users were not lying
about in the streets, or filling the workhouses, or beating their
wives. It seems fair to conclude that at the saturation level which
the plateau represented, opium was not a vastly malign or problematic drug in terms of its impact on social functioning.32
If there was no catastrophic drug problem before drug prohibition, why was prohibition enacted? Alcohol prohibition should have
taught us not to expect sublime rationality in drug control legislation. In 1926, after eleven years of narcotic prohibition, an editorial
in the'Illinois Medical Journal stated:
The Harrison Narcotic law should never have been placed upon the
Statute books of the United States. It is to be granted that the
well-meaning blunderers who put it there had in mind only the idea
of making it impossible for addicts to secure their supply of "dope"
and to prevent unprincipled people from making fortunes, and fattening themselves upon the infirmities of their fellow men.
As is the case with most prohibitive laws, however, this one
fell far short of the mark. So far, in fact, that instead of stopping
the traffic, those who deal in dope now make double their money
from the poor unfortunates upon whom they prey ....
The doctor who needs narcotics, used in reason to cure and
allay human misery, finds himself in a pit of trouble. The lawbreaker is in fact in clover . . . .It is costing the United States
more to support bootleggers of both narcotics and alcoholics than
there is good coming from the farcical laws now on the statute
books.
As to the Harrison Narcotic law ....People are beginning to
30. However, one article suggested that firemen not use cocaine in their eyes to fight the
effects of smoke because it might become habit-forming. N.Y. Times, Jun. 25, 1897.
31. See N.Y. Times Index 1979-1988.
32. V. BERRIDGE & G. EDWARDS, OPIUM AND THE PEOPLE: OPIATE USE IN NINETEENTH
CENTURY ENGLAND 262, 264 (1987).
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ask, "Who did that, anyway?""3

Actually, the most important "who" was Secretary of State
William Jennings Bryan, "a man of deep prohibitionist and missionary convictions and sympathies. He urged that the law be promptly
passed to fulfill United States obligations under the new international [drug control] treaty." 4
Some of the other reasons underlying the Harrison Act included
the association of opium and its derivatives with a scorned minority
group-Chinese Americans35 and lobbying by physicians and pharmacists eager to gain a legal monopoly over the distribution of narcotics and other drugs.3 "
Similarly, when marijuana was first banned in 1937,11 no medical testimony was presented to Congress."8 Thus, drug prohibition
was not originally based on careful analysis and research.
Finally, in spite of the fact that legalizers urge a change in the
status quo, prohibitionists should bear the burden of proof because
' 33. See E. BRECHER, supra note 28, at 52 (quoting Stripping the Medical Profession of
Its Powers and Giving Them to a Body of Lawmakers: The Proposed Amendment to the
Harrison Narcotic Act-Everybody Seems to Know About DoctoringExcept Doctors, 49 ILL
MED. J. 447 (1926)).
34. Id. at 49. Brecher noted that the Harrison Act supporters "said little ... about the
evils of narcotics addiction in the United States. They talked more about the need to implement the Hague Convention of 1912." Id. The Hague Convention of 1912 was an international
agreement to help solve drug problems in the Far East, which required that each consenting
nation enact domestic legislation for narcotics control. See Musto, The History of Legislative
Control Over Opium, Cocaine, and Their Derivatives, in DEALING WITH DRUGS, supra note
17, at 47-51.
Brecher also argued that the Harrison Act was merely intended as "a law for the orderly
marketing of opium, morphine, heroin, and other drugs .... " E. BRECHER, supra note 28, at
49. He concluded from this that legislators would not have "realized in 1914 that the law
Congress was passing would later be deemed a prohibition law." Id.
Arnold Trebach disagrees with Brecher's analysis. See A. TREBACH, THE HEROIN SOLUTION 118-43 (1982). He believes that drug control was the motive behind the bill. Id. at 121.
But even Trebach admits that the congressional discussion of the bill was "limited" and that,
"on its face, the Harrison Act was a tax law." Id. at 120. Furthermore, Trebach believes that
the bill was not intended to deprive physicians of the power to prescribe opiates. Id. at 123.
Finally, Trebach does not present evidence that opiate use at the time was a major social
problem, beyond the fact that it might have been disapproved of by some people; nor does he
present evidence that the likely consequences of prohibition were carefully considered by Congress. See, id. at 118-24.
35. E. BRECHER, supra note 28, at 42-45.
36. See D. MusTo, THE AMERICAN DISEASE: ORIGINS OF NARCOTIC CONTROL 56-59
(1973); Hamowy, Introduction: Illicit Drugs and Government Control, in DEALING WITH
DRUGS, supra note 17, at 14.
37. Marihuana Tax Act of 1937, ch. 553, 50 Stat. 551.
38. E. BRECHER, supra note 28, at 416. Ironically, the only physician to testify at the
Congressional hearings opposed the passage of the bill. Id.
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they are continually reasserting that prohibition is a good policy-explicitly in debates over legalization and implicitly at annual
budget hearings at the federal and state level.39 Prohibitionists are
continually reasserting that billions of dollars annually should be
spent on prohibition and that thousands of Americans should be imprisoned under prohibition for engaging in voluntary transactions
with others.4 0 In a free society, it would be wise to place the burden
of proof on those who advocate policies with such results. If that
many people are going to be imprisoned for doing things which were
not illegal for most of our nation's history, there had better be good
reasons.
E.

The Elements of the Case

Regardless of which side has the burden of proof, it will be useful to specify the elements of the case that each must establish.
Prohibitionists must prove both the moral and practical elements of their case. The mere fact that the state may have the moral
right to prohibit drugs is an inadequate basis for prohibition, without
a showing that the state can effectively do so, and do so without
jeopardizing values as substantial as the elimination or reduction of
drug use. For example, if you are standing near the rapids of Niagara Falls and a man suddenly slips and falls into the Niagara River,
most people would agree that there is a moral value to rescuing the
man. However, most people would also agree that no attempt to
achieve this moral value should be made if the chances of success
are zero percent, while the chances of causing an additional death
are 100 percent.
In contrast, legalizers need only prove that one part of their argument is correct. If individuals have the right to freedom of choice
in drug consumption or abstention, then we need not and must not
engage in a cost-benefit analysis concerning the consequences of respecting this right, for the same reason that a cost-benefit analysis of
slavery is inappropriate. One way of looking at rights in this context
is that a rights doctrine is a kind of mega cost-benefit analysis which
concludes that the value of rights outweighs whatever costs occur as
39. See N. CAPALDI, THE ART OF DECEPTION 120 (1971). If a proposition is deemed
true unless someone can disprove it, then the fallacy of appeal to ignorance is committed. Id.
40. See Ostrowski, supra note 22, at 2 (asserting that "[t]he leaders of the war on drugs
are apparently unable to defend on rational cost-benefit grounds their 70-year-old policy,
which costs nearly $10 billion per year (out of pocket), imprisons 75,000 Americans, and fills
our cities with violent crime.").
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a result of the enforcement of those rights.
For example, an ill person generally has the right to refuse medical treatment even when such treatment is necessary to preserve
that person's life. Individuals have the right to refuse treatment because the value of controlling one's own destiny outweighs the economic, social and emotional costs of a premature death. It is precisely the point of rights doctrines to "render most legal cost-benefit
calculations superfluous and ... avoid tragically wasteful (and often

41
irreversible) social experimentation."
Naturally, should legalizers fail to establish a valid rights doctrine, they may still prevail in the argument by justifying legalization on cost-benefit grounds.
Much of the confusion surrounding the cost-benefit side of drug
policy discussions could be alleviated by asking the right question
initially. The question that must be addressed in determining
whether to legalize drugs on practical grounds is this: do drug laws
cause more harm than good?
The focus here is not how dangerous drugs are or how much
damage drug users inflict upon themselves. 2 If these factors were
decisive, then surely alcohol and tobacco would be banned. Rather,
the proper focus should be how effective are drug laws in preventing
damage from drugs, compared with the amount of injury the laws
themselves cause.
With this emphasis in mind, the respective burdens of proof
resting upon the parties to the debate can be specified. Supporters of
prohibition must demonstrate all of the following:

(1) the use of currently illegal drugs is immoral;
(2) the state has the right to enforce this moral rule;
(3) the state can effectively enforce this moral rule without
creating additional problems as serious as drug use itself; that is:
(a) that drug use would increase substantially after
legalization;
(b) that the harm caused by any increased drug use would not
be offset by the increased safety of legal drug use;
(c) that the harm caused by any increased use would not be
offset by a reduction in the use of dangerous drugs that are already
legal (e.g., alcohol and tobacco); and
(d) that the harm caused by any increased drug use not offset
41. Barnett, Curing the Drug-Law Addiction: The Harmful Side Effects of Legal Prohibition, in DEALING WITH DRUGS, supra note 17, at 100.
42. See e.g., infra notes 213-28 and accompanying text.
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by (b) or (c) would exceed the harm now caused by the side effects
of prohibition (e.g., crime and corruption).

In the absence of data supporting these propositions, neither the
theoretical danger of illegal drugs nor their actual harmful effects,
are a sufficient basis for prohibition. Even if it were proven that drug
use would rise if legalized, such proof would be insufficient to support prohibition. Prohibitionists face a daunting task-one that no
one has yet accomplished or, apparently, even attempted.43
The case for legalization is sustained if any of the following propositions is true:
(1) regardless of whether the use of currently illegal drugs is
prohibiimmoral, the state has no moral right to enforce this moral
4
tion because doing so would violate individual rights; "
has no substantial impact on the level of illegal
(2) prohibition
45
drug use;

(3) prohibition increases illegal drug use;46
(4) prohibition merely redistributes drug use from illegal
drugs to harmful legal drugs; 47 or
(5) even though prohibition might decrease the use of illegal
drugs, the negative effects of prohibition outweigh the beneficial
effects of reduced illegal drug use.48
43. Note that a 1984 study by the Research Triangle Institute on the economic costs of
drug abuse, HARWOOD, NAPOLITANO, KRISTIANSEN, & COLLINS, ECONOMIC COSTS TO SOCIFry OF ALCOHOL AND DRUG ABUSE AND MENTAL ILLNESS (1984) has been erroneously cited
in support of drug prohibition. Kerr, The Unspeakable is Debated: Should Drugs be Legalized?, N.Y. Times, May 15, 1988, §1, at 1, col. 1, 24, col. 3; Kondracke, Don't Legalize
Drugs, NEW REPUBLIC, June 27, 1988, at 17; Church, Thinking the Unthinkable, TIME, May
30, 1988, at 12, 14-15. This report, which estimates the cost of drug abuse at $60 billion for
1983, is not, and was not intended to be, an evaluation of the efficacy of prohibition or the
wisdom of legalization. It does not mention the terms "legalization" or "decriminalization"
and makes no attempt to separate the costs attributable to drug use per se from the costs
attributable to the illegality of drug use. The study seems to include some costs of legal drugs
in its estimates. See HARWOOD, NAPOLITANO. KRISTIANSEN & COLLINS, supra, at 49-50.
Many of the costs cited are clearly the result of prohibition, for example, interdiction costs
($677 million). Furthermore, the report considers only costs that prohibition has failed to prevent, making no attempt to measure the costs prevented--or caused-by prohibition. The
study is therefore almost entirely irrelevant to the issue of legalizing drugs.
44. See infra notes 85-154 and accompanying text.
45. See infra notes 166-93 and accompanying text.
46. The analysis in this Article does not rely heavily upon this point. For an analysis of
historical evidence on this point, see E. BRECHER, supra note 28, at 521-22.
47. See infra notes 307-11 and accompanying text.
48. See infra The Cost-Benefit Analysis.
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F. The Four Types of Drug-Related Harm
Any cost-benefit analysis of prohibition must separate the four
categories of harm related to illegal drug use. The distinctions between these categories have often been blurred in the legalization
debate. These categories are:
(1) harm
(2) harm
(3) harm
(4) harm

caused by prohibition;
prevented by prohibition;
not prevented by prohibition;
which is related to, but not caused by, drug use.

1. Harm caused by prohibition.- This category includes all the
problems caused by the law enforcement approach to the drug problem. Obvious examples include: drug enforcement costs, law enforcement officers killed in drug enforcement, and police corruption related to drugs. Less obvious examples include: crime committed by
people as a result of the diversion of resources away from violent
crime enforcement and toward drug enforcement, drug-related
AIDS, black market violence and drug-related street crime. 49
2. Harm prevented by prohibition.- This category includes all
of the harm that people do not do to themselves or others because
drugs are illegal and thus less available. By and large, these are people who (a) are not currently abusing a serious legal50 or illegal
drug, (b) would suddenly start heavy use of a newly legalized drug,
and (c) would, in spite of warning labels, quality controls and objective education, recklessly cause harm to themselves or others after
legalization. It is primarily for the benefit of such people that the
war on drugs is fought.
That the harm prevented by prohibition is quite large is the
main practical argument for prohibition. Strictly speaking, this category is unknowable, since human beings cannot accurately predict
the future. One reason for this is that predictions themselves can
affect future behavior. 1 For example, dire predictions of heavy drug
use after legalization could well stimulate anti-drug educational, cultural and treatment efforts, which if successful, might actually lead
to a reduction in drug use.
49. See infra notes 205-36 and accompanying text (discussing each of these harms).
50. See infra notes 304-30 and accompanying text (discussing the switching from one
drug to another with the same type of effect as a consequence of drug legalization).
51. See M.N. ROTHBARD, INDIVIDUALISM AND THE PHILOSOPHY OF THE SOCIAL SCIENCES 33 (1979) (describing how predictions of price inflation in the United States affect

future inflation).
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It is generally believed that the uncertainty argument favors the
status quo. The notion that we should not legalize drugs because we
are not certain what would happen has become the favored argument of many prohibitionists.5 2 Rather than providing cost-benefit
evidence in support of their policy, prohibitionists latch onto the uncertainty argument in the same way that criminal defense lawyers
whose clients are clearly guilty latch onto the presumption of innocence. Prohibitionists use the uncertainty argument as a substitute
for evidence that they apparently do not possess, secure in the knowledge that no one predicting the future can ever be refuted in the
present.
Does the uncertainty argument really favor the status quo? As
previously discussed, the main practical benefit of prohibition is its
alleged harm-prevention value. That is, without prohibition, harmful
drug use would increase. Thus, the inability of prohibitionists to
prove that harmful drug use would increase after repeal of prohibition also means that they are unable to prove that prohibition provides any practical benefit. The lack of evidence in favor of prohibition, combined with the major problems which are undeniably
caused by prohibition, makes a persuasive argument for repeal.
It must be insisted that the prevention of mere drug use, without evidence of actual harm, does not qualify as harm prevented by
prohibition. While mere drug use may violate norms of morality
prohibitionists believe the state must enforce, such drug use cannot
be considered in a cost-benefit approach because such an approach
considers only harmful consequences of drug use. Prohibitionist literature is filled with references to levels of drug use in certain places
and times of -legal availability, but without evidence demonstrating
any actual harm caused by this use.53 Probably more attention is
paid to this category of drug use-use without actual harm-than
any other. Yet, it is logically irrelevant to the issue.
Another severe methodological hurdle for prohibitionists is the
drug-switching/addiction-switching problem. It is not controversial
to argue that people use drugs either to make themselves feel better
52. See E.J.

DELATTRE,

supra note 12, at 129 (noting that prohibitionists argue that

[and] the likelihood of
legalization experiments are "extremely difficult to reverse .....
adverse consequences is too great to risk.").
53. See, e.g., Bennett, A Response to Milton Friedman, Wall St. J., Sept. 19, 1989, at'

A30, col. 3 (arguing for continued drug prohibition without discussing the harm which drug
legalization may cause); Lewis, The Opium War, N.Y. Times, Oct. 29, 1989, at E23, col. 6

(discussing the nineteenth century Opium War but failing to discuss the harm caused by
opium use).
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than they already do, or to take away bad feelings they have. 54 Prohibition at best reduces the availability of certain types of drugs, but
does nothing to make people feel better or take away bad feelings.
Thus, presumably, people who are deprived of certain drugs by prohibition will seek out legal drugs as a substitute (drug-switching)
and/or will engage in addictive forms of behavior which do not involve drugs (addiction-switching), such as gambling or overeating.
This means that to prove some level of harm has been prevented by
prohibition, it also has to be shown that harmful illegal drug-taking
behavior has not been replaced by harmful legal drug-taking behavior or by harmful non-drug addictive behaviors.
3. Harm not prevented by prohibition.- Obviously, prohibition
has failed to prevent all acts of illegal drug use occurring today in
spite of prohibition. But we must be extremely careful to separate, to
the fullest extent possible, the harm caused by drug use per se from
the harm caused by the fact that drug use is illegal. For example, if
a man smokes marijuana today, any harmful consequences of marijuana smoking (which would occur even if marijuana was legal and
quality controlled, etc.) would fall into the category of harm not prevented by prohibition. If the man is arrested and put through criminal court proceedings, all the financial and other costs of this proceeding fall into the category of harm caused by prohibition. Now, if
unknown to the smoker, the marijuana was laced with paraquat
sprayed on it by law enforcement agents with resulting injury to the
smoker, this again would amount to harm caused by prohibition.
Thus, we can conclude that any harm resulting from the use of
illegal drugs falls into the category of either harm caused by prohibition or harm not prevented by prohibition. From this, we can further
conclude that no evidence of the harm caused by current illegal drug
use, by itself, can be utilized as evidence in support of prohibition.
Without additional data showing that the repeal of prohibition would
increase the level of harmful drug use, evidence of current harm
from illegal drug use-even excluding harm caused by prohibition-is of no use to the prohibitionist argument. What prohibitionists must do is (1) demonstrate that legalization would lead to some
level of increased use; then (2) use evidence of harm from existing
use to show the extent of the harm that would be caused by legalization. To engage in step (2) without step (1) is meaningless.
54. See, e.g., Barnett, supra note 41, at 78-79 (arguing that the "prime motivation for

the drug user's behavior is to alter his state of mind-to get 'high.' ").
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4. Harm related to, but not caused by, drug use.- Prohibitionists often fall into the trap of scapegoatism. They blame a seemingly
endless list of human problems such as violence, child abuse, prostitution, spouse abuse, laziness, joblessness, irresponsible pregnant
women-most of which have been around for thousands of
years-on the use of illegal drugs. Prohibitionists have presented
very little evidence that drug use per se is the cause of these
problems. It is more likely that drug use is a correlative of most of
these problems5 5 and that both drug use and the other problems have
separate causes-the personality, character and values of the drug
user or perhaps adverse social conditions.
This point can be illustrated by a thought experiment." If a
hundred nuns and a hundred congressmen smoked crack, how many
would become violent and murder someone? Most reasonable people
would answer none. In fact, there is a dearth of evidence that
wealthy persons or physicians become violent after using cocaine, although many thousands of them have used the drug. This suggests
that too often the blame for antisocial conduct is placed on the drug
and not the person. As Stanton Peele writes, "it is a mark of naivete-not science-to mistake the behavior of some drug users with
the pharmacological effects of the drug, as though addictive loss of
control and crime were somehow chemical properties of
57
substance."
In summary, the cost-benefit argument hinges upon whether
prohibition causes more harm than it prevents. But prohibitionists
have rarely sought to supply evidence that meets this criterion.
Rather, prohibitionists have mainly supplied evidence of harm that
prohibition has failed to prevent. They have also been guilty of
smuggling into their argument various types of harm caused by prohibition and harm related to, but not caused by, drug use.
G. ProhibitionistPitfalls
The case for prohibition has a number of contradictions and
55. See generally Peele, A Moral Vision of Addiction: How People's Values Determine
Whether They Become and Remain Addicts, 17 J.DRUG ISSUES 187 (1987) (discussing the
importance of value orientations in the development and expression of drug addiction).
56. See, e.g., C. MURRAY, LOSING GROUND (1984) (using a thought experiment in analyzing welfare reform; that is, imagining certain facts and hypothesizing a result based on
common sense and human experience).
57. Peele, Does Drug Addiction Excuse Thieves and Killersfrom Criminal Responsibility?, in DRUG POLICY 1989-1990: A REFORMER'S CATALOGUE 204 (A. Trebach & K. Zeese
ed. 1989).
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pitfalls:58
(1) The moral argument for prohibition faces the difficulty that
prohibition sacrifices people who do not use drugs,59 and imposes
costs on drug users who harm no one with their drug use.6 0
(2) Prohibitionists must face the fact that there is no general
consensus in American society on the morality of using consciousaltering drugs."' Some people reject all of these; some embrace all;
some reject some, but not all; and still others accept all if used in
moderation. Since there is little hope of social consensus on the morality of drug use, we should consider that Thomas Szasz is correct
when he argues that the war on drugs is essentially a religious war: a
war about ultimate values. 2 Our past wars of religion were resolved
only when freedom of religion was declared. The solution to the drug
war is to declare the "right to self-medication."
(3) As a corollary to the previous point, prohibitionists must answer the following question: why should some dangerous drugs be
banned, when others are not, and when other forms of self-destructive behavior are not? The narrow focus on certain illegal drugs
which happen to be associated with minority races and religions,6"
seems to suggest that the Szaszian view of prohibition is correct: that
the drug war is fundamentally a religious war.
(4) Prohibitionists emphasize the addictive nature of illegal
drugs, but at the same time argue that law enforcement will dissuade people from trying or repeatedly using drugs. That is, prohibitionists believe that in general, people are not reasonable enough or
strong-willed enough to avoid being seduced by drugs, but at the
same time, they believe that people will make a rational cost-benefit
decision to avoid illegal drugs because of the penalties involved, or
because of the high price. To so argue compels one to admit that
illegal drugs may not be so addictive after all.
58. The contradictions and inconsistencies in the case for legalization will have to be
addressed by another author.
59. See infra notes 195-204 and accompanying text (discussing street crimes, including
murder, committed by addicts).
60. See infra notes 213-28 and accompanying text (discussing drug related AIDS infection, which causes drugs to become more dangerous).
61. Conscious-altering drugs include, for example, alcohol, cocaine, marijuana, tobacco,
valium, caffeine, and heroin. See generally The Morality of Drug Controls, in DEALING WITH
DRUG, supra note 17, at 327 (discussing the pros and cons of characterizing drug use as a

moral issue).
62. T. SZASZ, CEREMONIAL CHEMISTRY x-xii (1985).
63. See, e.g., E. BRECHER, supra note 28, at 42-46 (arguing that the prohibition against
opium started in San Francisco and was directed against the Chinese).
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(5) Prohibitionists simultaneously argue that (a) drugs are
great, and (b) drugs are terrible. That is, drugs make you feel great,
but after a while, they make you feel terrible. Given the well known
tolerance and withdrawal syndrome, 4 there is certainly some truth
to this scenario. However, there is still an inconsistency, since if
drugs eventually make you feel terrible, there is reason to doubt that
large numbers of people will use them repeatedly.6 5 There is reason
to doubt the necessity of law enforcement if the satisfaction derived
from drug use eventually subsides. In sum, drug tolerance and withdrawal serve as a natural check on drug abuse.
H. Limitations of the Cost-Benefit Approach
The problem with all forms of cost-benefit and utilitarian analysis is that no ethical, economic or mathematical mechanism exists
which would allow social costs and benefits to be measured and
weighed. 6 Harm, value, cost, and happiness are subjective concepts
pertaining to purely mental phenomena. These phenomena are not
subject to any objective interpersonal measurement or mathematical
7
calculation.
This thesis can be confirmed by examining the methods used to
resolve two public policy controversies: abortion and the minimum
wage. Each controversy was decided by an institution with ample
financial resources and access to some of the finest analytical minds
in the country-the Supreme Court in the case of abortion, and the
Congress in the case of the minimum wage. Presumably, if a method
existed to resolve conflicts of interest (abortion) or to weigh social
costs (minimum wage), we would have seen this method used in
these cases.
1. Minimum wage.- A very brief summary of the minimum
64. See, e.g., E. BRECHER, supra note 28, at 65 (noting that "an addicting drug is one
that produces both withdrawal symptoms and tolerance.").

65. See Murphy, Reinarman & Waldorf, An Il-Year Follow-Up of a Network of Cocaine Users, 84 BRIT. J. ADDICTION 427 (1989) (discussing a study which found that "addic-

tion is not a uniform outcome of sustained use and that long-term controlled use is possible.").
There is evidence that the desire of cocaine users to continue to use cocaine moderately and

pleasurably is a strong deterrent to heavy cocaine use, which very quickly turns cocaine use
into an unpleasant experience. Id. at 432-33.
66.

M. ROTHBARD, TOWARD A RECONSTRUCTION OF UTILITY AND WELFARE ECONOI-

ICs 9 (1977).

67. Id. "Psychological magnitudes cannot be measured since there is no objectively extensive unit-a necessary requisite of measurement. Further, actual choice obviously cannot
demonstrate any form of measurable utility; it can only demonstrate one alternative being
preferred to another." Id.
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wage debate is as follows:
(a) pro-increase-many people who receive the minimum
wage have families to support; they desire and "need" more
money.
(b) anti-increase-theminimum wage would reduce the total
number of people employed; the least skilled workers would be hurt
the most.
Those in favor of an increase in the minimum wage offer no
proof that the desire of some for more money outweighs the desire of
others not to lose their jobs.6" Those in opposition to an increase offer
no proof that the desire of some people for more money was outweighed by the desire of others to be employed at all.
2. Abortion.- In Roe v. Wade, Justice Blackmun stated that
"our task ... is to resolve the issue by constitutional measurement,
free of emotion and of predilection. '6 9 As a first premise in his argument, Justice Blackmun rejected the argument that a "woman's
right [to privacy] is absolute. 7 0 Thus, the Court was required to
balance the woman's right to privacy against "important state interests in regulation." 7 1 It turns out that the Court's use of the word
measurement was purely metaphorical. Nowhere in the majority decision is there even an attempt to define a method of measuring or
weighing rights or interests, nor are there any citations in that
direction.
The actual method of the Court is to discuss, sometimes in great
detail, the nature of the competing interests and the various factors
involved; then to simply announce which interest will prevail. How
these interests are weighed and measured is not discernable to the
reader. The best guidance the Court offers is statements such as: "At
some point in pregnancy, [the state's] interests become sufficiently
compelling to sustain regulation of the factors that govern the abortion decision, 72 and "it is reasonable and appropriatefor a State to
decide that at some point in time another interest, that of ...poten73
tial human life, becomes significantly involved."
In spite of the (extreme) limitations of cost-benefit analysis, it

68.

Rosenbaum, Bush and Congress Reach Accord Raising Minimum Wage to $4.25,

N.Y. Times, Nov. 1, 1989, A22, at col. 1.
69.

410 U.S. 113, 116 (1973) (emphasis added).

70.
71.
72.
73.

Id. at 153.
Id. at 154.
Id. (emphasis added).
Id. at 159 (emphasis added).
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is, nevertheless, utilized to argue for legalization for the following
reasons:
(1) to persuade those who reject a rights approach;
(2) to check the correctness of the rights approach (we are not
omniscient); and
(3) to show the unity of theory and practice between abstract
rights and real world events. 7 '
In the cost-benefit analysis in Part III, the argument is put forth
that prohibition kills more people than it saves, costs more dollars
than it saves, and causes all sorts of problems not amenable to mathematical calculation.7 5 There can be no attempt to combine these
factors into a grand formula because no such formula exists.
II. THE MORAL ARGUMENT FOR LEGALIZATION
In addition to the argument that prohibition causes more harm
than it prevents, legalization is also justifiable on the grounds that
individuals have the right to control their own lives and bodies and
thus the right to ingest mood- and mind-altering chemical substances. 76 As Thomas Szasz wrote:
I believe that we also have a right to eat, drink or inject a substance-any substance-not because we are sick and want it to
cure us, nor because a government-supported medical authority
claims that it will be good for us, but simply because we want to
take it; because the government-as our servant rather than our
master-hasn't the right to meddle in our private dietary and drug
affairs.77
It should be stressed that what is asserted here is not simply a
narrow right to use drugs, but a generalized right of self-determination; a right to engage in any action which is peaceful; which does
not deprive others of their right to free action. The right to use and
sell drugs is simply one aspect of the general right to freedom.
It is not asserted here that the general right to freedom of control over one's own life is to be found in the United States Constitu74. See infra note 161 and accompanying text.

75. See infra notes 155-350 and accompanying text.
76. This section of the Article will not explicity rebut the prohibitionist position on the
morality of drug use. Rather, the Article will assume arguendo that the use of illegal drugs

may be considered immoral, but will argue that the state does not have the right to enforce
this moral principle.
77. T. SZAsZ,
EVENTS

THE THERAPEUTIC STATE: PSYCHIATRY IN THE MIRROR OF CURRENT

271 (1984).
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tion. 78 The Supreme Court has implicitly rejected such a view.7 9 It is
not a legal right, but a moral right. It is a right which exists regardless of whether or not it is recognized in various legal codes and
constitutions. Rather, it is to such rights that the drafters of constitutions and legal codes should refer. It is such rights which serve as
the basis for criticizing the legal acts of governments which are alleged to violate the rights of individuals. Such rights are referred to
as "natural rights" because they are usually justified by reference to
the nature of man or the natural state of man, and are to be distinguished from "positive rights" which are those rights actually recognized in legal codes and constitutions.
The doctrine of natural human rights, as formulated by John
Locke and other philosophers,"0 was influential in eighteenth century
America and was adopted by Thomas Jefferson in the Declaration of
Independence:
We hold these truths to be self-evident, that all men are created
equal, that they are endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable Rights, that among these are Life, Liberty, and the pursuit of
Happiness. 1
The doctrine of natural rights subsequently came under attack
from a variety of sources including the Humean fact-value dichotomy.8 2 In a now famous remark, Jeremy Bentham, the great Utilitarian theorist, called natural law "nonsense on stilts."'8 3 But natural
law theory has tremendous resiliency. It seems to possess something
of the character of an axiom since its opponents tend to smuggle
natural law concepts, such as human nature, back into their own
theories. This tendency led Heinrich Rommen, paraphrasing French
philosopher Etienne Gilson, to remark, "[t]he Natural Law always
buries its undertakers." 84
78. But see id. (noting that a constitutional amendment was necessary to outlaw drinking, and suggesting that the ingestion of drugs could also be considered a constitutional right).
79. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 154 (1973) (stating that "[the Court has refused
to recognize an unlimited right [to do with one's body as one pleases] .... "). There is no
intent here to deny that intelligent legal arguments for a right to self-medication can be made.
80. B. BAILYN, THE IDEOLOGICAL ORIGINS OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION 26-31
(1967).
81. The Declaration of Independence, para. 2 (U.S. 1776).
82. D. Hume, A Treatise of Human Nature 469 (L.A. Selby-Bigge ed. 1988).
83. J. BENTHAM, ANARCHICAL FALLACIES 489, 501 (1962).
84. H. ROMMEN, THE NATURAL LAW 267 (1947).
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A. Individual Rights Theories
In this section, two contemporary theories of human rights are
discussed which provide a moral basis for the policy of drug legalization. Douglas Rasmussen, building on theories of Aristotle and novelist-philosopher Ayn Rand, constructs an argument for libertarian
natural rights.85 Hans-Hermann Hoppe, an economist and philosopher, develops a non-natural law rights doctrine utilizing a neoKantian method of a priori reasoning. 86 Interestingly, Hoppe concedes that it is not "impossible to interpret my approach as falling in
' and Rasmussen ada 'rightly conceived' natural rights tradition," 87
mits that his method of deriving rights "has been called 'transcendental' because of Kant's arguments about 'what is necessary for the
possibility of experience." 88
1. Douglas Rasmussen.- Douglas Rasmussen has developed a
rigorous argument for a natural human right to liberty. His first premise is that "life of the sort of thing a human being is-man's life
qua man-[is] the ultimate moral value, the summum bonum."89
Proving this premise relies on the technique of axiomatic demonstration. 90 This involves a showing that all persons who deny its truth are
engaging in self-contradiction.91 Rasmussen believes that just as Aristotle's principle of non-contradiction can be justified "by showing it
to be necessary not only for the very possibility of its being denied,
but even for the denier's thought, speech and action," so the first
premise of natural law can be defended. 2
Rasmussen argues that every human choice contains within it
an implicit choice to value one's own life.93 Since "to be a living
85.

See generally Rasmussen, A Groundworkfor Rights: Man's Natural End, 4 J. LIB-

65 (1980); see also T. R. MACHAN, INDIVIDUALS AND THEIR RIGHTS
(1989) (espousing a theory of neo-Aristotelian rights); M.N. ROTHBARD, THE ETHICS OF LIBERTY (1982); H. VEATCH, HUMAN RIGHTS (1985); Mack, Egoism and Rights Revisited, PERSONALIST (July 1977).
ERTARIAN STUDIES

86. See generally Hoppe, From the Economics of Laisser-Faireto Libertarian Ethics,
in MAN. ECONOMY, AND LIBERTY: ESSAYS IN HONOR OF MURRY N. ROTHBARD 56 (1988). For
other neo-Kantian rights theorists, see A. GEWIRTH, REASON AND MORALITY (1978); Pilon,
Ordering Rights Consistently: On What We Do and Do Not Have Rights To, 13 GA. L. REV.

117 (1979).
87.
88.
89.

Hoppe, supra note 86, at 58.
Rasmussen, supra note 85, at 67.
Id. at 73. This has traditionally been referred to as "man's natural end." Id.

90. Id. at 67.
91.

Id. at 74.

92. Id. at 67.
93.

Rasmussen, supra note 85, at 73.
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thing and not be a particular sort of living thing is impossible," this
implicit choice to value one's life is actually a choice to value one's
life as the type of living thing one is.94 Rasmussen summarized his
argument as follows:
Insofar as one chooses [values], regardless of the choice ... one
must choose [value] man's life qua man. It makes no sense to value
some Y without also valuing that which makes the valuing of Y
possible ... it is a category mistake-a type of contradiction-to
hold something as a value ... and at the same time ask why one
should live in accord with his nature. 'Man's life qua man' is the
end at which all human action implicitly aims; and insofar as one
chooses, one values this ultimate end. The very asking of the question, 'Why should I live in accord with my nature?', is a choice, a
valuation, that demands that one already accept this ultimate value
....[N]ot only does the mere acceptance of end-oriented behavior
require the acceptance of an ultimate end; the mere acting for
some end requires the acceptance of an ultimate end, which in the
case of chosen ends is man's life qua man."
Having established that man's life qua man is the ultimate
moral value, Rasmussen develops his complete argument for the
right to liberty as follows:
A human being is that kind of living being which can be designated
as a rational animal . . . .Thus, life as a rational animal is the
ultimate value for each person ....A rational animal is an animal
whose mode of consciousness is characterized by the use of concepts, viz., conceptual awareness is the way man is differentiated
from the other animals . . . .Thus, conceptual awareness must
characterize one who lives as a rational animal, and one only lives
as a rational animal in so far as one engages in conceptual activity.
Conceptual awareness is a peculiarly human form of existence ....
The conceptual mode of cognitive contact with reality is man's only
means of determining how to deal with reality so as to sustain his
own existence ....Actions taken in accord with judgments of how
to deal with reality are man's only means of dealing with reality so
as to sustain his own existence . . . .Thus, living as a rational
animal means, minimally, acting in accordance with one's own conceptual judgments ....Conceptual awareness is not automatic. It
must be initiated and sustained by a constant act of volition on the
part of the person. Conceptual awareness cannot exist save through
94. Id.
95. Id. at 74.
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the person's choice to engage in such a mode of awareness.

6

Since a rational animal must act in accordance with his or her
own conceptual judgments, "a precondition for living the life of a
rational animal is that within any given context one be free from
interference upon acting according to one's judgment."97 Since
man's life qua man is the ultimate value and one must be free to act
on one's own judgment, anything which threatens the precondition
for living the life of a rational animal is of ultimate disvalue. In a
social context, the initiation of physical force (and by extension the
threat thereof) by one man against another serves to destroy the precondition of living the life of a rational animal, since acting upon
one's judgment becomes impossible. Thus, the initiation of physical
force is an ultimate disvalue.9 a That is, one ought not to initiate
physical force against another human being.
"'Rights' is a moral concept determining the limits or boundaries of human interaction. Thus, one has no right to initiate the use
of physical force against another human being." Because the initiation of force is the ultimate disvalue, the right of the individual to be
free from such force is "the ultimate social principle. Thus, no other
social principle or other rights can include the initiation of physical
force as their means of being exercised." 99
2. Hans-Hermann Hoppe.- Hans-Hermann Hoppe has developed an argument for individual rights which does not draw upon
natural rights or natural law theory. 100 He thus seeks to avoid using
the disputed concept of human nature as a premise in his argument.
Instead, he relies upon a form of extreme a priori reasoning analogous to that used by the Austrian economists Rothbard and von
Mises. 101 Instead of formulating hypotheses and then testing them
against empirical evidence, he takes seemingly innocuous but unde96.

Rasmussen, Essentialism, Values and Rights: The Objectivist Case for the Free
THE LIBERTARIAN READER 49-50 (T. Machen ed. 1982); see also Den Uyl &
Rasmussen, Nozick on the Randian Argument, in THE PERSONALIST 193 (1978) (discussing
the arguments as they relate to the writings of Ayn Rand).
97. Rasmussen, supra note 96, at 50.
98. Id.

Society, in

99. Id.
100. H. HOPPE, FROM THE ECONOMICS OF LAISSEZ-FAIRE TO LIBERTARIAN ETHICS 12734 (1988).
101. See generally L. VON MISES, HUMAN ACTION: A TREATISE ON ECONOMICS (1949)
(predicting the downfall of socialist economies); M.N. ROTHBARD. MAN, ECONOMY & STATE:
A TREATISE ON ACTION ECONOMIC PRINCIPLES (2d ed. 1970).
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niable concepts and deduces from them some startling conclusions."0 2
Hoppe begins his argument by analyzing the notion of ethical
subjectivism-that a rational ethics or rights theory is impossible.
Hoppe argues that even this proposition contains an implicit premise.
A person who denies that a rational ethics is possible, is at the very
least committed to the proposition that "the question of whether or
not normative statements are cognitive ones is itself a cognitive problem." 10 Reason may not be able to establish a rational ethic, but it
is able to determine whether a rational ethic is possible. If it is not
subjectivism
able to so determine, then the explicit premise of ethical
10 4
ceases to exist as an "arguable intellectual position.5
The above argument illustrates that "any truth claim-the
claim connected with any proposition that it is true, objective or
valid ... is and must be raised and decided upon in the course of an
argumentation."10 5 Hoppe's next premise is known as "the a priori of
communication and argumentation.'510 6 This principle states that
"everyone knows what it means to claim something to be true (one
cannot deny this statement without claiming its negation to be
true).
As argumentation is an axiom in Hoppe's system, his next task
is to make "explicit what is already implied in the concept of argumentation itself."' 0 8 Hoppe points out four such implications:
(1) "As it is implied in argumentation that everyone who can
understand an argument must in principle be able to be convinced
of it simply because of its argumentative force, the universalization
principle of ethics can now be understood and explained as
grounded in the wider 'a priori of communication and
argumentation.' ,1o1
(2) Argumentation is a practical affair." 0
(3) "[A]rgumentation, as a form of action, implies the use of
the scarce resources of one's body.""'
102. M.N.
19-22 (1979).
103.

ROTHBARD, INDIVIDUALISM AND THE PHILOSOPHY OF THE SOCIAL SCIENCES,

H. HOPPE, A THEORY OF SOCIALISM AND CAPITALISM: ECONOMICS, POLITICS, AND

ETHICS 130 (1989).

104. Id. at 131.
105.

Id. at 130. Hoppe also notes that one cannot argue that one cannot argue. Id.

106.
107.
108.
109.
110.
111.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 131.
Id. at 130 (emphasis added).
Id. at 132.
Id.
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(4) "[A] rgumentation is a conflict-free way of interacting ...
a mutual recognition of each person's exclusive control over his
own body must be presupposed as long as there is
argumentation." ' 2
Hoppe summarizes the complete argument as follows:
Whenever a person claims that some statement can be justified, he
at least implicitly assumes the following norm to be justified: "Nobody has the right to uninvitedly aggress against the body of any
other person and thus delimit or restrict anyone's control over his
own body." This rule is implied in the concept of justification as
argumentative justification. Justifying means justifying without
having to rely on coercion. In fact, if one formulates the opposite of
this rule, i.e., "everybody has the right to uninvitedly aggress
against other people" . . . then it is easy to see that this rule is not,
and never could be, defended in argumentation. To do so would in
fact have to presuppose the validity of precisely its opposite, i.e.,
113
the aforementioned principle of non-aggression.
B.

Rights Theory Applied

Rasmussen and Hoppe have each argued for a large measure of
individual autonomy or liberty. Each holds that individuals have a
moral right to control their own minds and bodies. To Rasmussen
and Hoppe, such a right is general and applies to all aspects of social
and economic life. Each believes that individuals have the right to be
free from aggression from others, including state officials, when engaging in non-violent action, even if such action would be considered
immoral by each theorist, and even if the purposes behind such aggression would be laudable if achieved by non-violent means.
Since drug prohibition involves the initiation of physical force
against persons engaging in peaceful drug transactions to promote
their own good and that of the community, drug prohibition is contrary to the moral rights of individuals. Therefore, pursuant to Rasmussen's and Hoppe's views, prohibition violates the individual's
right to be free from the initiation of force and aggression.
C.

Is Drug Use an Exception to Rights?
The argument that drug use should be an exception to individ112. Id.
113. Id. at 133. Having argued for a principle of individual self-ownership, Hoppe continues on to deduce a theory of private property rights. Id. at 133-34. However, for the purposes of this article, his theory of self-ownership suffices.
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ual rights because it undercuts the very rationality that is the basis
for those rights must fail. First, many things, such as alcohol, music,
gambling, television, sex, astrology, and trashy magazines, are perfectly legal yet can undercut human rationality. Any strong emotional stimulus can discourage the full use of reason-including antidrug fanaticism. The full extension of such an argument would pave
the way for totalitarian control of all behavior which produces strong
emotions.
Second, the argument only works when it assumes that a person
is already under the influence of a drug. Surely, even prohibitionists
would admit that the initial choice to use a drug would not be influenced by the effect of the drug to be used.
Finally, the argument does not hold even for those who have
tried illegal drugs. For example, most of the people who have tried
cocaine have stopped using it,"14 most of the people who use it regularly never become addicted to it, 1" and large numbers of people
who become addicted to it succeed in returning either to controlled
use or to complete abstention without the need for treatment." 6
That even hard-core drug users are amenable to rational persuasion
is confirmed by the fact that much of what goes on in drug treatment centers today amounts to attempts at rational persuasion.
D. PaternalismRejected
The individual rights theories outlined above preclude any notion of paternalism, the philosophical bulwark of prohibition. Paternalism is the use of force against persons for their own alleged good.
In natural rights terms, it is precisely force which prevents persons
from achieving their own good. As Henry Veatch wrote:
[N]o human being ever attains his natural end or perfection save
by his own personal effort and exertion. No one other than the
human individual-no agency of society, of family, of friends, or of
whatever can make or determine or program an individual to be a
good man, or program him to live the life that a human being
ought to live. Instead, attaining one's natural end as a human person is nothing if not a 'do-it-yourself job.11
114.

See infra notes 319-20 and accompanying text (finding that most people who tried

cocaine stopped using it).
115.

See, e.g., Murphy, Reiflarman & Waldorf, supra note 65, at 47; infra notes 321

and accompanying text.
116.

See Murphy, Reinarman & Waldorf supra note 65 (presenting evidence of such

control with cocaine).
117. H.B. VEATCH,

HUMAN RIGHTS: FACT OR FANCY? 84 (1985).
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Murray Rothbard continues the argument:
By forcing [people] to [do good], we are taking them out of the
realm of action and into mere motion, and we are depriving all
these coerced persons of the very possibility of acting morally. By
attempting to compel virtue, we eliminate its possibility.,,"
So paternalism must fail in its mission to make people better. It
merely restricts "the opportunity for vice which simultaneously restricts the opportunity for virtue. In the end such efforts promote not
moral excellence, but a drab form of moral mediocrity and
conformity."' 119
Of particular importance in this context is Veatch's argument
that the state cannot compel an individual to be a good man because
human rights "are no less the necessary means to his reforming himself than they are the necessary means to his making something of
himself in the first place." 20
No price is too high to pay for freedom properly understood as
the right to dispose of one's own life as one pleases, which implies
the duty not to interfere with the equal right of others to do the
same. Since a proper human life must involve choice and the exercise of reason, life is empty and meaningless without freedom. It
may be a bad thing for people to smoke tobacco and a good thing for
people to choose not to smoke tobacco, but being forced not to smoke
tobacco has no moral significance for the individual since moral
choice and value require freedom. A person forced not to smoke is
simply an object being acted upon by outside forces, not a moral
agent.
Finally, another effect of paternalism is to make some people-the morality enforcers-more powerful, and therefore, as Lord
Acton argued, more corrupt.'2 1 In the context of drug enforcement,
the resulting corruption is not only financial, but moral as well. 2 2
118.

Rothbard, Frank S. Meyer: The Fusionist as LibertarianManque, in FREEDOM
DEBATE 93 (G. Carey ed. 1984).
119. Den Uyl, Freedom and Virtue Revisited, in MAN, ECONOMY, AND LIBERTY: ESSAYS
IN HONOR OF MURRAY N. ROTHBARD 202 (W.Block and L. Rockwell, Jr., eds. 1988).
120. Id. at 206.
121. Letter from Lord Acton, editor of THE ENGLISH HISTORICAL REVIEW, to Mandell
Creighton (Apr. 3, 1887) reprinted in G. HIMMELFARB, ESSAYS ON FREEDOM AND POWER 264
AND VIRTUE, THE CONSERVATIVE/LIBERTARIAN

(1948).
122.

Hoppe offered a fascinating economic explanation of how prohibition encourages

moral corruption:
[Violation of the right of self-ownership] implies a change in the social structure, a
change in the composition of society with respect to personalty or character types.
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The Moral Argument From Consequences to Third Parties

It has been previously'argued that each person has a moral
right of self-ownership or liberty. 12 3 It follows that it is wrong to use
force against a person to advance that person's alleged good. However, can we morally use force against a person 'to prevent that person from harming others? If the concept of "harm" is defined as acts
of violence, fraud, property destruction or theft, the answer is yes. It
is right to use force to prevent these acts because each act infringes
on another's right of self-ownership (this right includes the right to
own property produced by one's own labor). 24
A prohibitionist will not be satisfied with existing tort and criminal law to prevent and punish a drug user for any actual harm
caused to other persons or property. The prohibitionist will argue
that it is right to use force to prevent drug users from possibly
harming others. The prohibitionist will want to expand the concept
of harm to include not only positive harmful acts to third parties, but
also negative acts in which a person fails to fulfill alleged duties to
third parties.
This argument faces numerous obstacles. First, it assumes that
drug use, as opposed to personality and other factors, is a major
cause of harmful conduct. However, it is difficult to prove this causal
relationship. 12 5 Second, the rights of all drug users not be infringed
solely because prohibition might prevent some drug users from causing harm to third parties, when such harm is already unlawful?
Third, why is it so morally imperative to prevent heroin, cocaine, and
marijuana users from harming third parties when no one is calling
Abandoning the natural theory of property implies a redistribution of income. The
psychic income of persons in their capacity as users of their "own" natural body, as
persons expressing themselves in this body and deriving satisfaction from doing so,
is reduced at the expense of an increase in the psychic income of persons in their
capacity as invaders of other people's bodies. It has become relatively more difficult
and costly to derive satisfaction from using one's own body without invading that of
others, and relatively less difficult and costly to gain satisfaction by using other people's bodies for one's own purposes. . . . The redistribution of chances for income
acquisition must result in more people using aggression to gain personal satisfaction
and/or more people becoming more aggressive, i.e., shifting increasingly from
nonaggressive to aggressive roles, and, slowly changing their personalities as a con-

sequence of this, [resulting in a] change in the character structure, in the moral
composition of society.
H. HOPPE, supra note 100, at 16-17.
123. See supra notes 89-122 and accompanying text.
124. M.N. ROTHBARD, supra note 85, at 29-34 (discussing "Crusoe Economics").
125. See supra note 56 and accompanying text.
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for the prohibition of alcohol, the worst of all third-party harmful
drugs. 2 6 Fourth, to the extent that the argument from third-party
consequences involves the alleged lost productivity of drug users, the
argument fails. Since each person has a moral right of self-ownership, this implies that he owes society no level of production whatsoever. A person who owes third parties a non-contractual duty to produce is commonly called a slave. The specific contractual and quasicontractual (e.g., child support) duties a person owes should be enforced in the usual ways regardless of the reason for the failure to
fulfill such duties, one possible cause being heavy drug use. Finally,
any third party harm caused by illegal drug use today is dwarfed by
the third party harm caused by illegal drug laws. 27 Thus, the moral
argument from third-party consequences actually runs in favor of legalization and not against it.
F. The Consequences of Rights Violations
Not only does prohibition violate rights in an abstract sense, but
this violation has real world consequences. This should surprise no
one. No serious theorist of rights, from Aristotle to Thomas Aquinas
to Locke to Henry Veatch ever viewed the promulgation of rights
doctrines to be a mere academic exercise. Rather, they viewed rights
as a necessary condition of human success in everyday life.'2 8
1. Impact on the individual.- The violation of rights has a serious impact on the lives of those persons whose rights are 'violated.
When rights are violated, when an individual is forced not to engage
in actions he would otherwise engage in, he suffers a loss of control
over his own life. That is, he is no longer acting according to his own
judgment, but he is simply the tool for the achievement of goals formulated by others who have neglected to persuade him of the value
of those goals. Since he has, been taken "out of the realm of action
and into mere motion,"' 1 9 we may say that he has been stripped of
his very humanity.
Prohibition also harms the individual by depriving him of the
opportunity of facing a challenge and overcoming it and learning
126. See sources cited supra note 10.
127. See supra text accompanying notes 155-292 (providing the cost-benefit analysis of
these harms).
128. See infra notes 269-92 and accompanying text (analyzing the specific practical
consequences drug policies which violate rights). This section of the Article will discuss the
consequences of rights violations in more general terms.
129. Rothbard, supra note 118, at 93.
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more about himself and the world in the process. People who have
confronted drugs and dealt with them on their own have reached a
higher state of self-knowledge and discipline than those who were
protected from them by the state.
Ironically, a major impact of prohibition is to reduce individual
responsibility. The common assertion that freedom requires responsibility is misleading. It is responsibility that requires freedom. One
cannot be responsible for things beyond one's control. Whenever the
state takes over a part of one's life, as it does by punishing drug use,
there is a corresponding loss of responsibility, that is, a reduction in
the time and energy a person spends on developing the skills and
disciplines ("human capital") formerly needed to cope with that aspect of life now controlled by the state.130 In short, as the state
grows, the individual shrinks. 131
Hoppe puts an economic spin on a seemingly moral phenomenon. "The abolition of private ownership of one's body ... [causes] a
reduction in the amount of human capital." 13 2 Since a person "can
no longer decide on his own, undisturbed by others, to what uses to
put his body, the value attached to it by him is now lower." Since
the costs of achieving goals remain the same:
the natural owner is faced with a situation in which the costs of
action must be reduced in order to bring them back into line with
the reduced expected income .... There is only one way left to do

this: by shortening the waiting time, reducing the disutility of waiting, and choosing a course of action that promises earlier returns.
Thus, the introduction of aggressively founded ownership leads to a
tendency to
reduce investment decisions and favors consumption
33
decisions.1
2. Cost-Benefit Quagmire.- Randy Barnett argued that rejection of a rights-based approach to policy necessitates reliance upon
"ad hoc arguments about the exigencies of particular policies" and
"an endless series of explicit cost-benefit analyses." 3 4 As we have
seen, the cost-benefit approach has methodological limitations. 3 5 To
130. H. HoPPE, supra note 100, at 49.
131. Id. Hoppe puts an economic spin on a seemingly moral phenomenon. "The abolition of private ownership of one's body . . . [causes] a reduction in the amount of human
capital." Id. at 15.
132. Id. at 15.
133. Id.
134. Barnett, supra note 41, at 99.
135. See supra text accompanying notes 14-75.
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these limitations, Barnett adds two further arguments: "policy mak-

ers suffer from a pervasive ignorance of consequences" 136 and are
often influenced by considerations of self-interest. 137 Barnett writes:
"To minimize decisions made in ignorance or out of self-interest, legal policy makers must somehow be constrained. And the most practical way to constrain them is to craft general principles and
individual rights that rests
rules-laws-reflecting a conception of
138
on fundamental principles of justice.1
Both elements of Barnett's thesis are exemplified by the drugrelated AIDS crisis. In spite of the existence of substantial evidence
that prohibition caused the drug-related AIDS crisis, 139 there is no
official recognition of this fact. Thus, tragically, nothing has been
done to repeal the laws which caused the problem in the first place.
The first problem was ignorance. Although by 1987, evidence of
the cause of drug-related AIDS existed, it was unknown to almost

everyone. The staff of the National Institute on Drug Abuse
(NIDA) in Spring 1987 conducted a telephone survey of state drug
officials concerning the rate of infection. among intravenous drug
users in each state. 140 The data collected by NIDA indicated that in
those states which make it a crime to sell clean needles, 31 percent
of drug users had the AIDS virus,' while in states where the sale of
needles is allowed, only 5 percent were infected. 42 In states such as
136. Barnett, supra note 41, at 99.
137. Id.
138. Id. (emphasis in original).
139. See On Drug Related AIDS and the Legal Ban on Over the Counter Hypodermic
Needles, A REPORT OF THE NEW YORK COUNTY LAWYERS ASSOCIATION 2-4 (Jan. 12, 1988)
[hereinafter Drug Related AIDS]. Substantial evidence exists linking the ban on over-thecounter sales of hyperdermic needles with the contraction of AIDS through intravenous drug
use. See id; see also Note, Standardsof Conduct, Multiple Defendants, and Full Recovery of
Damages in Tort Liability for the Transmission of Human Immunodeficiency Virus, 18 HOsTRA L. REv. 37, 46 n. 43 (1989) (discussing the impact of intravenous drug use on the spread
of AIDS) (authored by Richard C. Shoenstein).
140. Portions of the results of this survey are published in Drug Related AIDS, supra
note 139, at 9-10. For reasons unknown to the author, this study was not published by NIDA
and NIDA at that time had no plans to publish it. While the entire nation was struggling to
find ways to deal with the drug-related AIDS crisis, the most important cost-benefit evidence
demonstrating the failure of current policy was lying on the desk of a NIDA staff member.
141. DrugRelate AIDS, supra note 139, at 9. The states which ban the non-prescription
sale of hypodermic needles which were included in the survey were: California, Connecticut,
Delaware, District of Columbia, Illinois, Massachusetts, New Jersey, New York, and Pennsylvania. Id.
142. Id. at 10. The states which allow the non-prescription sale of hyperdermic needles
which were included in the survey were: Colorado, Florida, Georgia, Indiana, Maryland,
Michigan, Ohio, Texas, and Wisconsin. Id.
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New York, where drug-related AIDS proliferates, over-the-counter
sales of clean hypodermic needles are illegal as is their mere possession. This is why drug users obtain their needles at "shooting galleries" where dirty needles are passed around to save a few dollars.
Additionally, the study noted that "the rate of intravenous drug
use in states which allow over-the-counter needle sales is lower than
in states which ban such sales. In states which ban needle sales,
eight out of one thousand people use intravenous drugs, while in
states which allow needle sales, only four out of one thousand people
use these drugs."' 43
The NIDA study demonstrates that just one piece of prohibitionist legislation-the ban on over-the-counter needle sales-seems
to be responsible for most drug-related AIDS cases. The problem
was that no one knew of the study except the few NIDA employees
who worked on it.
It is at this point that the second prong of Barnett's critique of
ad hoc policy making-self-interest 44-becomes operative. Historian Ronald Hamowy elaborates upon the impact of self-interest on
the drug policy debate:
[T]here are large numbers of people, principally employees of law
enforcement agencies, who have a vested interest in seeing to it
that ever increasing amounts are expended to stamp out the distribution and sale of illicit drugs. These groups are economically dependent on the existence of restrictive drug legislation; and even
though the evidence might point to relaxing or repealing our current laws, their own economic benefit will best be served by supporting comprehensive
legislation and a massive campaign of drug
enforcement. 14 5
In addition to the self-interest of bureaucrats, there is also the selfinterest of politicians, eager to utilize the public's concern over the
drug problem for the purpose of getting publicity and votes, and
gaining approval for greater public spending.1 46 Thomas Szasz described this phenomenon as follows:
The assertion that the War on Drugs is failing, or is not working,
is-in a fundamental sense-false. It is terribly misleading. The
143. See Drug Related AIDS, supra note 139, at 4 (emphasis in original).
144.
145.

See supra notes 134-38 and accompanying text.
Hamowy, supra note 36, at 7.

146. Accordingly, in 1988, Representative Lawrence J. Smith (D., Fla.), described the
drug problem as "a great issue, a great opening for the Democrats." Roberts, Democrats Seek

to Seize Initiative on Drug Issue, N.Y. Times, March 14, 1988, at A17, col. 1.
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War on Drugs is working just fine, thank you. Its primary purpose
is to elect politicians. Hasn't it done wonders for Governor Nelson
Rockefeller and many others? When confronted with social policy,
we must always ask: "Cui bono?" The War on drugs is not supposed to help the addicts, or the people who get mugged by
criminals on the street, or the patients who get AIDS from contaminated blood because selling clean syringes is illegal in America. It
is supposed to help [politicians].""
In spite of clear evidence that drug laws stimulate the spread of
AIDS,148 legislatures in New York and Massachusetts have refused
to allow the sale of clean needles. Two hundred fifty thousand drug
users are already infected and millions more are at risk, and yet very
little is being done. Perhaps legislatures have refused to do anything
because legalizing clean needles would be admitting that the law enforcement approach has not only failed to stop IV drug use, but has
also contributed to a deadly plague among drug users. Perhaps asking drug enforcers to step aside on the issue of legalizing needles
would lead to a slippery slope threatening the entire edifice of drug
prohibition. It is difficult to imagine a motive for the failure to legalize needles other than mere bureaucratic and political self-interest.
3. Impact on rights-violatingpolicy.- Finally, regardless of the
rights of the individual, policies based on rights-violating coercion
face all of the practical obstacles involving the inefficacy of coercion.
The problem here is not that rights are violated, but that those who
use coercion to achieve their goals will only achieve these goals to
the extent that coercion is able to achieve them.
Coercion so often fails to achieve positive social goals because a
human being is not an inert object waiting to be pushed around by
outside forces. A human being has a mind, free will, emotions, and
values. A human being is inner-directed by his values and choices,
not outer-directed by coercion. A human being acts, and must act, in
accordance with his own values and his own judgment. A human
being can be temporarily controlled by another human being with a
gun, but this coercive control breeds resistance. As soon as the gun
disappears, the person will go back to his preferred chosen behavior.
He will do so with a vengeance because there are now two values at
stake--doing what one values and asserting one's right to do what
one values. A person with self-destructive values may be restrained
147. Symposium Proceedings:Roundtable Discussion, 11 NOVA L. REv. 957-58 (1987)
(comments of Thomas Szasz) (emphasis in original).
148. See supra notes 139-43 and accompanying text.
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by a gun for a while, but when the gun disappears, he will return to
his business of self-destruction.
G. The Relation Between Rights and Cost-Benefit Analysis
In the natural law tradition, individual rights are a statement of
the fundamental preconditions for human happiness.149 A human being is by nature a unity of mind and body. 150 As a natural fact, the
human mind controls the actions of the human body. 15 This is the
meaning of the concept of self-ownership.
The natural fact of self-ownership is so fundamental to human
life that it is often overlooked. Efforts to prove the ultimate moral
status of self-ownership-such as Rasmussen's and Hoppe's-can
proceed only by various forms of axiomatic demonstration.1 52 They
demonstrate that the moral norm of self-ownership is implicitly accepted even by those who explicitly reject it.
Not only is self-ownership a natural fact and an ultimate moral
principle, but it is a practical one as well. According to Rasmussen,
"[aictions taken in accord with judgments of how to deal with reality are man's only means of dealing with reality so as to sustain his
own existence.' 53 In Rasmussen's formulation, "judgment" refers to
the mind determining the "actions" of the body. Thus, self-ownership is also a fundamental principle of practical success in life. According to Rasmussen:
[I]t is not possible to separate consequential considerations from
formal considerations when arguing for man's life qua man [selfownership] as the standard of value. It is because life requires certain things for its maintenance that a human being, with no automatic form of knowledge, must use the only tool available to
him-his conceptual ability. The principle of rationality is dictated
by the nature of a human being and the life of the human being
necessitates the adoption of such a principle. Both the consequences
and formal considerations are part of one principle ... and cannot
be considered separately. 15'
149. See Rasmussen, supra note'85, at 49 (stating that "[h]uman excellence cannot be
accomplished ifa person's actions are not his own.").
150.

See Salmon & Berliner, Health Policy Implications of the Holistic Health Move-

ment, 5 J. HEALTH POL'Y & L. 535-36 (1980); see also supra text accompanying note 98
(discussing the Randian argument).
151. M.N. ROTHBARD, supra note 85, at 46.
152. See supra notes 85-116 and accompanying text.

153. Uyl & Rasmussen, supra note 96, at 198 (emphasis added).
154. Id. at 193.
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Since successful human life requires that the right of individual
self-ownership be respected, it can be predicted that when this right
is not respected, human life-in those areas in which rights have
been violated-will be unsuccessful. The following cost-benefit analysis of the specific consequences of rights violations regarding drug
use, confirms this thesis.
III.

THE COST-BENEFIT ANALYSIS

A. Introduction
On Thursday, March 17, 1988, at 10:45 p.m. in the Bronx,
Vernia Brown was killed by stray bullets fired in a dispute over illegal drugs.1 55 The 19-year-old mother of one was not involved in the
dispute, yet her death was a direct consequence of the "war on
drugs."
There can be little doubt that most, if not all, "drug-related
murders" are the result of drug prohibition. The same type of violence came with the eighteenth amendment's ban of alcohol in
1920.151 The murder rate rose with the start of Prohibition, remained high during Prohibition, then declined for eleven consecutive
years when Prohibition ended.157 The rate of assaults with a firearm
rose with Prohibition and declined for ten consecutive years after
Prohibition. 158 In 1933, the last year of Prohibition, there were
12,124 homicides; 7,863 resulted from assaults with firearms and explosives. 159 By 1941 these figures had declined to 8,048 and 4,525
155.

James, Stray Bullet Kills Woman in the Bronx, N.Y. Times, Mar. 19, 1988, at 29,

col. 5.
156.

U.S. CONST. AMEND. XVIII (repealed). Pursuant to this amendment, "the manufac-

ture, sale or transportation of intoxicating liquors within, the importation thereof into, or the
exportation thereof from the United States and all territory subject to the jurisdiction thereof

for beverage purposes is hereby prohibited." Id. § 1.
157.

See

BUREAU OF TIE CENSUS,

U.S.

DEP'T OF COMMERCE, BICENTENNIAL EDITION,

HISTORICAL STATISTICS OF THE UNITED STATES, COLONIAL TIMES TO 1970, PART 1, at 414
(1975) [hereinafter HISTORICAL STATISTICS]. The murder and assault rates had been rising

even before Prohibition. Nevertheless, during Prohibition "[v]iolence was commonplace in establishing exclusive sales territories, in obtaining liquor, or in defending a supply." D.E.
KYvIG, REPEALING NATIONAL PROHIBITION 27 (1979). While there is no comprehensive study
of Prohibition-era violence, it is reported that there were more than 1,000 gangland murders in
New York City alone during prohibition. Id. Another writer estimates that between two and

three thousand people died during law enforcement raids, auto chases, and arrests, casualties
which would not show up in murder statistics. See H. LEE, How DRY WE WERE: PROHIBITION
REVISITED 8 (1963).
158. See HISTORICAL STATISTICS, supra note 157, at 414.
159. Id.
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respectively.1 60

Vernia Brown died because of the policy of drug prohibition.' 61
If her death is a "cost" of that policy, what did the "expenditure" of
her life "buy"? What benefits has society derived from the policy of
prohibition that led to her death? To find the answer, it was necessary to turn to the experts and to the supporters of drug prohibition.
In 1988, I wrote to then-Vice President George Bush, the head
of the South Florida Drug Task Force, then-Education Secretary
William Bennett, Assistant Secretary of State for Drug Policy Ann
Wrobleski, White House drug policy adviser Dr. Donald I. McDonald, and the public information directors of the Federal Bureau of
Investigation, Drug Enforcement Administration, General Accounting Office, National Institute of Justice, and National Institute on
Drug Abuse. None of these officials were able to cite any study that
demonstrated the beneficial effects of drug prohibition when weighed
against its costs.'6 2 The leaders of the war on drugs are apparently
160. Id.
161. It is necessary to distinguish between individual and policy notions of causation.
Individuals act, cause certain results to occur, and are responsible for those results. However,
individuals also act within a context. When social policy changes the context within which
individuals act, resulting in the commission of more murders, it may be said that this policy
caused these murders to occur, without denying that the proximate cause of the murders was
the murderers themselves.
162. On April 1, 1988, each official was requested in writing to supply or cite any study,
regardless of the source, which demonstrated the net benefits of drug prohibition. Additionally,
in lieu of provision of a pro-prohibition study, all officials were provided with a copy of this
author's prior cost-benefit analysis in support of drug legalization. See ADVISORY REPORTs OF
THE COMMITTEE ON LAW REFORM OF THE NEW YORK COUNTY LAWYERS AssoCIATION (August 1987). Comments were also solicited.
The responses were as follows: Vice-President Bush: A spokesman said he did not know of
any study in support of prohibition. Telephone interview with Kevin Cummings, spokesman for
Vice President Bush, (Apr. 29, 1988). Assistant Secretary of Statefor Drug Policy, Ann B.
Wroblewski: "I am not aware of any cost-benefit studies of the type to which you refer."
Letter from Ann Wroblewski, Assistant Secretary of State for Drug Policy, to James Ostrowski (May 2, 1988) (copy on file at Hofstra Law Review). FBI Public Affairs Office: "The FBI
has not conducted research comparing the costs with the benefits of drug prohibition" and the
FBI does not comment on policy studies. Letter from Milt Ahlerich to James Ostrowski (Apr.
18, 1988) (copy on file at Hofstra Law Review). William J. Bennett: Insufficient data exists
for an adequate cost-benefit study of prohibition. Letter from John P. Walters to James Ostrowski (Apr. 21, 1988) (copy on file at Hofstra Law Review). National Institute of Justice: I
was informed by Mr. Glenn Holly that he was not aware of any cost-benefit studies of the
overall effects of prohibition. Telephone conversation with Glenn Holly, National Clearinghouse on Drug and Crime Information, (Apr. 29, 1988). White House Drug Policy Advisor,
Dr. Donald L McDonald: No written reply was received and a detailed phone message was not
returned. Drug Enforcement Administration: No response was received to a letter and detailed
phone message. National Institute on Drug Abuse: No response to letter or phone call was
received. General Accounting Office: The GAO supplied an excellent study, see infra note 225,
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unable to defend on rational cost-benefit grounds their 70-year-old
policy, which costs nearly $10 billion per year,16 3 imprisons nearly
75,000 persons, 6 and fills our cities with violent crime.16 5 It would
seem that Vernia Brown and many others like her have died for
nothing.
Some supporters of drug prohibition claim that its benefits are
undeniable and self-evident. 6 Their main assumption is that without prohibition, drug use would skyrocket with disastrous results.16 7
There is precious little evidence for this commonly held belief. The
few cases of empirical evidence lend little support to the prediction
of soaring drug use. 68 For example, in the Netherlands 69 and
on the results of the Reagan drug enforcement effort, but did not supply or cite any costbenefit studies.
163.

See infra note 232.

164. In 1986, there were 54,674 prisoners in both federal and state prisons for drug
related offenses. See BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, CORRECTIONAL
POPULATIONS IN THE UNITED STATES, 1986 37 (1989) (reporting 38,394 imprisoned for drug
offenses in state prisons); Kerr, War on Drugs Puts Strain on Prisons, U.S. Officials Say,
N.Y. Times, Sept. 25, 1987, at Al, col. 2 (noting that 37 percent of the 44,000 federal prison
inmates, or 16,280, were arrested on drug charges).
165. See infra notes 194-209 and accompanying text (discussing the effect of drug prohibition on crime).
166. See, e.g., Interview with William Bennett, Director of National Drug Control Policy (Cable News Network television broadcast, Dec. 16, 1989); Interview with Carl Rowan,
columnist, Inside Washington (Public Broadcasting System television broadcast, Dec. 16,
1989); cf Legalization of Illicit Drugs: Impact and Feasibility, Part 1, Hearing Before the
House Select Comm. on Narcotics Abuse and Control, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. 2 (1988) [hereinafter Legalization Hearings, Part 1](statement of Charles B. Rangel, stating that the
United States should pursue further the war on drugs which has just begun); id. at 59 (testimony of Edward I. Koch, Mayor, New York City, arguing that it was a mistake to legalize
even liquor); id. at 68 (testimony of Dennis Callahan, Mayor, Annapolis, Maryland, stating
that drug related crime is a crime against youth, future and moral fabric); id. at 70 (testimony
of John Lawn, Administrator, Drug Enforcement Administration, stating that no legalization
should ever be permitted because drugs cause the most damage to society), id. at 73 (testimony of Arthur C. "Cappy" Eads, Chairman of the Board, National District Attorneys Association, saying "drugs are illegal because they are bad."); id. at 74 (testimony of Sterling
Johnson, Special Narcotics Prosecutor, City of New York, stating that legalization is impossible because "lilt is morally, ethically and wrong religiously."); id. at 109 (testimony of Mitchell Rosenthal, M.D., President, Phoenix House, New York, New York, asserting that drug
treatment and not legalization is the-only solution to the drug problem); OFFICE OF NATIONAL
DRUG CONTROL POLICY, NATIONAL DRUG CONTROL STRATEGY, 1 (1989) [hereinafter BENNETT PLAN I] (presenting the statement by William J. Bennett, Director, Office of National
Drug Control Policy, that "[m]ost Americans remain firmly convinced that drugs represent the
gravest present threat to our national well-being.").
167. See, e.g., Legalization Hearings, Part I, supra note 166, at 71 (testimony of John
C. Lawn); id. at 108 (testimony of Mitchell Rosenthal).
168. See A. TREBACH,supra note 17, at 103 (citing a study by Dr. Bernard Segal, director of the Center for Alcohol and Addiction Studies at the University of Alaska, which concluded that "there is no conclusive proof that legalization affected use, since there was no good
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Alaska, 70 two places in the Western world where use of small
amounts of marijuana is legal, the rate of marijuana consumption is
arguably lower than in the continental United States where marijuana is banned.7 In 1982, 6.3 percent of American high school
seniors smoked marijuana daily, but only 4 percent did so in
Alaska. 172 In 1983, 5.5 percent of American high school seniors used
marijuana daily, but in the Netherlands in 1985 only 0.5 percent of
high school seniors used marijuana daily. 17 3 These are not controlled
comparisons; no such comparisons exist. However, the numbers that
are available do not bear out the drastic scenario portrayed by supporters of continued prohibition.
Finally, there is at least some evidence that the "forbidden
fruit" aspects of prohibition may lead to increaseduse of, or experimentation with, drugs, particularly among the young. This phenomenon apparently occurred with marijuana, LSD, and glue-sniffing. 17 4
The case for legalization does not rely on such an argument, but
those who believe prohibition needs no defense should consider this
possibility.
Legalizers and prohibitionists agree that the status quo is intolerable. Change is demanded by all concerned. Yet, we have only two
options: escalate the war on drugs or legalize them. Once we grasp
the consequences of still further escalation, the legalization option
may win by default.
Escalating the war on drugs is doomed to fail. First, past escalations by Richard M. Nixon,'175 Nelson Rockefeller, 7 and Ronald
evidence about the extent of use [in Alaska] before 1975."); infra note 171 and accompanying
text (setting forth the results of the study).
169. See Van Vliet, The Uneasy Decriminalization:A Perspective on Dutch Drug Policy, 18 HOFSTRA L. REV. 717 (1990).
170. ALASKA STAT., § 11.71.070 (1989) (imposing a fine not to exceed $100 for possession of less than an ounce of marijuana in public).
171. A. TREBACH, supra note 17, at 103. Dr. Segal's study found that in 1982, 4 percent
of Alaskan students used marijuana daily, which was lower than the national average of 6.3
percent for that year. Id.
172. Id.
173. Id. at 105. Further, although 4 percent of Dutch youth admitted to ever having
used marijuana, 55 percent have reported that they stopped using it before their nineteenth
birthday. See Ruter, The Pragmatic Dutch Approach to Drug Control: Does It Work
(presented at Drug Policy Forum, sponsored by The Drug Policy Foundation, May 25, 1988)
reprinted in Legalization Hearings, Part I, supra note 166, at 521.
174. See generally, E. BRECHER, supra note 28, at 368-69 (discussing how the publicity
of anti-LSD warnings was partially responsible for the increase in the demand for LSD); id at
321-33 (discussing how the anti-glue-sniffing campaign popularized glue sniffing). ,
175.

See C.

SILBERMAN, CRIMINAL VIOLENCE, CRIMINAL JUSTICE

http://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/hlr/vol18/iss3/5

232-45 (1978) (dis-

38

Ostrowski: The Moral and Practical Case for Drug Legalization

19901

MORAL AND PRACTICAL CASE

Reagan, 1 " have failed.178 Second, there are the seemingly intractable problems of lack of funds, lack of prison space, lack of political
will to put middle class drug users in jail, and the simple impossibility of preventing consenting adults in a free society from engaging in
extremely profitable transactions involving tiny amounts of illegal
drugs.
However, none of these factors ultimately explain why escalating the war on drugs will fail. Failure is guaranteed because the
black market thrives on the war on drugs and benefits from its intensification. At best, intensified law enforcement simply boosts the
black market price of drugs, encouraging more drug suppliers to supply more drugs. The publicized conviction of a drug dealer, which
instantly creates a vacancy in the lucrative drug business, has the
same effect as hanging up a help-wanted sign which says, "Drug
dealer needed-$5,000 a week-exciting work."
While escalating the war on drugs cannot succeed, there is a
real danger that an intensified war on drugs will squander much of
our nation's wealth and freedom and cause enormous social disruption. As of yet, there is no limit in sight to the amount of money and
new enforcement powers that committed advocates of prohibition
17 9
will demand before giving up.
It is instructive to note the parallel between the current debate
over the drug problem and the debate over the alcohol problem in
the twenties and thirties. In the alcohol debate, one side called for
intensified enforcement efforts, while the other called for outright repeal. The prohibitionists won all the battles: enforcement efforts escalated throughout the duration of Prohibition. Convictions under
the National Prohibition Act'8 0 rose from approximately 18,000 in
cussing Richard M. Nixon's efforts after escalating the war on drugs failed).
176. NATIONAL INST. OF LAW ENFORCEMENT & CRIM. JUST., THE NATION'S TOUGHEST
DRUG LAW: EVALUATING THE NEW YORK EXPERIENCE, THE FINAL REPORT OF THE JOINT

COMMITTEE ON NEW YORK DRUG EVALUATION 7 (1978) [hereinafter EVALUATING THE NEW
YORK EXPERIENCE].
177. See A. TREBACH, supra note 17, at 177. According to Trebach, Reagan's South
Florida Task Force resulted in "little objective evidence of bottom-line success produced by the
vast efforts of the many competent enforcement leaders and officers .... "; see also Brinkley,
4-Year Fight in Florida 'Just Can't Stop Drugs, N.Y. Times, Sep. 4, 1986, at Al, col. 2.
(discussing the failure of the South Florida Task Force which was labelled the "the most
ambitious and expensive drug enforcement operation in the nation's history ....
).
178. See also EVALUATING THE NEW YORK EXPERIENCE, supra note 176, at 7.
179.

See, e.g., OFFICE OF NATIONAL DRUG CONTROL POLICY, NAT'L DRUG CONTROL

STRATEGY 7 (1990) [hereinafter BENNETT PLAN II] (proposing that the federal government
spend $10.6 billion in 1991 to fight the war on drugs).
180. National Prohibition Act, ch. 85, 41 Stat. 305 (1919) (repealed 1935).
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1921181 to approximately 61,000 in 1932.182 Prison terms grew
longer and were meted out with greater frequency in the latter years
of Prohibition." aa The enforcement budget rose from $7 million in
1921 to $15 million in 1930.184 The number of stills seized rose from
32,000 in 1920 to nearly 282,000 in 1930.185 In 1926, the Senate
Judiciary Committee produced a 1,650-page report evaluating enforcement efforts and proposing reforms.18 6 In 1927, the Bureau of
Prohibition was created to streamline enforcement efforts, and
agents were brought under civil service protection to eliminate corruption and improve professionalism. 8 7 In 1929, the penalties for violating the National Prohibition Act were increased. 88
Also in 1929, President Hoover appointed a blue-ribbon commission to evaluate enforcement efforts and recommend reforms.
The 1931 Wickersham Commission report, while concluding that
"there is as yet no adequate observance or enforcement," nevertheless urged that:
[A]ppropriations for the enforcement of the Eighteenth Amendment should be substantially increased and that the vigorous and
better organized efforts which have gone on since the Bureau of
Prohibition Act, 1927, should be furthered by certain improvements in the statutes and in the organization, personnel, and equipment of enforcement, so as to give enforcement the greatest practical efficiency." 9
Proponents of legalization won the war. In 1933, two years
later, Prohibition was dead. 190 In light of this history, it should not
be at all surprising that increasing support for drug legalization is
coming at the same time as the war on drugs is intensifying. There is
nothing incongruous about a highly respected big-city mayor, Kurt
Schmoke of Baltimore, Maryland, endorsing legalization' 9 ' at the
181.
182.

1921 ATT'Y GEN. ANN.

REP. 101.
1932 ATT'Y GEN. ANN. REP. 65.

183. See

NATIONAL COMM'N ON LAW OBSERVANCE AND ENFORCEMENT, ENFORCEMENT

OF THE PROHIBITION LAWS, S. Doc. No. 307, 71st Cong., 3d Sess. 144-45 (1931) [hereinafter
REPORT ON ENFORCEMENT].

184.
185.
ting forth
186.
187.
188.

Id. at 18.
Id. at 123; see also 1930 COMM'R OF PROHIBITION ANN. RaP. 110-11 (1930) (setstatistics for 1930).
REPORT ON ENFORCEMENT, supra 183, at 14.
See Act of 1927, ch. 348, 44 Stat. 1381 (repealed 1933).
See National Prohibition Act, ch. 473, 45 Stat. 1446 (1929) (repealed 1935).
189. REPORT ON ENFORCEMENT, supra note 183, at 83.
190. U.S. CONST. amend XXI.
191. See Schmoke, An Argument in Favor of Decriminalization, 18 HOFSTRA L. REV.
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same time that the first "drug czar" is appointed.' 92 Rather, it
means that the nation may be ready for a major change in its policy
toward drugs.
This Article does not suggest that legalization would solve the
drug problem in its entirety. Legalization is offered as a solution only
to the "drug problem problem,"' 193 that is, the problems such as the
crime, corruption, and AIDS caused not by the pharmacological effects of illegal drugs but by the attempt to fight drug use with the
criminal justice system. The repeal of alcohol prohibition provides
the appropriate analogy. Repeal did not end alcoholism-as indeed
Prohibition did not-but it did solve many of the problems created
by Prohibition, such as corruption, murder, and poisoned alcohol.
We can expect no more and no less from drug legalization today.
B. The Costs of Prohibition
"Policies are judged by their consequences but crusades are
judged by how good they make the crusaders feel.' 1 94 So the inquiry
must be, do drug laws cause more harm than good?
1. Street Crime by Drug Users
Drug laws greatly increase the price of illegal drugs, often forcing users to steal to get the money to obtain them. Although difficult
to estimate, the black market prices of heroin and cocaine appear to
be about 50 to 100 times greater than their anticipated market price
under legalization. It is frequently estimated that at least forty percent of all property crime in the United States is committed by drug
users so that they..can maintain their expensive habits. 95 That
501 (1990).

192. See Anti Drug-Abuse Act of 1988, 21 U.S.C. § 1501 (1989); see also Shenon,
Nomineefor 'Drug Czar' Has Tough-Talking Past, N.Y. Times, Jan. 13, 1989, at B17, col. I

(describing Bennett's appointment).
193.

E.

BRECHER,

supra note 28, at 521 (referring to the term coined by Dr. Helen

Nowlis).
194. T. SOWELL, COMPASSION VERSUS GUILT AND OTHER ESSAYS 74 (1987).
195. Estimates of drug-related crime vary widely. Arnold Trebach, summarizing various
surveys, estimated that 50 percent of all burglaries and robberies were drug related in urban
areas. Trebach, The Potential Impact of "Legal" Heroin in America, in DRUGS, CRIME AND

POLITICS 169 (A. Trebach ed. 1978). A Wharton Econometrics survey found that local police
officials believe that drug users commit about 25 percent of auto thefts, 40 percent of robberies

and assaults, and 50 percent of burglaries and larcenies. See G. Godshaw, R. Koppel & R.
Pancoast, Anti-Drug Law Enforcement Efforts and Their Impact 95 (Aug. 1987) (unpublished
study prepared for the U.S. Customs Service on file at the Hofstra Law Review). In 1986,

Assistant Police Chief Isaac Fulwood of Washington, D.C., estimated that 50 to 60 percent of
crime in his city is drug-related. Lewis, U.S. Judge Hails 'Clean Sweep, Wash. Post, Nov. 7,
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amounts to about eight million crimes per year and $6 billion in stolen property.'" 6 In addition, many victims of property crime are
beaten and severely injured; an estimated 1200 are murdered each
197

year.

1986, at BI, col. 4, B7, col 1; see also Terry, Drug Riches of the Capital Luring Poor Youth
Down a Bloody Path, N.Y. Times, Apr. 2, 1989, at 1, col. 1, col. 2 (stating that 36.8 percent
of all homicides committed in New York City in 1988 were drug related); id. at 25, col. 1
(reporting that more than 80 percent of of the 126 people slain in Washington, D.C. in the
early months of 1989 were drug related).
196. In the chart below, the value of property stolen is based on the FBI UNIFORM
CRIME REP.: CRIME IN THE

U.S. (1988). Figures on total crimes are based on victimization

surveys done by the Bureau of Justice Statistics for the year 1985.
Crime
No.(l0OOs)
x 40%
x $$ stolen
robbery
larceny
burglary
car theft

985
13,474
5,594
1,270

394
5,389.6
2,237.6
508

$631
$426
$1,014
$5,117

=

Total (millions)
$248
$2,290
$2,270
$2,600

21,323
8,529.2
n/a
$7,400
Thus, the total number of drug-related property crimes is 8,529,200 and the total value of
property stolen is $7.4 billion. One possible objection to the $7.4 billion figure is that using the
value of property stolen in reported crimes to calculate the value of property stolen in unreported crimes may make the totals questionable since the value of property taken in unreported crimes may be less. To deal with this objection, we can assume that the value of property taken in unreported crimes is only fifty percent of the value of property taken in reported
crimes.
Based on comparing the victimization figures to the FBI reported crime figures, the percentage of crimes unreported are as follows: robbery-54%; larceny-49%; and auto
theft-20%. If we reduce the dollar value of the property stolen in the chart above by fifty
percent for each unreported crime, the new total would still be approximately $6 billion.
197. There were on average 20,640 murders each year from 1979-1988. To determine
the estimated number of murders which result from drug-related property crime, we must
determine how many murders result from property crime and then multiply by the number of
property crimes estimated to be drug-related--40 percent.
9.1 percent of murders resulted from robbery. FBI CRIME REP.: CRIME IN THE U.S. 14
(1988) [hereinafter FBI REP.] (taking average from 1984-1988). 3.6 percent of murders resulted from "other felonies" not specified. Since burglaries are a commonly committed felony
(over five million each year) with a high potential for violence, assume that one-third of "other
felonies" are burglaries. Telephone interview with Vicki Major, FBI Statistical Office (Jun. 1,
1990). This would yield a percentage of 1.2 percent. Thus, 10.3 percent of murders resulted
from robbery or burglary (9.1 + 1.2).
1.8 percent of murders resulted from "suspected felonies." See FBI REP. supra. The percentage of murders resulting from known felonies is 18.8 percent, 10.3 percent of which resulted from property crime. Id. This means that 55 percent of these felonies involved property
crime. If we assume that the same percentage holds true of "suspected felonies," we can conclude that 1 percent of these involved property crimes. Accordingly, the total percentage of
murders resulting from property felonies and suspected property felonies is 11.3.
23.8 percent of murders resulted from unknown circumstances. Id. Drug-related property
crime murders could easily be seen as occurring in this category since they would frequently
involve violence against a stranger-exactly the type of crime which would remain a mystery
to the police. 14.8 percent of murders whose circumstances were known involved property
crime. If we assume that this percentage would hold for murders whose circumstances were
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Supporters of prohibition have traditionally used drug-related
crime as a simplistic argument for enforcement: stop drug use to
stop drug-related crime. They have even exaggerated the amount of
such crime in the hopes of demonstrating a need for larger budgets
and greater powers. In recent years, the more astute prohibitionists
have noticed that drug-related crime is drug-law-related. Thus, in
many cases they have begun to argue that even if drugs were legal
and thus relatively inexpensive, drug users would still commit crime
simply because they are criminals at heart.19 8
While some researchers have questioned the causal connection
between illegal drugs and street crime, many studies over a long period have confirmed what every inner-city dweller already knows:
drug users steal to get the money to buy expensive illegal drugs.' 9 9
Moreover, in addition to causing street crime and drug related
violence, prohibition also stimulates crime by:
-criminalizing users of illegal drugs, creating disrespect for the law;
*forcing users into daily contact with professional criminals, which
often leads to arrest and prison records that make legitimate employment difficult to obtain;
*discouraging legitimate employment because of the need to "hustle" for drug money;
*encouraging young people to become criminals by creating an extremely lucrative black market in drugs;
edestroying, through drug crime, the economic viability of low-income neighborhoods, leaving young people fewer alternatives to
unknown, we can conclude that 3.5 of those murders were property crime related.
Thus, 14.8 percent of all murders involve property crime. 40 percent of these were drugrelated in the sense that their motive was to secure funds to pay for expensive black market
drugs. That is 5.9 percent. 5.9 percent of 20640 is 1,217.
For a study on drug related homicides see generally P.J. GOLDSTEIN & H.H. BROWNSTEIN, DRUG RELATED CRIME ANALYSIs-HoMICIDE: A REPORT TO THE NAT'L INST. OF JUS-

(1987).
Further, according to one study, in 1980 there were 460,000 drug-related assaults and in
140,000 of these cases, the victims required hospitalization totaling 50,000 hospital days. Goldstein, The Drugs/Violence Nexus: A Tripartite Conceptual Framework, 15 J. DRUG ISSUES
493, 494 (1985).
198. See, e.g., Inciardi & McBride, Legalization: A High Risk Alternative in the War
on Drugs, 32 AM. BEHAVIORAL Sci. 259-60 (1989).
199. These studies were reviewed in 1985. The authors concluded:
[Hleroin addiction can be shown to dramatically increase property crime levels....
A high proportion of addicts' preaddiction criminality consists of minor and drug
offenses, while post-addiction criminality is characterized much more by property
TICE DRUGS, ALCOHOL AND CRIME PROGRAM

crime.

Speckart & Anglin, Narcotics and Crime: An Analysis of Existing Evidence for a Causal
Relationship 3 BEHAVIORAL SC. & THE LAw 259, 273 (1985).
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working in the black market; and
aremoving the settling of drug-related disputes from the legal process, creating a context of violence for the buying and selling of
drugs.2 00
2.

Black Market Violence

Prohibition also causes what the media and police misname
"drug-related violence." This prohibition-relatedviolence includes
all the random shootings and murders associated with black market
drug transactions: ripoffs, eliminating the competition, killing informers and suspected informers.
Those who doubt that prohibition is responsible for this violence
need only note the absence of violence in the legal drug market. For
example, there is no violence associated with the production, distribution, and sale of alcohol. Such violence was ended by the repeal of
Prohibition.
The President's Commission on Organized Crime estimates a
total of about 70 drug-market murders yearly in Miami alone. 1
Based on that figure and FBI data, a reasonable nationwide estimate
would be that at least 825 murders each year are drug-market
murders. 0 2 Recent estimates from New York City and Washington
D.C. suggest an even higher figure. 03 In addition, many law enforcement officers are killed enforcing drug laws each year. 04
200.
201.

See infra text accompanying notes 201-04 (discussing black market violence).
PRESIDENT'S COMM'N ON ORGANIZED

TRAFFICKING, RECORD OF HEARING

IV,

CRIME, ORGANIZED

CRIME AND COCAINE

NOVEMBER 27-29, 1984. at 536 (1984) (prepared

statement of Charles V. Wetli, M.D., Deputy Chief Medical Examiner, Medical Examiner

Department, Miami, Florida) [hereinafter

PRESIDENT'S COMM'N, ORGANIZED CRIME AND CO-

CAINE TRAFFICKING].

202.

There were, on average, 20,640 murders and non-negligent homicides per year
UNIFORM CRIME REP.: CRIME IN THE U.S. 13 (1988). The F.B.I. estimates
that four percent of the murders (from 1984-88) involved narcotics. Id. at 14. That would
mean, on average, 825 narcotic related murders per year. However, this figure is certainly an
underestimate since the motive of twenty-three percent of all murders was "unknown" and
drug-related murders can be expected to frequently fall into this category. Id. Thirty to forty
percent of all murders in Miami, about 70 per year, are drug-related. See PRESIDENT'S

from 1979-88. FBI

COMM'N, ORGANIZED CRIME AND COCAINE TRAFFICKING,

supra note 201, at 536. In addition,

one study found that 42 percent of murders committed in a nine month period in 1981 in one
precinct in New York City were drug-related. Heffernan, Martin & Romano, Homicides Related to Drug Trafficking, 3 FED. PROHIBITION 3, 6 (1982). These figures indicate that the
four percent FBI estimate is very low.
203. See Heffernan, Martin & Romano, supra note 202 (setting forth statistics for New
York City and Washington, D.C.).

204. See FBI, U.S.
SAULTED

DEP'T OF JUSTICE, LAW ENFORCEMENT OFFICERS KILLED AND

As-

1988, at 17. From 1979 to 1988, 65 law enforcement officers lost their lives in arrest
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3. Do Drugs Cause Crime?
It is often thought that illegal drugs cause crime through their
pharmacological effects on the mind. Marijuana laws were originally
justified on that basis. 5 Today, the notion that marijuana causes
crime "is no longer taken seriously by even the most ardent antimarijuana propagandists." 20 6 Even heroin use "is a neutral act in
terms of its potential criminogenic effect upon an individual's behavior .... [T]here is nothing in the pharmacology, or physical or psy20
chological impact, of the drug that would propel a user to crime." 1
Cocaine, like other stimulants such as nicotine and caffeine, can
stimulate aggressive behavior. However, Grinspoon and Bakalar
argue:
[P]ersonality and setting as usual make all the difference.... Jared Tinkelberg, commenting on [a DEA] study and in general on
the relation between cocaine and violence, expresses some surprise
that it seems to produce "amphetamine-like paranoid assaultiveness" so seldom and concludes that at present it is not a serious
crime problem.
...[M]ost violence in the illicit cocaine trade, like the violence in
the illicit heroin traffic today and in the alcohol business during
Prohibition, is of course not necessarily related to the
psychopharmacological properties of the drug. Al Capone did not
order murders because he was drunk, and the cocaine dealer
"Jimmy" does not threaten his debtors or fear the police because of
cocaine-induced paranoia. 0 8
When the New York City Police Department announced that
38 percent of murders in the city in 1987 were "drug-related," Deputy Chief Raymond W. Kelly explained that "[w]hen we say drugrelated, we're essentially talking about territorial disputes or disputes
over possession[]. . . .We're not talking about where somebody is
deranged because they're on a drug."2 9
situations involving drug-related matters. Id.
205.

See E. BRECHER, supra note 28, at 414-15.

206. E. GOODE,

DRUGS IN AMERICAN SOCIETY

124 (2d ed. 1984).

207. A. TREBACH, supra note 34, at 246.
208. L. GRINSPOON & J. BAKALAR, COCAINE-A DRUG AND ITS SOCIAL EVOLUTION
227 (rev. ed. 1985) (footnotes omitted).
209. James, Serious Crime Up 3.4% in New York City, N.Y. Times, Mar. 23, 1988, at
B1, col 2, cal. 3-col. 4.

Published by Scholarly Commons at Hofstra Law, 1990

45

Hofstra Law Review, Vol. 18, Iss. 3 [1990], Art. 5
HOFSTRA LAW REVIEW

4.

[Vol. 18:607

Loss of Illegal Drugs for Medical Purposes

The issue of whether the medical use of drugs such as marijuana and heroin should be permitted appears to be logically separable from the issue of whether the use of such drugs is allowed for
non-medical purposes. However, as a practical matter, the valuable
medical uses of these drugs 10 have been denied to the American
people largely because making them even medically available is perceived dangerous to the drug war effort.21 ' Thus, the general unavailability of marijuana for the treatment of glaucoma and cancer
and heroin for the relief of pain in cancer patients can be considered
a cost of drug prohibition.
A description of the use of marijuana to alleviate the nausea of
chemotherapy and to fight weight loss in cancer patients, contained
in a 1988 decision by a DEA administrative law judge, leaves little
doubt that some people have died because of the unavailability of the
medical use of marijuana during the past several decades.21 2 However, there is no reliable "body count" to date.
5.

Drugs Made More Dangerous

Because there is no quality control in the black market, prohibition also kills by making drug use more dangerous. Illegal drugs contain poisons, are of uncertain potency, and are injected with dirty
needles. Many deaths are caused by infections, accidental overdoses,
and poisoning 2 3
At least 3,500 people will die from AIDS each year as a result
of the use of unsterile needles, a greater number than the combined
210. See Grinspoon & Bakalar, Medical Uses of Illicit Drugs in DEALING WITH
supra note 17, at 183 (discussing the significant medical uses of psychoactive drugs,
including opium, coca, cannabis, mescaline and even alcohol, although they are severly restricted or banned by law today).
211. See, e.g., Marijuana Scheduling Petition; Denial of Petition, 54 Fed. Reg. 53,767,
53,784 (1989) (announcing the view of John C. Law, then-Drug Enforcement Administrator,
that even the declaration of marijuana as a medically accepted drug has potential risks).
212. In the Matter of Marijuana Rescheduling Petition, Docket No. 86-22 (Dep't of
Justice, Drug Enforcment Admin., Sept. 6, 1988), reprinted in THE DRUG POLICY FOUNDADRUGS,

TION, DRUG POLICY

1989-1990, A

REFORMER'S CATALOGUE

325 (A.S. Trebach & K.B. Zeese

eds. 1989) (recommending that marijuana should be transferred from a Schedule I substance
to a Schedule 11 substance to allow legitimate use for medical treatment through pharmacies).
But see Marijuana Scheduling Petition, Denial of Petition, 54 Fed. Reg. 53767 (1989) (rejecting the recommendation of the administrative law judge since all evidence accepted by the
judge was merely preliminary studies and insufficient to demonstrate that marijuana has an
accepted medical use in the treatment of any medical conditions).
213, See supra notes 222-36 and accompanying text.
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death toll from cocaine and heroin. 14 These casualties include the
sexual partners and children of intravenous drug users.115 Drug-related AIDS is almost exclusively the result of drug prohibition.2 16
Users inject drugs rather than taking them in tablet form 217 because
tablets are expensive. They go to "shooting galleries" to avoid arrests
for possessing drugs and needles. They share needles because possession of needles is illegal and they are difficult to obtain. 18 In Hong
Kong, where needles are legal, there are no cases of drug-related
AIDS. 219 Legalization would fight AIDS in three ways:
-by making clean needles cheaply available;
-by making drugs in tablet form less expensive;
-by helping to break up the drug subculture, with its "shooting
galleries" and needle-sharing. 2

214. See CENTERS FOR DISEASE CONTROL, HIV/AIDS WEEKLY SURVEILLANCE REPORT, Nov. 1989. In the one year period from November 1988 through October 1989, there
were about 10,000 new cases of drug-related AIDS. Id. The overall fatality rate from AIDS is
about 60 percent, including the most recently diagnosed cases. Id. Thus, barring a cure for
AIDS, about 6,000 people who were diagnosed with drug-related AIDS in that period will
eventually die from AIDS. From 1986 to 1988, -deaths from drug-related AIDS averaged
about 4,000 per year. Id. However, deaths from AIDS declined in 1989, perhaps as a result of
improved medical treatment. Id. It cannot be assumed that all cases of drug-related AIDS are
reflected in the official statistics. The Centers for Disease Control estimates that 10 to 30
percent of the cases go unreported, while the figure may be as high as 40 percent in some
states. Many AIDS Cases Go Unreported, N.Y. Times, Nov. 28, 1989, at C15, col. 1.
215. According to the National Institute on Drug Abuse Survey, there are about
1,285,000 intravenous drug users in the United States. According to one expert, the average
drug user has 0.5 female non-drug using sexual partners and two children. This means that
about 4,500,000 people are in the direct line of fire of drug-related AIDS. Drug Related
AIDS, supra note 139, at 5 (footnotes omitted) (emphasis in original) (referring to an unpublished survey by the National Institute on Drug Abuse dated Spring, 1987).
216.
section).
217.

See supra text accompanying notes 139-43 (referring to cost benefit analysis
See Appendix, infra notes 380-459 and accompanying text.

218. See Drug Related AIDS, supra note 139, at 7 (discussing the problems drug users
have in obtaining clean needles).
219. Kristof, Hong Kong Program: Addicts Without Aids, N.Y. Times, June 17, 1987,
at Al, col. 3.
220. These factors would also reduce the spread of hepatitis, tuberculous and other diseases spread by the use of dirty needles.
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The number of deaths caused by illnesses other than AIDS spread
through the use of unsterile needles is unknown."'
As many as 2,400 of the 3,000 deaths attributed to heroin and
cocaine use each year-80 percent-are actually caused by black
market factors.222 For example, many heroin deaths are caused by
an allergic reaction to the street mixture of the drug, 2 ' while 30
percent are caused by infections.224
In summary, the attempt to protect users from themselves has
backfired, as it did during Prohibition. The drug laws have succeeded only in making drug use much more dangerous by driving it
underground and out of the reach of moderating social and medical
influences. As indicated225
in Table 1, drug prohibition causes at least
year.
each
7,925 deaths
221. See Hailer, Infections in Intravenous DrugAbusers: What Makes Them Different,
83 POSTGRADUATE MED. 95 (1988). Infections which are more prevalent in intravenous drug
abusers include: pulmonary infection, endocarditis, bacteremia, osteomyelitis and arthritis,
hepatitis, tetanus and AIDS. Id. at 96-111; see also Kolata, Gain Reported in Hepatitis
Treatment, N.Y. Times, July 15, 1988, at B5, col. 4 (stating that according to the Center For
Disease Control, 4,000 deaths annually are related to hepatitis B); Changing Patterns of
Groups at High Risk for Hepatitis B in the United States, 37 MORBIDITY & MORTALITY
WEEKLY REPORT 429, 430 (1988) (estimating that 27% of hepatitis B cases are incurred
through intravenous drug abuse).
222. See Appendix, infra notes 380-459 and accompanying text.
223. E.

BRECHER,

supra note 28, at 101-14.

224.

N.

225.

Not included in this estimate are deaths caused by "designer" drugs.

ZINBERG

& J.

ROBERTSON, DRUGS AND THE PUBLIC

204 (1972).

Designer drugs "is a term that has been used . . . to describe synthetic drugs of
abuse.... More correctly, this term should be applied to only those drugs that are
(I) synthesized from common chemicals, (2) exempt from control by the Drug Enforcement Adminstration because of their unique chemical structure, and (3) skillfully marketed under attractive, often exotic names.
Henderson, Designer Drugs: Past History and Future Prospects,33 J. FORENSIC ScI. 569, 569
(1988) For example, the DEA found that the material called "China White" was alphamethylfentanyl, which caused fifteen deaths in Orange County, California in 1979-1980. Id. at
570. Estimates of deaths due to designer drugs range from 100 to 1,000. See id. at 573 (estimating about 100 deaths between 1981-1987; U.S. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFCE, CONTROLLING DRUG ABUSE: A STATUS REPORT 17 (1988) [hereinafter GAO REPORT] (reporting
deaths caused by dangerous drugs including designer drugs
The net effect, tragic and ironic, of drug prohibition has been the creation of synthetic drugs that are more potent, dangerous, and unpredictable than the drugs originally banned. . . .Unless we turn away from drug prohibition, and learn to live
with the drugs we have, we will be awash in a flood of cheap and deadly synthetic
drug substitutes.
Shafer, The War on Drugs is Over-The Government Has Lost, INQUIRY, Feb., 1984 at 14.
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Table 1.
ANNUAL DEATHS CAUSED BY DRUG PROHIBITION

Murders incident to street crime ..............
Black market murders ......................
Drug-related AIDS ........................
Other diseases spread through dirty needles .........
Poisoned drugs/no quality control .............
Loss of medical use of illegal drugs ...............

1,200
825
3,500
?
2,400
?

Total .......................

7,925

..........

An implicit point throughout this Article is made explicit here;
drug users do not benefit from drug prohibition. Users die of overdoses caused by the uncertain quality of illegal drugs, and of AIDS
contracted through dirty needles. They are murdered in remarkable
numbers while buying or selling drugs. They are led into a criminal
lifestyle by the need to raise large sums of money quickly, and must
constantly associate with professional criminals to secure a drug supply. Many users have long records of convictions for drug offenses,
making it difficult for them to secure legitimate employment. 226 "It
is difficult to overestimate the harm caused by forcing drug users
into a life of crime. Once this threshold is crossed, there is often no
return."227
Yet, isn't the point of drug prohibition the salvaging of the welfare of those who, for whatever reasons, are unable to resist the lure
of drugs? The 250,000 drug users infected with the AIDS virus are a
grim reminder of the failure of prohibition to do so. 228
C. Economic Impact of Prohibition
What about the economic impact of prohibition? First, take a
common estimate of annual black market drug sales which in 1980
226. See generally Barnett, supra note 41, at 85-86 (discussing how "drug laws
criminalize users.").
227. Id. at 85.
228. See DrugRelated AIDS, supra note 139, at 5 (citing the results of an unpublished
survey by the National Institute of Drug Abuse).
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was $79 billion. 2 Because the black market price of drugs is inflated at least ten-fold over the probable legal price,23 ° 90 percent of
this figure, or about $70 billion, constitutes an economic loss caused
by prohibition. The drug user (and his dependents) is deprived of the
purchasing power of 90 percent of the money he spends on illegal
drugs without any net benefit accruing to the economy as a whole.23 '
The added expenditure to the drug user under prohibition pays
for the dramatically increased costs of producing and selling illegal
drugs. Large amounts of land, labor and capital, not required in the
legal drug market, are utilized in the illegal drug market. The high
prices drug users pay for illegal drugs compensate drug dealers for
their expenditures in acquiring the drugs, as well as for the risks of
violence and imprisonment.
The economic loss to drug users is evident in such phenomena
as wealthy users squandering hundreds of thousands of dollars on
drugs, middle-class users losing their houses and cars to drug expenditures, and poor users going without food or shelter because the
bulk of their funds is spent on purchasing expensive illegal drugs.
Ironically, this economic loss to drug users under prohibition is frequently cited as a justification for prohibition. However, this harm is
a major cost of prohibition and should be held against it in the legalization debate.
The total cost of drug-related law enforcement-courts, police,
prisons, on all levels of government-is about $10 billion each
229. NATIONAL NARCOTICS INTELLIGENCE CONSUMER'S COMMITTEE, NARCOTICS INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE, THE SUPPLY OF DRUGS TO THE U.S. ILLICIT MARKET FROM FOREIGN AND

DOMESTIC SOURCES IN1980, at 77 (1980). In 1986, it was estimated that revenues from black
market drug sales were estimated at about $100 billion per year. See S. WISOTSKY. supra note
17, at 80.
230. See, e.g., BENNETT PLAN I, supra note 166, at 6 (estimating the free market price
of a gram of cocaine would be three or four dollars, roughly five percent of the current black
market price of sixty to eighty dollars.
231. In a value-free economic analysis, we are compelled to treat a black market business the same as a legitimate one. Thus, it might be argued that the high price drug users pay
for drugs is offset by the high profits made by drug dealers, and thus drug transactions are a
zero-sum game with no net economic loss to the economy. While this logic applies to transfers
of property by theft-which are therefore not included in the cost analysis of this report-it
does not apply to black market drug sales. While it is true that the money paid for illegal
drugs goes to black market "businesses", there is no net economic benefit because, if drugs
were made legal, this money would flow to legal business. Thus, drug prohibition operates to
transfer gross sales from legal to illegal business entities in zero-sum fashion, while the drug
consumer, and his dependents if any, are net losers in the process. Cf. H. HAZLITT, ECONOMICS
INONE LESSON 23-24 (2d ed. 1979) (discussing analogous economic consequences of a broken
window).

http://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/hlr/vol18/iss3/5

50

Ostrowski: The Moral and Practical Case for Drug Legalization
1990]

MORAL AND PRACTICAL CASE

year.2 32 Each dollar spent on drug enforcement yields seven dollars
in economic loss.233 Prohibition takes $10 billion from taxpayers and
uses it to raise $80 billion for organized crime and drug dealers, impoverishing many drug users in the process. To pay for expensive
black-market drugs, poor drug users then victimize the taxpayers by
stealing $7.5 billion from them.23 4 Thus, the total economic cost of
prohibition is about $80 billion each year (excluding the $7.5 billion
in thefts).
Even this $80 billion figure does not include a number of other
negative economic consequences of prohibition that are difficult to
estimate. These include:
*the lost productivity of those who die as a result of prohibition;
-the lost productivity of those in prison on drug convictions
or drug
23
users who must "hustle" all day to pay for their drugs; 1
-the costs imposed by organized crime activities funded by drug
profits;
*government and private funds spent on prohibition-created illnesses such as AIDS, hepatitis, and accidental overdose;238 and
-the funds spent on private security to fight drug-related crime.

Another difficult-to-measure economic cost of prohibition merits special mention: the negative impact of prohibition on the economic viability of inner cities and their inhabitants. Prohibition-related violence and property crime raise costs, make loans and insurance
232. See G. GODSHAW, R. KOPPEL & R. PANCOAST, supra note 196, at 17, 134 (estimating the cost of drug use on the criminal justice system to be $4.5 billion and estimating
that $6.2 billion is spent on drug-related police activities alone, excluding the cost of courts
and prisons). Total criminal and civil justice spending was $39.7 billion in 1983, three-quarters

of which went for police and prisons.

BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE,
BULLETIN, JUSTICE EXPENDITURE AND EMPLOYMENT 1983, at 1 (1986). Further, the federal

government has proposed an increase for drug reduction activities to $10.6 billion in 1994.
BENNETT PLAN II, supra note 179, at 7.
233. See supra text accompanying notes 234-35.
234. See supra text accompanying note 197 (estimating drug-related property crime
losses).
235. Not all drug addicts are easy to discern.
The addict who is able to obtain an adequate supply of drugs through legitimate
channels and has adequate funds usually dresses properly, maintains his nutrition,
and is able to discharge his social and occupational obligations with reasonable efficiency. He usually remains in good health, suffers little inconvenience, and is, in
general, difficult to distinguish from other persons.
E. BRECHER, supra note 28, at 38 (quoting J. Jaffe, in GOODMAN AND GILMAN 286 (4th ed.
1970)).
236. For example, it is estimated that the yearly cost of care for an AIDS patient can
range from $50,000 to $100,000. See NEw YORK STATE DEP'T OF HEALTH, ACQUIRED IMMUNE DEFICIENCY SYNDROME: 100 QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS 17 (1989).
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difficult or impossible to secure, and make it difficult to attract
skilled workers. Prohibition lures some workers away from legitimate
businesses and into the black market, where salaries are astronomically higher. As long as a black market in illegal drugs thrives in the
inner cities, it is difficult to see how inner cities can ever become
economically viable.
D. Economic Costs of Drug Use
If prohibition causes at least $80 billion in economic loss each
what are the economic costs of illegal drug use per se? What
costs of drug use would remain the same despite legalization? The
author is unaware of any studies that attempt to directly measure
these costs. However, an examination of the various components of
economic cost indicates that the costs of legal drug use would be less
than the costs of legal alcohol and tobacco use.

year,2 a

1. Crime
As noted above, the pharmacological effects of cocaine, heroin,
and marijuana on violent crime are slight.""8 The drug most frequently associated with crime and violence is alcohol.2" 9
2. Accidents
The primary drug associated with accidents is, again, alcohol.
Large numbers of drunk drivers have killed themselves and others on
the nation's roads.240 In a study of 440 fatally injured drivers,
"[a]Icohol was by far the drug found most frequently, and the crash
responsibility analysis provided evidence of its causal role in
crashes," but the role of marijuana and other illegal drugs could not
237.

See supra notes 232-34 and accompanying text.

238. See supra notes 205-09 and accompanying text.
239.
hol.

For example, in 1980, 50% of the homicides committed were attributable to alco-

SECRETARY OF HEALTH AND HUm. SERVS., SIXTH SPECIAL REPORT TO THE U.S. CON-

12 (1987) [hereinafter SIXTH SPECIAL REPORT ON ALCOsee also BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, SOURCEBOOK OF
CRIMINAL JUSTICE STATISTICS 1988, at 481 [hereinafter 1988 SOURCEBOOK] (setting forth the
statistics for all arrests in 1987). According to the Federal Bureau of Investigation through the
Uniform Crime Reporting System, almost 25% of all arrests (12,711,600) in 1987 were alcohol related crimes including "driving while under the influence" (1,727,200), violation of liquor laws (616,700) and "drunkeness" (828,300). See id. By comparison, only 7% of all arrests were for "drug abuse violations." Id.
240. In 1986, 23,897 highway deaths were alcohol related. NATIONAL COUNCIL ON ALCOHOLISM, FACTS ON ALCOHOLISM AND ALCOHOL RELATED PROBLEMS 2 (1987).
GRESS ON ALCOHOL AND HEALTH
HOL];
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be determined.24 ' Heroin was present in very few of the victims. 42
Cocaine, a stimulant, is unlikely to constitute a major accident problem. The Research Triangle Institute study was unable to find evidence to show that illegal drugs play a major role in causing auto
accidents.2 4 3 The point is not that legalization would not have an
impact on accidents, but that the impact will be far less than the
impact of alcohol consumption on the number of fatal accidents.
3. Health Care Costs
Tobacco and alcohol are more lethal on a per capita basis than
illegal drugs.244 In addition, since the pernicious effects of tobacco
and alcohol are primarily chronic and long-term, there can be little
doubt that users of these drugs do and will consume greater health
care resources than the users of the illegal drugs. 245
4. Productivity

Some legal drugs, such as caffeine, seem to make people more
productive.246 Others, such as alcohol, seem to make them less productive.2 47 Many illegal drugs could impair productivity if used on
the job. As with alcohol, however, on-the-job use of a drug is no
reason to make a drug illegal.
241. Williams, Peat, Crouch, Wells & Finkle, Drugs in Fatally Injured Young Male
Drivers, 100 PUBLIC HEALTH REP. 19, 24 (1985). However, marijuana and cocaine were found
frequently enough to constitute a potentially significant problem on the highway. Id.
242. Id. at 22.
243. HARWOOD, NAPOLITANO, KRISTIANSEN, & COLLINS, supra note 43, at 4.
244. See Appendix, infra notes 380-459 and accompanying text.
245. In the United States, tobacco smoking is the cause of more than 300,000 deaths per
year. Smoking "causes lung cancer, other cancers, chronic obstructive lung disease, heart disease, complications of pregnancy, and several other health effects." U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH
AND HUMAN SERVS., THE HEALTH CONSEQUENCES OF SMOKING: NICOTINE ADDICTION iii

(1988); see also U.S.

DEP'T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERvs., REDUCING THE HEALTH CONSEQUENCES OF SMOKING: 25 YEARS OF PROGRESS 35-101 (1989) (discussing specific diseases

caused by cigarette smoking).
Health hazards of alcohol include:
liver disease, particularly cirrohsis; diseases of the nervous, gastrointestinal, and respiratory systems; heart and vascular diseases; cancers; metabolic and immune system disorders; endocrine disorders; nutritional deficiencies; [and] poisoning . ...
The health effects of maternal drinking on the developing fetus include neurological,
behavioral, skeletal, morphological, and development disorders, including mental
retardation.
SIXTH SPECIAL REPORT ON ALCOHOL,

supra note 239, at 8.

246. Loke, Effects of Caffeine on Mood and Memory, 44 PHYSIOLOGY & BEHAV. 367,
371 (1988).
247. See SIXTH SPECIAL REPORT ON ALCOHOL, supra note 239 at 8-12 (discussing the
adverse effects of alcohol consumption).
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As a general rule, a worker's productivity is visible and measurable. Thus, when productivity falls, the employer can take action,
including firing the worker if appropriate. However, the fact that
many companies are adopting drug testing suggests that the impact
of illegal drug use on the job is not readily apparent. If it is difficult
to discern, it is not significantly affecting productivity.
Possibly, the key motivation behind drug testing is the prevention of employee theft. Under legalization, the price of drugs would
be greatly reduced and employee theft may decline as well. The reasons given for drug testing based on the desire to reduce health care
costs and increase productivity seem disingenuous. Few companies
test for (or ban) off-the-job nicotine use (which is often associated
with high health care costs and absenteeism) or alcohol use (associated with lower productivity), even though the Constitution would
probably prohibit such testing by private employers. 48
It is remarkable that the Research Triangle Institute study, so
often relied upon to demonstrate the negative impact of illegal drugs
on productivity, contains so little solid evidence of such an impact.
First, the report concedes that "the statistical analysis of the impact
of consumption of drugs other than marijuana yielded no significant
results relating abuse of the drugs to household income."2 9 The report states that the relatively small number of other users of other
illegal drugs makes statistical analysis difficult.250
Second, the study's conclusion that marijuana use causes a $34
billion economic loss each year251 is highly dubious. According to the
study:
The cause and effect relationships among ... drug abuse, the work
environment, and other social factors are not clear ...[T] he attitudes, values, and personality traits which underlie substance

abuse behaviors as well as others should be incorporated in future
analysis; however, it was not possible with the data sets presently
available .... The drug abuse study, unlike the study on alcohol

abuse, obtained no information about untoward events [that] might
have been due to abuse of drugs. Questions were not asked about
areas in which abuse of alcohol is known to have an impact such as
symptomatic drug consumption, interpersonal problems, difficulties
in the household, legal entanglements, or problems on the job. By
248.

249.
250.

251.

See, e.g., sources cited supra note 245.
HARWOOD, NAPOLITANO, KRISTIANSEN, & COLLINS, supra note 43, at A-20.
Id. at A-22.
Id. at A-22.
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analogy, it would be predicted that drug abuse has impacts in the
same areas as alcohol abuse, but this has not been examined by
any of the national surveys on drug abuse. .. . It would be too
simplistic to suggest that the [cost attributed to marijuana use]
could only be due to... drug abuse. Plausible alternative explanations can be offered. One alternative may be that ... drug abuse
may be symptomatic of other personal problems .... Drug abusers
may be self-destructive or have other personality disorders, low ori2 52
entation toward achievement or low motivation.

The major remaining cost component is crime costs. The study
divides these costs into the following categories: crime careers, drug
trafficking, property crime, and various consensual offenses, victims
of crime, incarceration, and enforcement expenses.2 53 The overwhelming majority of these costs involve drug law enforcement,
black market violence, and street crime committed by drug users to
pay for expensive -illegal drugs. These costs are a direct or indirect
cost of prohibition. 5 4 One can therefore estimate that 90 percent of

crime costs are prohibition-related. In addition, federal drug interdiction costs can be completely attributed to prohibition.25 5

The study's estimate of mortality costs2 56 can be discounted by
80 percent because, as discussed in the appendix, about 80 percent of
illegal-drug-related deaths can be traced to prohibition factors. As
for the remaining cost components, there is little doubt that some are
prohibition-related. However, for the sake of a conservative estimate,
it will be assumed that they would all be incurred under legalization.
252. Id. at A3, A20, A24 (emphasis added). As noted earlier, supra note 43, the Research Triangle Institute study does not separate the costs attributable to prohibition from
those attributable to drug use per se. Per se costs could be estimated by discounting the Research Triangle Institute figures by the extent to which they represent costs attributable to
prohibition, except that the figures given for lost productivity are unwarranted estimates. The
study's estimate of $26.4 billion in economic loss from drug abuse sets the upper limit of
possible economic loss from drug use per se. This figure must be discounted by the percentage
of costs attributable to prohibition.
253. HARWOOD, NAPOLITANO, KRISTIANSSE, & COLLINS, supra note 43, at 5.
254. It can be inferred from the study that the purely chemical effects of drugs may
play a role in crime. Id. at C-6, C-7. The study does not contain any data from which the
quantity of chemically-induced crime can be measured. To prove that the chemical effects of
drugs cause crime is very difficult because such proof would have to separate the effects of
personality and environment from the effects of the drugs themselves.
255. See, e.g., P. REUTER, G. CRAWFORD, J. CAVE, SEALING THE BORDERS, THE EFFECTS
OF INCREASED MILITARY PARTICIPATION IN DRUG INTERDICTION 64-65 (1988) (estimating
the drug interdiction costs in 1987 to be $775 million total and $647 million without port-ofentry customs expenses).
256. HARWOOD, NAPOLITANO, KRISTIANSEN, & COLLINS, supra note 43, at 4.
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Table 2 presents the revised Research Triangle Institute figures for
the economic cost of drug abuse.
Table 2.
THE DIsCOUNTED COSTS OF DRUG ABUSE

Type of Cost

Total Cost
($ millions)

Cost Caused by
Prohibition %

Costs Caused
by Prohibition

($ millions)
Treatment
Mortality

Lost Employment
Crime
Welfare
Interdiction

Total

2,049
2,486

0
80

0
1,988

405
20,781

0
90

0
18,702

3
677

0
100

0
677

26,401

80%

21,367257

In summary, the gross costs of drug abuse are $26.4 billion. Of that,
$21.4 billion is the result of prohibition, while $5 billion is the result
of drug use per se.
E. Clogged Courts and Prisons
Each dollar spent enforcing drug laws and fighting the violent
crimes stimulated by those laws is a dollar that cannot be spent
fighting other violent crimes. Incarceration is one law enforcement
technique that works in deterring violent crime. Put a violent career

criminal in prison for five years and that person simply will not commit his usual quota of over 100 serious crimes per year during the
period of his incarceration.
Currently, there are not enough judges and prosecutors to try
cases or enough prison cells to house convicts.25 In 1987, the federal
257. These calculations are based upon HARWOOD, NAPOLITANO, KRISTIANSEN, & COLLINS, supra note 43, at 34 and passim. Cost of drug use per se: $5,034 ($26,401 - $21,367).
This calculation omits the $33.3 billion loss attributed to marijuana use because of the study's
dubious methodology. See supra note 43 and accompanying text.
258. See, e.g., BENNETT PLAN I, supra note 166, at 27 (graphically representing the
overcrowding in federal and selected state prisons for 1988); see also BUREAU OF JUSTICE
STATISTICS. U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE. CORRECTIONAL POPULATIONS IN THE UNITED STATES:
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prison system had 44,000 inmates;259 16,000 were drug offenders. 60
Official capacity in federal prisons was only 28,000.261 In addition,
many prisons are operating under court orders due to overcrowding
or poor conditions.262 Because of the lack of prison space, violent
criminals frequently are given deals, probation, or shorter terms than
they deserve. Then they are back on the streets, and often back to
serious crime. 63
F. Corruption
Drug money corrupts law enforcement officials. Corruption is a
major problem in drug enforcement because drug agents are given
tremendous power over desperate persons in possession of large
amounts of cash. Drug corruption charges have been leveled against
FBI agents, policemen, prison guards, U.S. Customs inspectors, even
prosecutors.264 In 1986, in New York City's 77th Precinct, 12 police
1986, at 8 (1989) [hereinafter CORRECTIONAL POPULATIONS] (stating that jails in jurisdictions with large jail populations were operating at 108 percent capacity in 1986); Schuler &
McBride, Notes from the Front: A Dissident Law-Enforcement Perspective on Drug Prohibition, 18 HOFSTRA L. REV. 893 (1990) (reporting the overcapacity problems of the criminal
justice system resulting from prohibition).
259. See 1988 SOURCEBOOK, supra 239, at 615 (reporting federal prison population as
of December 31, 1986 as 44,408).
260. Id. at 620.
261. Kerr, War on Drugs Puts Strain on Prisons, U.S. Officials Say, Sept. 25, 1987,
Al, at col. 1, col. 2.
262. See CORRECTIONAL POPULATIONS, supra note 258, at 9 (reporting that 166 jails in
jurisdictions with large jail populations are under a court order to reduce population or improve confinement conditions in 1986).
263. For example, in 1987 in New York City, a man who had been released after serving 5 years of a 15-year term for robbery was arrested again for auto theft, released on bail,
and finally arrested once more and indicted for rape and robbery at knife-point. Williams,
Queens Parolee Is Held in Rape in ParkingLot, N.Y. Times, Oct. 23, 1987, at B5, col. 6.
264. See, e.g., Berke, Corruptionin Drug Agency Called Cripplerof Inquiries and Morale, N.Y. Times, Dec. 17, 1989, § 1, at 1, col. 1 (stating that [a] recent spurt in corruption
cases at the Drug Enforcement Administration has undermined morale and crippled many
investigations"); Lubasch, 9 Jail Guards Are Arrested in Drug Case, N.Y. Times, Feb. 17,
1989, at BI, col. 5 (reporting that nine New York City correction officers were accused of
receiving cash payments and cocaine from agents posing as inmates); F.B.I. Agent is Held on
Charge of Selling Cocaine in Chicago, N.Y. Times, Oct. 22, 1988, at 9, col. 1 (reporting that
an eight year veteran of the Federal Narcotics Bureau was arrested for selling a gram of
cocaine); Pitt, Officer Arrested in Robbery of Bronx Drug Dealers, N.Y. Times, June 30,
1988, at B3, col. I (reporting that a senior police officer was arrested in what "appeared to be
a small ring of officers who robbed drug dealers in the South Bronx"); Woestendiek, Of
Guards and Drugs in Philadelphia'sPrisons, Philadelphia Inquirer, Aug. 2, 1987, at 1, col. 1.
(reporting that in the Philadelphia prison system, officials have predicted that as many as 200
prison employees are involved in supplying drugs to inmates); Ex-U.S. ProsecutorIndicted,
N.Y. Times, Oct. 29, 1985, at D26, col. 5 (reporting that a former U.S. prosecutor was in-
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officers were arrested for stealing and selling drugs.285 Miami's problem is worse. In June 1986, seven officers there were indicted for
using their jobs to run a drug operation that used murders, threats,
and bribery.268 Add to that two dozen other cases of corruption in
Miami in the last few years.267
We must question a policy that so frequently turns policemen
into organized criminals. There are two solutions to drug corruption:
hire morally perfect policemen or eliminate the black market in
drugs.
G. Assault on Civil Liberties

Drug war hysteria has created an atmosphere in which longcherished rights are discarded wherever drugs are concerned. Suspected drug users are subject to urine testing, 268 roadblocks,2 69 routine strip searches,270 school locker searches without probable
cause, 271 abuses of the good faith exception to the exclusionary
27 4
rule, 272 preventive detention, 273 and'nonjudicial forfeiture.
dicted for selling over $200,000 worth of information to drug dealers); see also Schuler &

McBride, supra note 258, at 915, n.81.
265. See Daly, The Crack in the Shield: The Fall of the Seven-Seven, N.Y. MAG., Dec.
8, 1986, at 50.
266. Volsky, 7 Former Officers on Trial in Miami, N.Y. Times, Oct. 12, 1986, § 1, at
35, col. 1.
267. See, e.g., Volsky, Wide Miami Inquiry into Police Is Seen: Law Enforcement Officers Say 100 to 200 on City Force May Be Investigated, N.Y. Times, Dec. 13, 1987, at 29,
col. I (describing several cases which have occurred in Miami since 1985).
268. In many contexts, the courts have ruled that drug testing can proceed if a "reasonable suspicion" of drug use has been established. See, e.g., New Jersey v. T.L.O 469 U.S. 325,
340-41 (1985); Lovvorn v. City of Chattanooga, 846 F.2d 1539, 1547 (6th Cir. 1988) (drug
testing of fire fighters); Thomson v. Weinberger, 682 F. Supp. 829 (D. Md. 1988) (U.S. Army
testing of civilian employees); Taylor v. O'Grady, 669 F. Supp. 1422, 1443 (N.D. I11.1987)
(testing of correctional officials); Amalgamated Transit Union, Local 1277 v. Sunshine Transit
Agency, 663 F. Supp. 1560, 1569 (C.D. Cal. 1987) (testing of municipal bus drivers); Feliciano v. City of Cleveland, 661 F. Supp. 578, 592 (N.D. Ohio 1987) (testing of police academy
cadets); see also Note, The National Collegiate Athletic Association, Random Drug-Testing,
and the Applicability of the Administrative Search Exception 17 HOFSTRA L. REv. 641
(1989) (authored by Craig H. Thaler) (discussing the body of law surrounding drug testing,
and applying the analysis to the NCAA's drug testing policies).
269. See generally Grossman, Society Checkpoints: Roadblocks to Fourth Amendment
Protections, 12 AmI. J. CRIM. L. 123 (1984) (discussing the legal implications of the use of
roadblocks).
270. See, e.g., Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 558 (1979) (upholding strip searches of
prisoners following visits from outsiders); United States v. Guadalup-Garza, 421 F.2d 876, 879
(9th Cir. 1970) (upholding strip searches at borders if based on "real suspicion").
271. See New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 341-42 (1985) (holding that searches of
students must be based on reasonable suspicion).
272. See generally Uchida, Bynum, Rogan & Murasky, Acting in Good Faith: The Ef-
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These governmental intrusions into our most personal activities

are the natural and necessary consequence of drug prohibition. It is
no accident that a law review article entitled "Crackdown: The
Emerging 'Drug Exception' to the Bill of Rights" was published in
1987. 175 In explaining why drug prohibition, by its very nature,

threatens civil liberties, law professor Randy Barnett notes that drug
offenses differ from violent crimes in that there is rarely a complaining witness to a drug transaction. 6 Drug transactions are hidden from police view because the transactions are illegal, but the
participants in the crime are willing. Thus, to be effective, drug
agents must intrude into the innermost private lives of suspected
drug criminals.
The term innermost is no exaggeration. In one case, the Supreme Court "approved a prolonged and humiliating detention of an
incomer who was held by customs agents to determine, through her
natural bodily processes, whether or not she was carrying narcotics
internally," even though probable cause was lacking. 77 That is, a
woman was subjected to a rectal exam even though there was no
probable cause to believe she was carrying drugs.278 Since evidence
of guilt, if it exists, is not obtained until after such intrusions, the
privacy of large numbers of innocent people must be violated in the
fects of United States v. Lean on the Police and Courts, 30 ARIZ. L. REV.467 (1988) (discussing policies and practices regarding search warrants).
273. See, e.g., Baker v. McCollan, 443 U.S. 137, 143 (1979) (finding that the probable
cause requirement for both pretrial arrest and detention is identical).
274. See UNIF. CONTROLLED SUBSTATNCES ACT § 505, 9 U.L.A. 833 (1970).
275. Wisotsky, Crackdown: The Emerging "Drug Exception" to the Bill of Rights, 38
HASTINGS L.J. 889 (1987). Wisotsky states that the "War on Drugs is producing a politicallegal context in which drug enforcement constitutes an exception to the principle that laws
must comport 'with the deepest notions of what is fair and just.' In drug enforcement, most
anything goes." Id. at 925-26.
276. Barnett, supra note 41, at 88-92. In addition, Barnett notes the following:
If the rights of individuals to choose how to use their person and possessions are
fully respected, there is no guarantee that they will exercise their rights wisely.
Some may mistakenly choose the path of finding happiness in a bottle or a vial ....
But we must not give in to the powerful temptation to grant some the power to
impose their consumptive preferences on others by force.
Id. at 102.
277. People v. Luna, 73 N.Y.2d 173, 176, 535 N.E.2d 1305, 1307, 538 N.Y.S.2d 765,
767 (1989) (discussing the Supreme Court's decision in United States v. Montoya de Hernandez, 473 U.S. 531 (1985)).
278. See Montoya de Hernandez, 473 U.S. at 532-36 (outlining the events and the
search). The Court noted that situations arising at the international border receive less scrutiny as a general matter. Id. at 537-41. Therefore, it was held that such a search was justified
if customs agents "reasonably suspect that the traveler is smuggling contraband in her alimentary canal." Id. at 541.

Published by Scholarly Commons at Hofstra Law, 1990

59

Hofstra Law Review, Vol. 18, Iss. 3 [1990], Art. 5
HOFSTRA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 18:607

process of enforcing drug laws.
The same principle operates in enforcement efforts seemingly
far removed from the invasive practice of body searches. Roadblocks,
used with greater frequency in the war on drugs, impose an inconvenience on all citizens for the sake of allowing the police to ferret out
a few drug suspects. 9 One of the main purposes of currency reporting laws is to allow government agents to trace cash from drug
transactions that is being "laundered. '28 0 Currently, most cash
transactions involving more than $10,000 must be reported to the
government. 2 l Thus, the financial privacy of all must be sacrificed
to allow government agents to search for a relatively small number
of drug criminals. This intrusion is simply another cost of criminalizing an activity in which all the participants are willing.
The dangerous precedents used in the war on drugs represent a
permanent increase in government power for all purposes. The tragedy is how cheaply our rights have been sold. Our society was once
one in which the very thought of men and women being stripsearched and forced to urinate in the presence of witnesses was revolting. Furthermore, this degradation of our individual rights is in
furtherance of a policy that does not work. It does not work because
prohibition is the cause of the problems that make these extreme
measures appear necessary.
H. Destruction of Community
Drug prohibition has had devastating effects on inner-city minority communities. A poorly educated young person in the inner
city now has three choices: welfare, a low-wage job, or the glamorous, high-profit drug business. It is no wonder that large numbers of
ghetto youth have gone into drug dealing, some of them as young as
10 years old. When the most successful people in a community are
those engaged in illegal activities, the natural order of the community is destroyed. How can a mother maintain authority over a 16year-old son who pays the rent out of his petty cash? How can a
teacher persuade students to study hard when dropouts drive
279. See Grossman, supra note 269.
280. See Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1986, Subtitle H-Money Laundering Control Act of
1986, Pub. L. No. 99-570, 100 Stat. 3207 (codified in scattered sections of 18 & 21 U.S.C.).
281. See 12 U.S.C. §§ 1730(d) & 1829b(b) (1988) (authorizing the Secretary of the
Treasury to prescribe regulations for retention of records by insured banks); 31 C.F.R. §
103.22 (1989) (setting forth the reporting requirement for transabetions of currency in excess of
$10,000).
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BMWs? The profits from prohibition make a mockery of the work
ethic and of family authority.
A related problem with prohibition is that it forces drug users to
come into contact with people of real criminal intent. For all the
harm that alcohol and tobacco cause, one does not have to deal with
criminals to use those drugs. Prohibition drags the drug user into a
criminal culture.
Once familiar with breaking the law by using drugs and dealing
with criminals, it is difficult for the drug user, and especially the
drug dealer, to maintain respect for other laws. Honesty, respect for
private property, and other aspects of a law-abiding community are
further casualties of the drug laws. When the huge illegal profits and
violence of the illegal-drug business permeate a neighborhood, it
ceases to be a functioning community. The natural tendency of people to help each other and to maintain standards of decency and
order is undermined. In the communities where drug dealing is most
prevalent, this has many consequences. For example, legitimate businesses are discouraged from opening or remaining in business, education is disdained, and the resulting violence makes mail carriers
and ambulance drivers afraid to enter housing complexes. The destruction of inner-city communities is one of the major evils of
prohibition." 2
I. International Costs
23
There are three kinds of international costs:
284
(a) costs to primarily drug-consuming countries;
285
(b) costs to primarily drug-producing countries;
(c) restrictions on the ability of persons, goods
and capital to cross national borders. 6
1. Costs to Other Drug-Consuming Countries
We can assume that other wealthy nations with substantial
markets for illegal drugs are experiencing costs similar to those in282. I am indebted to David Boaz of the Cato Institute for many of these insights.
283. See generally Marshall, Drugs and United States Foreign Policy, in DEALING
WITH DRUGS, supra note 17, at 137 (discussing the success or failure of United States foreign
policy controlling the supply of drugs); Nadelmann, U.S. Drug Policy: A Bad Export, 70
FOREIGN POL'Y 83 (1988) (discussing the failure of past United States foreign policy and
suggesting drug policies that should be adopted).
284. See infra notes 287-89 and accompanying text.
285. See infra notes 290-91 and accompanying text.
286. See infra note 292 and accompanying text.
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curred in the United States.2 8 The level of particular costs in other
countries will depend upon the demand for illegal drugs and the intensity of enforcement in those countries.2 88 The greater the demand
and intensity of enforcement, the greater the costs. Thus, for example, as Great Britain intensified drug enforcement in recent years,
prohibition-related crime and smuggling increased. 89
2. Costs to Producing Countries
The main problem with producing countries, such as Colombia,
is that drug money derived mainly from sales in the United States
and Europe creates a huge illegal slush fund that is used to corrupt
democratic governments and courts and fund terrorist and revolutionary movements.2 90 The power of those who control illegal drug
profits is magnified in producing countries since they are, in general,
quite poor relative to consuming countries. Thus,'a few billion dollars translates into tremendous economic and social power in those
countries.291
287.

See, e.g., BRITISH INFORMATION SERVICES, THE PREVENTION AND TREATMENT OF

DRUG MISUSE IN BRITAIN, 14-16 (1985) (describing the efforts by the British Government in
enforcing anti-drug laws, especially by HM Customs, Excise and the police).
288. For example, the United Kingdom incurred the following cost: an annual contribution of £100,000 to the United Nations Fund for Drug Abuse and Control, id. at 12; £2
million for anti-drug health education and information campaign, id. at 17; and a £17 million
fund was established and raised to support projects for treatment and rehabilitation. Id. at 24;
see also BUREAU OF INT'L NARCOTICS MATTERS, U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, INT'L NARCOTICS
CONTROL STRATEGY REPORT 47-48 (1989) (describing the international effort by the United
States to train personnel of other countries whereby more than 2000 persons from over 75
countries participated in the United States Government's International Narcotics training program in 1988).
289. BRITISH INFORMATION SYSTEMS, supra note 287, at 14-16.
290. See SUBCOMMITTEE ON TERRORISM, NARCOTICS AND INT'L OPERATIONS OF THE
COMM. ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, 100TH CONG., 2d SEss., REPORT ON DRUGS, LAW ENFORCE-

MENT AND FOREIGN POLICY 25-26 (Comm. Print 1988).
291, See Marshall, supra note 283, at 175. Jonathan Marshall summarizes the costs of
prohibition in producing countries.
These [costs] range from the disruption of traditional economies in Peru and Bolivia, where peasant leaders have warned that "pressures from the United States are
about to provoke a bloodbath" to the corruption of entire societies in Latin America
and Asia, where drug profits, artificially boosted by legal constraints, have lured
members of the political, judicial, police, and even church establishments. . . . In
Columbia, as in Peru, Bolivia, Mexico, Thailand, and Burma, the effect on drug
enforcement, police aid, and related programs has been to militarize the society, put
enormous pressure on fledgling liberal institutions, and divert resources from more
productive endeavors.
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3.

Restrictions on International Travel and Commerce

Drug enforcement necessitates that the movement of persons,
goods, and capital across international borders be restricted. 2 Common sense suggests that freedom of travel, free trade, and the free
flow of capital to where it is most urgently needed, are positive values. Yet, sadly, drug enforcers suspect that travelers are potential
drug couriers, that goods are potential hiding places for drugs, and
that capital is possibly laundered drug money. The resulting restrictions increase the costs of moving persons, goods, and capital across
international borders.
J.

The Consequences of Legalization

As a general rule, legal drug use is less dangerous than illegal
drug use and is influenced by the social mores of the society. Legal
drug use would involve non-lethal doses, nonpoisoned drugs, clean
needles and warning labels. Basketball star Len Bias died from a
cocaine overdose. 29 3 His friends, probably fearing the police, waited
until after his third seizure before calling an ambulance.2 94 Illegal
drug users have been arrested at hospitals after seeking medical attention. Legalization would put an end to this deadly situation. Users
would be free to seek needed medical attention and counseling without fear of legal repercussions.
A given amount of legal drug use would cause much less death
and illness than the same quantity of illegal drug use. A realistic
estimate is that illegal drug use is five times more dangerous than
legal use.2 95 This means that even a highly unlikely five-fold increase
in drug use under legalization would not increase the current number of drug overdose deaths. That is: the yearly number of heroin
and cocaine deaths combined is about 3,000 per year. 9 6 Of the
3,000 deaths, 80 percent or 2,400 deaths are caused by black market
factors, 9 7 while 20 percent or 600 deaths are caused by the intrinsic
effects of the drugs. Thus, if under legalization legal drug use remained at the same level as current illegal use, there would be only
292. See, e.g., 21 U.S.C.A. § 959 (West Supp. 1990) (making it unlawful to knowingly
or intentionally import controlled substances into the United States).
293. Examiner Confirms Cocaine Killed Bias, N.Y. Times, June 25, 1986, at D25, col.
3.
294. See Bias Said to Suffer Seizures, N.Y. Times, Oct. 18, 1986, at A50, col. 3
295. See Appendix, infra notes 380-459 and accompanying text.
296. See Appendix, infra notes 428-33 and accompanying text.
297. See id.
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600 deaths each year. Only a five-fold or 500 percent increase in use
would match the current black market death toll.298
Furthermore, it would take a 1,200 percent increase in legal
drug use to produce as many deaths as prohibition causes through
murder, AIDS, and poisoned drugs. Prohibition now causes 7,925
deaths, while 600 are the result of the drugs themselves. " ' Thus, in
order for legalized drug use to match the overall death toll of prohibition, use would have to increase more than thirteen-fold.
There are now about three million regular cocaine users 30 and
approximately 500,000 regular heroin users.30 1 Thus, to prove that
prohibition saves more lives than it destroys, it would have to be
shown that legalization would .result in more than 6.0 million additional heroin users and more than 35 million additional cocaine
users. Such enormous increases in drug use are inconceivable at a
time when the overall trend is toward less legal and illegal drug use.
The economic impact of drug use is subject to the same analysis. Since the economic cost of prohibition is $80 billion,30 2 and the
economi6 cost of drug use per se is about $5 billion,303 legalization of
drugs would have a positive economic impact-unless it causes a
1,500 percent increase in drug use.
Even if prohibition advocates could prove that astronomical increases in users would occur, the policy of prohibition would still not
be vindicated on the basis of the phenomenon of drug-switching. 0 4
Any increase in the use of newly legalized drugs is likely to involve some drug-switching by smokers and drinkers. Since the death
298. Note in this regard that estimates of the increase in alcohol use in the decades after
repeal of Prohibition range from 0 percent to a maximum of 250 percent. See D.E. KYVIG,
supra note 157, at 24, 112-13, 131, 186 (citing various reports which show that after the
repeal of Prohibition, alcohol use did not return to its pre-Prohibition levels); R. O'BRIEN &
M. CHAFETZ, ENCYCLOPEDIA OF ALCOHOLISM 72-73 (1982) (showing an increase in alcohol
consumption since the repeal of Prohibition); Kondracke, Don't Legalize Drugs, THE NEW
REPUBLIC, June 27, 1988, at 17 (stating that in the decade prior to Prohibition, "alcohol consumption. . . averaged 2.6 gallons per person per year. It fell to 0.73 gallons during Prohibition ... then doubled to 1.5 gallons ... after repeal, and is now back to 2.6 gallons.").
299. See supra note 225 & Table I.
300.

NATIONAL INST. ON DRUG ABUSE, HIGHLIGHTS OF THE

1988

NAT'L HOUSEHOLD

2 (revised ed. Aug. 1989) [hereinafter NIDA HIGHLIGHTS]. In
1988, there were 2.9 million current users of cocaine reported, a decrease from 5.8 million in
1985. Id.

SURVEY ON DRUG ABUSE

301.

NATIONAL INST. ON DRUG

ABUSE, OVERVIEW OF THE

1988

NAT'L HOUSEHOLD

2 (revised ed. Aug. 1989) [hereinafter NIDA OVERVIEW].
302. See supra notes 229-36 and accompanying text.
303. See supra notes 237-57 and accompanying text.
304. See infra notes 312-30 and accompanying text (referring to drug switching).

SURVEY ON DRUG ABUSE
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rate for these activities is greater than the death rate from heroin,
cocaine and marijuana use,30 5 for the purposes of cost-benefit analysis, any deaths avoided by switching would have to be subtracted
from the deaths caused by the legal use of heroin and cocaine. (The
marijuana death rate is apparently zero.) Depending on the rate of
switching, it is possible that the increased use of these drugs could
actually reduce the total number of drug deaths and drug related
economic costs.306
The consequences of drug-switching is not a technical or minor
issue. It is a critical one that any regime of drug control must face.
What is the point of attempting to limit access to certain drugs,
when the user will merely turn toward other, more dangerous drugs?
In China, the opium problem may or may not have been wiped out,
but so-called "[w] eak tranquillizers [sic] and sedative pills have been
widely used in China, and they are easily available on the market. ' ' 307 Furthermore, it has been reported that two-thirds of all Chinese men now smoke cigarettes. 08
Examples of drug-switching abound. When narcotics were first
outlawed, many of the middle class users switched to "barbiturates
• ..and later, to sedatives and tranquilizers . . . .The laws did
nothing to terminate this group of addicts .... They simply changed
the drug to which the users were addicted." 309 Marijuana smoking
first became popular as a replacement for alcohol during Prohibition.310 Recently, it has been reported that some intravenous heroin
305. See Appendix, infra notes 380-459 and accompanying text.
306. For example, assume that legalization leads to ten million new cocaine users. This
could cause an additional 400 deaths per year. However, assume also that a mere five percent
of these users switched to cocaine from tobacco (tobacco and cocaine both being central nervous system stimulants). This would reduce tobacco-related deaths by about 3,250 per year

and result in a net gain in lives saved of 2,850.
Using the more sophisticated method of "years of potential life lost" ("YPLL") would be

unlikely to change the analysis significantly. Although people who die from alcohol and tobacco use are generally older than those who die from illegal drug use, alcohol and tobacco

also cause a significant number of sudden deaths which take the lives of people of all ages
(e.g., car accidents, fires).
307. See Chenru, Keeping Narcotics Under Strict Control: Some Effects in China, 34
IMPACT OF SCL ON Soc'Y 131, 136 (1984). Shen Chenru, a Chinese journalist, claims that the
Communist Chinese government completely eliminated the opium problem three years after

coming into-power and that "[d]rug-taking became extinct." Id. at 134. However, he admits
that heroin is being smuggled into China and that 18 persons in one city were charged with

drug trafficking in one month. Id.
308.

CBS News, (CBS television broadcast, Apr. 24, 1988).

309. E. GOODE, supra note 206, at 221.
310.

See E. BRECHER, supra note 28, at 410.
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users have switched to smoking "crack" to avoid the risk of AIDS.311
The ramifications of drug-switching for defenders of drug prohibition are that, assuming they can prove that the use of drugs would
greatly increase under legalization, and that this increased use would
not be offset by quality control gains, they would then have to prove
that these new users would not be switching from more dangerous
drugs (e.g., alcohol) to less dangerous drugs (e.g., opium--one-tenth
the strength of heroin). Finally, prohibition advocates would need to
prove that the damage caused by any increase in legal use would
exceed the tremendous damage, both social and medical, caused by
the current level of illegal use. None of these critical methodological
steps have been performed. Until this is done, prohibition will simply
be a policy in search of a justification.
K.

Would Drug Use Increase?

Would there be any substantial increase in drug use under
decriminalization? Long-term trends in legal drug use suggest not.
As a society, we are gradually moving away from the harmful use of
alcohol and tobacco.
In 1956, 42 percent of adults smoked; in 1980 only 33 percent. In
1977, 29 percent of high school seniors smoked; in 1981, 20 percent .... We did not declare a war on tobacco. We did not make it
illegal. .

.

. We did seek to convince our citizens not to smoke

through persuasion, objective information, and education. 312

The consumption of alcohol, and deaths caused by alcohol, have also
been gradually declining as people switch from hard liquors to less
potent formulations. 313 Finally, users of marijuana-now a de facto
legal drug in some states-declined from 18 million in 1985 to 12
million in 1988 according to the National Institute on Drug Abuse
(NIDA).314
311. See D. MUSTO, THE AMERICAN DISEASE 274-77 (2d ed. 1987).
312. Trebach, Peace Without Surrender in the Perpetual Drug War, 1 JUST. Q. 136
(1984). In 1987, only 29 percent of adults continue to smoke. "Nearly half of all living adults
whoever smoked have quit." Mason & Windon, Foreward to U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH AND
HUMAN SERvs., REDUCING THE HEALTH CONSEQUENCES OF SMOKING: 25 YEARS OF PROGRESS

i (1989). The number of high school seniors who smoke has leveled off from 1980 through
1987. Id.
313. Per capita alcohol consumption declined 0.7 percent from 1974 to 1984, while distilled spirit consumption declined 15.4 percent. Berkelman, Ralston, Herndon, Gwinn,

Bertolucci & Dufour, Patterns of Alcohol Consumption and Alcohol-Related Morbidity and
Mortality, 35 MORBIDITY & MORTALITY WEEKLY REP ISS, 2SS (Aug. 1986) (No. 2SS).
314. NIDA HIGHLIGHTS, supra note 300, at 3.
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As our society grows increasingly health and fitness conscious,
heavy drug use will lose its appeal. Many are trading in the tavern
for the health club and choosing vitamins over martinis. This process
of bringing legal drug use under the influence of positive social values such as health and moderation has less influence on the illegal
drug scene. There, hard-core drug users form subcultures that reinforce the values of heavy, reckless drug use.
It is a mistake to assume that the mere availability of a drug
causes or leads to drug use or abuse:
[F]or most of human history, even under conditions of ready access
to the most potent of drugs, people and societies have regulated
their drug use without
requiring massive education, legal, and in5
terdiction campaigns.31
Before prohibition, in both America and England, narcotics use
peaked and then declined long before national prohibition was
adopted.3 16 Today, despite the availability of alcohol, only about 10
percent of the population are considered problem drinkers.3 17 Although marijuana can be purchased on virtually any street corner in
some cities, only about six percent of the population had done so
during a recent one month period, according to NIDA.318 Significantly, the figures for cocaine are similarly low, in spite of the drug's
reputation for addictiveness3 9 In addition, about twenty million
have tried the drug, but only 25 percent of them have used it in the
last month and only about 10 percent are considered addicts.32 0 It
should be noted that for cocaine, the sample population is drawn
from that segment of the population already interested enough in
drugs to break the law to obtain them. Thus, an even lower percentage of repeat users could be expected from the overall population
under legalization. These numbers explain or justify Stanton Peele's
belief that "[ciocaine use is now described [incorrectly] as presenting the same kind of lurid monomania that pharmacologists once
315.
316.
(1987).
317.
318.

Peele, supra note 55, at 209 (citation omitted).
D. MUSTO, THE AMERICAN DISEASE, ORIGINS OF

NARCOTIC CONTROL

41-42

SIXTH SPECIAL REPORT ON ALCOHOL, supra note 239 at 3.
See NATIONAL INST. ON DRUG ABUSE, NAT'L HOUSEHOLD SURVEY ON DRUG
ABUSE: POPULATION ESTIMATES 1988 23 (1989) [hereinafter NIDA 1988 HOUSEHOLD
SURVEY].

319. Id. at 29.
320. PRESIDENT'S COMM'N, ORGANIZED CRIME
201, at 487 (testimony of Dr. Arnold Washton).

AND COCAINE TRAFFICKING, supra
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claimed only heroin could produce ....
The fatal flaw in the policy of prohibition is that those who need
to be protected most from drug use-hard-core users-are those who
will not be deterred by laws against drugs. These individuals consider drug use to be one of their highest values in life. They will take
great risks, pay high prices, and violate the law to achieve this value.
The remainder of the population consists of moderate drug users and
non-drug users. These are people who have developed the individual
or social resources which allow them to avoid harmful legal drug
use.

Even when it comes to illegal drugs, it is naive to think that
prohibition relieves moderate drug users of having to make responsible choices regarding these substances. Regardless of the expense of
long-term use, obtaining the first batch of "crack" or heroin is not
expensive and opportunities abound-on the street, in broad
daylight, illegal drugs are there. Thus, the level of illegal drug use is
strongly influenced by individual choices and values. For example,
individual preference-not law enforcement-is the likely explanation for the existence of 20,000,000 marijuana smokers, but a mere
500,000 heroin users. 22 If 20,000,000 people demanded heroin, the
black market would meet that demand, just as it met the enormous
demand for alcohol in the 1920s. Thus, prohibition is at best a comforting illusion.
The ideal test of the effectiveness of our drug laws is whether
they have reduced overall drug use since their enactment. In fact,
they have not. On a per capita basis, the use of narcotics was no
greater before prohibition than it is today and the use of cocaine is
far greater today than it was when cocaine was legally available. In
1915, the year the first national control laws became effective, there
were about 200,000 regular narcotics users and only 20,000 regular
cocaine users.323 Today, there are about 500,000 regular heroin users
and nearly three million regular cocaine users. 324 Since the population is more than twice what it was in 1915,325 it is apparent that the

percentage of the population using narcotics has remained about the
321. Peele, supra note 55, at 200.
322. See supra note 300 and accompanying text.
323.

Kolb & Du Mez, The Prevalence and Trend of Drug Addiction in the United
REP. 1181 (1924).

States and the Factors Influencing It, 39 U.S. PUB. HEALTH
324. See NIDA HIGHLIGHTS, supra note 300, at 2.

325. See BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE. 1980 CENSUS OF POPULATION, NUMBER OF INHABITANTS, UNITED STATES SUMMARY 1-14 (stating that the population

of the United States was 106 million in 1920 and 226.5 million in 1980).
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same, while cocaine use has increased astronomically percent. Seventy years of intensive law enforcement efforts have failed to measurably reduce drug use.

This should not be surprising. During Prohibition, alcohol consumers merely switched from beer and wine to hard liquors often of
dubious quality, resulting in a drastic increase in deaths from alcohol
poisoning.32 Whether alcohol prohibition actually reduced total consumption is disputed,327 but it is known that the repeal of Prohibition
did not lead to an explosion in drinking. 328 More recently, in those
states which have decriminalized marijuana, no substantial increase
in use has occurred.3 29 When the Netherlands decriminalized marijuana in 1978, use actually declined.330
Regardless of time, place or drug, the policy of prohibition
tends to work in reverse.
L. The Failure of Enforcement
Common sense tells us that illegal drugs will always be readily
available. Prison wardens cannot keep drugs out of their own institutions-an important lesson for those who would turn this country
into a prison to stop drug use. Even the Soviet Union has admitted to
having a serious illegal drug problem.aa In this country, police officers are regularly caught using drugs, selling drugs and even stealing drugs."3 2 How are these people going to lead a drug war?
Regarding Reagan administration enforcement efforts, the New
326. See S. CASHMAN, PROHIBITION-THE LIE OF THE LAND 251-56 (1981).
327. See, e.g., D.E. KYVIG, supra note 157, at 24, 12-113.
328. See id. at 186. Some commentators have cited the sizable alcohol consumption
rates in post-war America as evidence that the repeal of prohibition may have been unwise.
Surely some of this increase in consumption was due to the increased purchasing power of
Americans in that era, and not solely to the legal availability of alcohol. It is safe to assume
that even if prohibition had not been repealed, an increase in disposable income would have led
to an increase in alcohol consumption.
329. FINANCIAL TIMES, Nov. 25-26, 1989, §2 (Weekend), at I, col. 1.
330. Zeese, No More Drug War, Nat'l L.J., at 25, 32 (July 7, 1986) (citing NETHERLANDS MINISTRY OF WELFARE, HEALTH AND CULTURAL AFFAIRS, SCIENTIFIC STUDY OF ALCOHOL AND DRUG USE, THE USE OF DRUGS. ALCOHOL AND TOBACCO

(1985)).

331. Schmemann, Drug Issue Publicized by Soviet, N.Y. Times, June 11, 1986, at A9,
col. 1 (stating that the Soviet press acknowledged a rising drug problem at home).
332. See, e.g., Police Officer Held on Drug Charges, N.Y. Times, Jan. 9, 1990, at B2,
col. 5; Hays, MassachusettsPolice Chief Quits, Accused of Stealing Cocainefrom Evidence
Room, N.Y. Times, Nov. 4, 1989, at 7, col. 1; Blumenthal, Convicted Officer Issues Warning
on Corruption,N.Y. Times, Sept. 17, 1989, at A54, col. 1; McKinley, Police Face Drug Testing in New York, N.Y. Times, Sept. 6, 1989, at B1, col. 5, B3, col. 1; Purdum, Drugs Seen as
an Increasing Threat to Police Integrity, N.Y. Times, Nov. 12, 1988, at A29, col. 2;
Nordheimer, Police Corruption PlaguingFlorida, N.Y. Times, Aug. 3, 1986, at A19, col. 1.
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York Times reported that "[flour and a half years after Vice President Bush established the South Florida Task Force, the most ambitious and expensive drug enforcement operation in the nation's history, the Federal officials who run it say they have barely dented the
drug trade here." 333 On August 10, 1986 a New York Times analysis concluded that "20 years of intensive enforcement has done little
to reduce drug abuse."334 The same article quoted Judge Irving R.
Kaufman as stating, "[]aw enforcement has been tested to the uftmost, but let's face it, it just hasn't worked. 33' Law enforcement
diehards should take note of the failure of the death penalty-liberally applied-to stop drugs in Malaysia.33 6 Despite 18
death sentences and four executions, "authorities reported in late
1981 widespread use of illicit drugs. ' 37
A General Accounting Office (GAO) report released at the
White House Conference for a Drug Free America in 1988 contains
overwhelming evidence of the failure of President Reagan's war on
drugs.338 Contrary to the claims of some critics, the Reagan war on
drugs did not fail for lack of trying. The federal drug control budget
increased from $1.2 billion in 1981 to nearly $4 billion in 1987. 339
The FBI and the military were brought into drug enforcement. 4 °
Two major pieces of legislation were passed to toughen penalties and
give enforcers more powers-the Comprehensive Crime Control Act
of 1984341 and the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1986.342 Arrests rose 58
percent and federal prisons became filled with convicted drug dealers.343 Drug seizures greatly increased-362 percent in the case of
333.

Brinkley, 4-Year Fight in Florida 'Just Can't Stop Drugs', N.Y. Times, Sept. 4,

1986, at Al, col. 2.
334.

Brinkley, Fighting Narcotics is Everyone's Issue Now, N.Y. Times, Aug. 10. 1986,

§ 4, at 1,col. 2.
335.

Id.

336. See

U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, INTERNATIONAL
205 (Mar. 1989) (describing Malaysia's drug laws
as among the world's most severe and noting that Malaysia's Dangerous Drug Act stipulates
the mandatory death sentence for narcotics trafficking).
337. Trebach, The Lesson of Ayatollah Khalkhali, 13 J. DRUG ISSUES 379, 383-84
BUREAU OF INT'L NARCOTICS MATTERS,

NARCOTICS CONTROL STRATEGY REPORT

(1983).
338.
339.
340.
341.
342.

See generally GAO REPORT, supra note 225.
Id. at 28 (noting further that in 1988 the budget was reduced to $3 million).
See id. at 29.
Pub. L. 98-473, 98 Stat. 1976 (codified in scattered sections of 21 U.S.C.)
Pub. L. No. 99-570, 100 Stat. 3207 (codified in scattered sections of 18 and 31

U.S.C.).
343. See GAO REPORT, supra note 225, at 30 (noting that "[c]ombined arrests of drug
violators by DEA, FBI, and the United States Customs Service (Customs) and the U.S. Coast
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cocaine from 1982 to 1986.1""
The GAO reported the results:
-Drug abuse in the United States has persisted at a very high level
throughout the 1980s. 45
-Cocaine: The amount of cocaine consumed more than doubled.
The price declined about 30 percent. The346average purity doubled.
rose substantially.

Cocaine-related deaths
*Herbin:The price of heroin declined 20 percent. The average purity rose 33 percent. Heroin-related deaths rose substantially. 341
-Marijuana: While use declined, "[m]arijuana continues to be
readily available in most areas of the country, with a trend toward
increased potency levels." Marijuana is now grown in all fifty
states and "[to avoid detection, marijuana growers are moving
their operations indoors and are growing smaller and more scattered plots outdoors. 3 48
M.

Why ProhibitionFails

Why did the Reagan war on drugs fail? The reasons for this are
best seen by examining the motivations of drug users, sellers and
enforcers.
Human beings experience life through their consciousness and
emotions. Drugs have a direct, powerful, and predictable effect on
these. Drug laws on the other hand have an occasional impact on the
drug user and many drug users persist in their use even after being
penalized by law. Obviously, for them, the subjective benefits of
drugs outweigh the costs of criminal penalties.
Even without criminal penalties, many drug users continue to
use drugs in the face of the severe physical penalties drugs impose on
their bodies. Again, they simply consider the psychic benefit of drug
use to be more important than the harm the drugs do to their bodies.
The fact is that drugs motivate some people-those who most need
protection from them-more than any set of penalties a civilized society can impose, even more than some less-than-civilized societies
have imposed. This is why the undeniable seductiveness of drugs,
usually thought of as a justification for prohibition, actually argues
Guard increased from 30,446 in 1982 to 48,061 in 1986 .....
344. Id.

345. See id. at 3.
346. Id. at 7-8.
347. Id. at 11-12.
348. Id. at 16.
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for legalization. If drugs are so seductive, the laws will fail to deter
millions of drug users and will greatly increase the social costs of
their drug use.
As far as drug sellers are concerned, a similar motivational gap
exists. Drug sellers are simply more highly motivated than those who
are paid to stop them. This is not a criticism of drug enforcement
personnel-it is just a fact. Drug sellers make enormous profits selling drugs-more money than they could make at other illegal activities (otherwise they would already be engaging in those other activities), and much more money than they could make at legal jobs.
They are willing to risk death and long prison terms to make this
profit. They are professionals, on the job 24 hours a day, and able to
pour huge amounts of capital into their enterprises as needed. They
are willing to murder competitors, informers and police as needed.
On the other hand, law enforcement officers get paid whether
they catch drug dealers or not. They have virtually no economic
stake in the success of their efforts, aside from incremental salary
increases. While it is true that they also risk their lives in their jobs,
drug dealers face a much greater risk of violent death than policemen-perhaps a hundred times greater. Drug dealers have ten times
as much money to work with as do drug enforcers. Drug enforcement is a bureaucracy and suffers from all the inefficiencies of bureaucracies, 349 while drug dealers are akin to free-market entrepreneurs, unrestrained by arbitrary bureatcratic rules and procedures.
They do what needs to be done based on their own judgment. They
are not restrained by law as are drug enforcers.
The public has been given the false impression that drug enforcers are highly innovative and continually devising new schemes to
catch drug dealers, always one step ahead of the dealers. Actually,
the reverse is true. The dealers, like any other successful businessmen, are usually one step ahead of the "competition":
Private firms [read: drug dealers] are constantly seeking new products and practices to give them a competitive edge. They adapt
swiftly to changing market conditions, knowing that the failure to
do so might lead to bankruptcy.
The rate of innovation in public operations [DEA] is much
slower, and public services [drug enforcement] appear to change
very slowly over time. During the time when a private sector good
or service may change beyond recognition, the public sector seems
349.

See generally M.

PRIVATIZATION

PIRIE, DISMANTLING THE STATE: THE THEORY AND PRACTICE OF

12-13 (1985) (describing in detail these inefficiencies).
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to turn out the same products year after year. The low rate of innovation in the state's postal services, for example, contrasts sharply
with innovations of private postal services.310
Finally, drug dealers can use their enormous profits to bribe the
police. A predictable minority of enforcement agents will always decide that the monetary benefit of a bribe is more important than the
moral cost and legal risk of corruption, particularly when it is so
clear that their legitimate efforts have been futile. Drugs are available in prisons, not so much because friends and relatives smuggle
them in, but more often because the drugs are supplied by corrupt
prison guards eager to supplement their income.
It is easy to get lost in piles of numbers, names, dates, and
places when evaluating the effect of drug enforcement. It is more
important to keep in mind the ultimately decisive facts of human
motivation. These facts guarantee that wars on drugs will always
fail.
N. The Policy Alternatives
If drug prohibition has failed, the next question is what policy
alternatives are available. It is best to see reform alternatives as gradations leading from outright criminal prohibition to outright free
availability. The options are presented in the following chart:

350.

Id. at 12-13.
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ALTERNATIVES TO PROHIBITION

Status Ouo
Prohibition

Criminal ban on production, sale and use.

Option A
Decriminalization
(new British
system)

Government-controlled distribution through
clinics only for short-term treatment purposes-criminal penalties for unauthorized sale
and use.

Option B
Decriminalization

Government controlled distribution through
clinics for long-term maintenance-criminal
penalties for unauthorized sale and use.

Option C
Decriminalization
(old British
system)

Government-controlled distribution; availability by prescription from any physician
for treatment or maintenance-criminal
penalties for non-prescription sale and use.

Option D
Legalization
(British and
American systems
prior to 1914)

Distribution, sale and use regulated on a par
with the alcoholic beverage industry; nonprescription use by adults permitted.

Keep in mind that the variations are endless. Nevertheless,
these are our basic choices. Options A, B, and C are various types of
"decriminalization," while "legalization" is represented by Option
D. Option C represents, more or less, the old British system, while
Option A represents the new British system.
In 1989, New York State Senator Joseph Galiber of the Bronx
introduced a bill to establish a regulatory authority which would legalize the sale and use of illegal drugs on a par with the sale and use
of alcohol. 351
The arguments previously presented indicate Option D or legalization is the best choice. Legalization (non-prescription availability)
351. S. 1918, 1989-90 N.Y. Reg. Sess. (intro. Sen. Galiber Feb. 6, 1989); see also
Galiber, A Bill to Repeal Criminal Drug Laws: Replacing Prohibition With Regulation, 18
HOFSTRA L. REV. 854 (1990).
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was our policy and England's until 1914, and continues to be our
policy on alcohol and tobacco use. The medical danger from these
drugs is comparable, to say the least, to that of heroin or cocaine. 52
There is no logical basis for distinguishing between these drugs. Supporters of prohibition illustrate this when they attempt to find a distinguishing criterion. Faced with clear evidence of the greater deadliness of tobacco and alcohol, they lamely assert that the difference
between the legal and illegal drugs is that the various legislatures
have chosen to treat them differently. This is question-begging in its
purest form-the, very issue in dispute is the rationality of this
choice.
In its simplest terms, the choice between decriminalization and
legalization is a choice between solving the entire problem (or close
to it) or solving part of the problem. Since the drug black market is
the cause of most illegal drug-related problems, the goal of reform is
to eliminate the black market. Legalization does this; decriminalization does not. For example, dispensing drugs in federal clinics staffed
by psychiatrists would probably draw some business away from the
black market. Those who did not want to be treated by psychiatrists
or take their drug in a clinical setting would continue to fuel a violent and destructive black market. How many drinkers would go to a
hospital and drink liquor while being harangued by psychiatrists?
Since the goal of reform is elimination of the black market, we
should be wary of legalization schemes which propose heavy taxation
and regulation of the legalized drug industry. Economist Richard
Stevenson, Department of Economics, Liverpool University, warns:
Markets may not be perfect. Mistakes would be made and some
firms would break the law, but it does not follow that governments
ought to intervene, or could do so usefully. If markets had weaknesses, citizens would respond in a variety of ways to protect their
interests ....

One danger with regulation is that politicians and

bureaucrats will so fetter the market as to make it unprofitable for
law-abiding firms. Unless regulatory restraint was exercised, the
aims of legalization could be frustrated. At best, responsible firms
would lack incentive to innovate, at worst, the criminal market
could re-emerge. The other risk is that the heavy hand of government intervention may stifle private initiative and prevent citizens
from solving their own problems.13 a
352. See Appendix, infra notes 380-459 and accompanying text.
353. Remarks by Richard Stevenson, Liverpool University Department of Economics, at
International Conference on Drug Policy Reform, Washington, D.C. (Nov. 1989) (on file at
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The British Systems-Old and New

Since the goal of reform is to eliminate the black market and its
attendant problems, the central test for judging the success or failure
of reform is whether this goal has been accomplished. However,
those who oppose any form of decriminalization or legalization sometimes proffer different criteria for evaluating the results of reform.
The prime example is their ubiquitous claim that "the British system
failed." Many who claim that the British system failed are not very
clear on exactly how and why it failed. Presumably, what they mean
is that during the 1960s, while doctors were allowed to prescribe heroin on a long-term basis, overall heroin use rose substantially.354
However, this argument cannot withstand scrutiny.
In the 1920's, the British elected to follow "the medical model"
of drug control (while the United States adopted the "criminal
model"). 355 Private physicians were allowed to prescribe heroin and
other controlled drugs to their patients in their discretion. By most
accounts, the system worked fairly well for the next forty years: the
number of users remained low; they were receiving quality-controlled
drugs under medical supervision; and no substantial criminal black
market developed.3 56
However, in the 1960s, the number of heroin users increased
substantially, especially among the young.35 These new users received their supply from illegal imports and from "grey market" sellers: users who received large amounts of prescribed heroin from a
few cooperative physicians.358
In response to this situation, the system was altered in the late
1960's. The right of individual physicians to prescribe heroin was
taken away.35 Drug Treatment Centers (DTCs) were established to
Hofstra Law Review).
354. See Stimson, The War on Heroin: British Policy and the International Trade in
Illicit Drugs in A LAND FIT FOR HEROIN? 35, 39 (N. Dorn & N. South eds. 1987). "In 1968,
after what had been seen as a major increase in the extent of heroin addiction, the total number of addicts known ... was only 2782." Id.
355. See Stimson, supra note 354, at 36-39 (discussing "the medico-centrism of British
Policy").
356. See Fazey, The British System Has Not Failed in DRUG POLICY 1989-1990: A
REFORMER'S CATALOGUE 195, 196 (1989); see also E. BRECHER, supra note 28, at 122-23
(discussing the lack of a black market for heroin in Great Britain).
357. See E. BRECHER, supra note 28, at 123-24.
358, Fazey, supra note 356, at 196. It was called the grey market because the supply
came from a legal, rather than illegal, source. Id.
359. Id. In the new system, only "more senior, hospital based, doctors could prescribe
for addicts." Id.
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treat users. While heroin could still be prescribed at DTC's, the emphasis was on "curing" users, not maintaining them on a long-term
basis.360 As a result,61the prescription of heroin, while still allowed,
3
slowed to a trickle.
The claim that the British system failed appears to be based on
the fact that drug use apparently increased under heroin maintenance in the 1960's. s62 However, to argue that the system caused
this use is to confuse correlation with causation. If the British system
"caused" increased drug use in the 1960's, why did it fail to cause
increased use in the previous four decades? If the British system
caused increased drug use in Britain, what caused the same increase
in the United States at the same time? Finally, drug use continued
to rise even under the new British system. 6
Neither the American nor British systems-nor any other system known to man-has been able to stop intermittent increases in
drug use.
As Arnold Trebach wrote:
The clinics ... were instructed to stop the spread of heroin addic-

tion in the general population. But no one-not the second Brain
committee, not the other experienced drug-abuse doctors, not the
criminologists, not the police, and certainly not the visiting Ameri-

can experts-knew then, and no one knows now, how to perform
that task."5 4

Erich Goode concurs:
[TIhere is at present no possible solution to the drug problem.
There is no program in effect or under discussion that offers any
hope whatsoever of a "solution." Asking for the solution to the
drug problem is a little like asking for the solution to the accident
problem, the problem of crime and violence, the problems created
by the economy. 65
360. See generally W. CUSKEY, A. KLEIN & W. KRASNER, DRUG TRIP ABROAD 141-53
(1972) (describing the treatment-clinics); see also, Fazey, supra note 356, at 196 (discussing
doctors' and nurses' desire to cure addicts rather than maintain their addiction).
361. However, in response to the drug-related AIDS crisis, there are indications that
policy may be shifting back to long-term maintenance. See Fazey, supra note 356, at 198.
362. Brecher suggests that the "increase" was a statistical artifact. E. BRECHER supra
note 28, at 127.
363. The number of heroin addicts estimated in Britain rose from 2,782 in 1968 to
12,489 in 1984. Stimson, supra note 355, at 39.
364. A. TREBACH, supra note 34, at 220.
365. E. GOODE, supra note 206, at 253.
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While neither system stopped drug use, the old British system
minimized the social harmfulness of drug use. Under the old British
system, there was virtually no black market nor organized crime and
little drug-related crime or violence.3"' The users themselves were
better off since they were receiving quality-controlled drugs and
medical treatment and were not branded as criminals and social

outcasts.
Predictably, when the British moved toward the criminal model
of drug control, the effective termination of heroin maintenance
forced users to turn to the ever-waiting black market, leading to an
1
"explosion of heroin importation" in the 1980's:36
7

The evidence ... suggest[s] that the illicit market in heroin, and
the involvement of criminal syndicates, increased in direct relationship to the policy of the clinics of rapidly cutting heroin
prescribing.3 68
Arnold Trebach agrees:
Inspector [H.B.] Spear is convinced that the new crop of younger
addicts, having been repelled in various ways by the clinics, is
resorting to the street, to the black market, and to crime in order to
obtain money to buy drugs. .

.

.Detective Chief Inspector Colin

Coxall estimated in July 1979 that 3,700 heroin addicts were on
the streets of London using illegal drugs and that these addicts
were spending between 60 and 80 [pounds] per day to satisfy their
habit. Most were forced to resort to crime in order to find that
much money. He calculated that 147 million [pounds] (approximately $382 million) worth of illegal heroin was being traded on
the streets of London annually.36 9
Even the British government now acknowledges a "growing incidence of serious crime associated with the illegal supply of controlled drugs" and describes the drug problem as "the most serious
366.

There is practically no illicit traffic in opiates [in Britain], because the legal provision of low-cost drugs ...

has largely eliminated the profit incentives supporting

such a traffic. Similarly ....serious addict-crime is almost non-existent. The addict
in Britain need not become a thief or a prostitute in order to support his habit ....
Stimson, supra note 355, at 37 (quoting E. SCHUR, CRIMES WITHOUT VICTIMS 154-55 (1965)).
367. Mersey Regional Alcohol and Drug Dependence Unit, Countess of Chester Hospital, The Decline of Long-term Prescribingto Opiod Users in the United Kingdom, 82 BRIT. J.
OF ADDICTION 457 (1987).
368. Leech, Leaving it to the Market, NEW STATESMAN, Jan. 4, 1985, at 8-9.
369. A. TREBACH, supra note 34, at 212.
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peacetime threat to our national well-being. 370
Since the drug black market is the source of most illegal drugrelated problems, we must eliminate that market to the greatest extent possible. Legalization is the most efficient means of doing this.
Decriminalization, such as the old British system, is less efficient in
combatting the black market. However, as a first step toward re
form, it would represent a vast improvement over current policies.
The new British system, by forcing drug users into the black
market, created an American-style drug problem in that country in a
few short years. The new British system failed because it adopted
the failed American "criminal model" of drug control.

IV.

HOPE FOR THE FUTURE

Most of the serious problems the public associates with illegal
drug use are in reality caused directly or indirectly by drug
prohibition.
Let's assume that we did end the war on drugs. What would
that mean? The day after legalization goes into effect, the streets of
America will be safer. The drug dealers will be gone. The shootouts
between drug dealers will end. Innocent bystanders will not be murdered anymore. Hundreds of thousands of drug "addicts" will no
longer be roaming the streets, shoplifting, mugging, breaking into
homes in the middle of the night to steal, dealing violently with those
who happen to wake up. One year after prohibition is repealed, 825
innocent people who would otherwise have been dead at the hands of
drug criminals will be alive and well. 7 '
Within days of prohibition repeal, thousands of judges, prosecutors and police will be freed up to catch, try, and imprison violent
career criminals, men who commit 50 to 100 serious crimes per year
when on the loose, including robbery, rape and murder.3 72 For the
first time in years, our overcrowded prisons will have room for these
men. Ultimately, repeal of prohibition will open up 75,000 jail
cells.3 Imagine the impact of locking up 75,000 violent criminals,
each of whom would have committed 50 crimes per year.
The day after repeal, organized crime gets a big pay cut-$80
370.

BRITISH INFORMATION

MISUSE IN BRITAIN 1

SERVICES, THE PREVENTION AND

(1985) (quoting HOME

TREATMENT OF DRUG

AFFAIRS COMMITTEE, HOUSE OF COMMONS, RE-

(May 1985)).
371. See supra note 197 and accompanying text.
372. See 1988 SOURCEBOOK supra note 239, at 620.
373. Id.
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billion a year. a"4
How about those slick young drug dealers who are the new role
models for the youth of our cities, with their designer clothes and
Mercedes convertibles, always wearing a broad smug smile that says,
crime pays? They snicker at the honest kids going to school or working for minimum wage. The day after repeal, the honest kids will
have the last laugh. The dealers will be out of a job, unemployed.
The day after repeal, honest drug education can begin. For the
first time in history, it can be honest. There will be no need to prop
up the failed war on drugs.
The year before repeal, 500,000 Americans died from illnesses
related to overeating and lack of exercise;37 5 390,000 died from
smoking;376 and 150,000 died from drinking alcohol.3 7 7 About 3,000
died from cocaine, heroin, and marijuana combined, and many of
these deaths resulted from the lack of quality control in the black
market. '78 The day after repeal, cocaine, heroin and marijuana will,
by and large, do no harm to those who choose not to consume them.
In contrast, the day before prohibition repeal, all Americans,
whether or not they chose to use illegal drugs, were forced to endure
the violence, street crime, erosion of civil liberties, corruption and
social and economic decay caused by the war on drugs.
This is why, at this point in the cost-benefit argument, utilitarian analysis breaks down and drug legalization unavoidably becomes a moral issue. The war on drugs is immoral as well asimpractical. It imposes enormous costs, including the ultimate cost of death,
on large numbers of innocent non-drug abusing citizens such as
Vernia Brown, 379 in the failed attempt to save a relatively small
group of hard core drug abusers from themselves. It is immoral and
absurd to force some people to bear costs so that others might be
prevented from choosing to do harm to themselves. This crude utilitarian sacrifice-so at odds with traditional American values-has
never been justified and can never be justified. That is why we must
end the war on drugs and why the war on drugs will be ended once
the public comes to understand the truth about this destructive
See supra notes 229-37 and accompanying text.
AMERICAN HEART ASS'N, 1990 HEART AND STROKE FACTS 20 (1989) (citing
statistics relating obesity and physical inactivity to coronary heart disease).
374.

375. See

376. See infra note 429 and accompanying text.
377.

See infra note 430 and accompanying text.

378. See supra note 213-28 and accompanying text.
379. See supra notes 155-65 and accompanying text.
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policy.
V.

CONCLUSION

Drug prohibition is immoral because it violates the individual
right of self-ownership. Drug prohibition is also a practical failure.
The moral and practical arguments come together since prohibition
fails precisely because it violates the right of self-ownership. Prohibition relies on force as opposed to persuasion to achieve its goal. Tens
of millions of Americans who have not been rationally persuaded to
avoid drug use are using illegal drugs in spite of the law whenever
the force of law is absent. In a free society, it is in the nature of law
enforcement to be absent most of the time.
While prohibition fails to deter millions of individual drug users
whose main risk of arrest occurs only when purchases are made, prohibition does absolutely deter legitimate businesses from entering the
drug market. Since businesses would have to establish fixed locations
for production, distribution and sale, drug enforcement would put
them out of business within hours. Thus, prohibition, by violating the
rights of legitimate businessmen and women to produce and sell
drugs to willing buyers, destroys any possibility of a drug market
which would produce drugs designed to reduce the chances of death
by overdose and other maladies, and to sell drugs at a low enough
price so that consumers would not have to impoverish themselves to
buy them.
Prohibition, by mandating that the conditions of drug production, distribution, and sale will be secrecy, violence, and risk, puts
the drug industry in the hands of professionals in the art of engaging
in clandestine action and systematic violence; avoiding arrest, conviction, and imprisonment and tolerating the same if necessary. Since
the risks of engaging in clandestine activities and systematic violence, and facing long prison terms are very high, illegal drug users
pay very high prices to compensate drug dealers for the cost of these
risks.
Violence between dealers is common because it is their primary
mode of resolving disputes since they are denied access to the courts.
Further, to be a dealer means that one is more willing to use violence
and incur the risk of violence than the average person. Thus, dealers
use this "skill" to enhance the profitability of their businesses by
murdering their competitors.
In sum, each of the problems caused by prohibition is ultimately
traceable to the fact that individuals are prevented from acting on
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their own judgment by the initiation of force by the state. It is not
that prohibition violates individual rights to liberty and also happens
not to work. Rather, prohibition does not work because it violates the
individual right to liberty.
APPENDIX
THE RELATIVE HARMFULNESS OF TOBACCO, ALCOHOL, HEROIN
AND COCAINE

One of the many myths underlying the policy of prohibition is
the belief that the drugs we have decided to prohibit are much more
dangerous than those which remain legal. Actually, the reverse is
true. The two main legal drugs-tobacco and alcohol-are more
deadly than heroin or cocaine would be if made legally available,
and marijuana has apparently caused no deaths at all.
I.

CHRONIC EFFECTS

The main danger from heroin and cocaine is death from acute
intoxication (overdose). This issue is discussed in the following section. However, the chronic or long-term effects of these drugs are not
as severe as those of their legal counterparts.
There is thus general agreement throughout the medical and psychiatric literature that the overall effects of opium, morphine, and
heroin on the addict's mind and body under conditions of low price
and ready availability are on the whole amazingly bland. 380
James Q. Wilson, an opponent of legalization, concurs; "While it is
true that heroin, by itself, does not cause, so far as we know, any
organic illness and could, in principle, be taken safely . . . its use,
and especially in the setting in which it is used, is far from
benign.38
After an exhaustive survey of the medical and social aspects of
cocaine use, Drs. Lester Grinspoon and James Bakalar conclude:
The dangers of cocaine are not of the nature or degree that the law
now implies and the public now assumes. There is little evidence
that it is likely to become as serious a social problem as alcohol (or
firearms) or as serious a health problem as tobacco ....The most
humane and sensible way to deal with [drugs]. . .is
to create a
social situation in which they can be used in a controlled fashion
380.

381.
added).

E.BRECHER, supra note 28, at 27.
Wilson, The Fix (Book Review), NEw

REPUBLIC,
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and with moderation. 82
In contrast, the chronic effects of tobacco and alcohol are devastating. Tobacco causes cancer, heart disease and emphysema.3 3 Alcohol consumption causes anemia, fatty liver, hepatitis, cirrhosis,
pancreatitis, gastritis, ulcer, hypoglycemia, congestive heart failure,
ataxia, brain damage, blurred vision, dementia, cranial nerve palsy,
circulatory collapse, and hemorrhages." 4
II. ACUTE EFFECTS
For the purposes of cost-benefit analysis, the purely medical effects of illegal drug use must be distinguished from the physical
harm caused by black market factors. The problem (for supporters
of prohibition) is that illegal drug use is shrouded in mystery and
ignorance and is cut off from the usual protections of legal drug use.
The entire social, chemical and informational context is different.
Under legalization, drug use would gradually return to lower
dosages and safer forms of administration, as did alcohol use after
repeal of prohibition. The universal tendency of prohibition, in addition to eliminating quality control, is to encourage the use of the
most potent drug formulations administered in the most radical
ways. From the producer's perspective, the need to smuggle encourages the sale of potent, less bulky drugs. From the consumer's perspective, the radical means of administration, such as injection, give
him "more bang for the buck" he pays for an expensive drug. This
trend was apparent in the early days of prohibition:
The various laws designed to restrict the use of narcotics by addicts
have almost completely done away with opium smoking, and have
tended to drive laudanum (alcohol mixed with morphine) and gum
opium users, who have failed to be cured, to the use of the alkaloids, because in this form the drug is much less bulky and conse35
quently can be more easily obtained and concealed. 1
The main intrinsic danger of both cocaine and heroin is acute
intoxication. 386 Due to black market factors, however, users do not
382.

L. GRINSPOON & J.B. BAKALAR, supra note 208, at 232-33.

383. See, e.g., UNITED STATES DEPT. OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVS., THE HEALTH
CONSEQUENCES OF SMOKING: NICOTINE ADDICTION 11-12 (1988).
384. See A.M. HARVEY, R. JOHNS, V. McKusiCK, A. OWENS & R. Ross, THE PRINCIPLES AND PRACTICE OF MEDICINE 452 (12th ed. 1980).
385. Kolb & Du Mez, supra note 323, at 1190.
386. See generally E. BRECHER, supra note 28, at 21-32, 101-14 (discussing heroin and
other opiates); Buchannan, Cocaine Intoxication:A Review of the Presentationand Treatment
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know the exact strength of the drug. Nor do they know the lethal
dose. Any deaths resulting from such ignorance must be presumed to
be caused by black market factors. To prove otherwise, it would have
to be shown that the user would have knowingly taken a lethal dose
in spite of warnings on the label to the contrary.
In addition to the general presumption that illegal drug deaths
are caused by the black market, there is a great deal of specific evidence that this is the case.
A. Heroin
Brecher reports that many heroin deaths are caused by an allergic reaction to the unpredictable street mixture of the drug. 387 Another 30 percent of the deaths are caused by '"tetanus, hepatitis, or
bacterial endocarditis, all contracted from bad heroin or dirty
syringes."388
Many deaths originally attributed to heroin use, have been later
found to have been caused by AIDS. 89 As noted in the text, drugrelated AIDS is almost purely a creation of the drug black market.
This is one possible explanation for the sharp rise in so-called heroin
deaths in recent years at a time when the level of heroin use was
relatively stable.
The medical literature indicates that the main causes of acute
heroin death are the use of heroin with alcohol, the presence of quinine and other impurities in the heroin street mixture, and the unpredictable and unknown potency of black market heroin. 390 Each of
these factors is largely the consequence of the black market context
of drug use.
Prohibition contributes to alcohol/heroin deaths in several ways.
First, since heroin is illegal, the usual warning labels of over-thecounter drugs are lacking. Second, given a social philosophy of "zero
tolerance" for drug use, absolutely no attempt is made to publicly
warn heroin users not to mix these two drugs. Brecher rightly deof Medical Complication (1988), reprinted in Born Hooked: Confronting the Impact of PerInatal Substance Abuse, Hearings Before the Select Comm. on Children, Youth and Families,

House of Representatives 101st Cong., Ist Sess. 37-41 (1989).
387. E. BRECHER, supra note 28, at 101-14.
388. N. ZINBERG & J. ROBERTSON, supra note 224, at 204.
389.

A recent study concluded that thousands of deaths previously thought to have been
LARGER SPECTRUM OF SEVERE HIV-1 RELATED DISEASE IN INTRAVENOUS DRUG USERS IN NEw YORK CITY, 242 Sc. 916-17 (1989).

drug-related, were actually caused by AIDS. A

390. See E. BRECHER, supra note 28, at 101-14 (discussing the effects of the black market for heroin).
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cried this failure in 1972, but 18 years later, there are still no public
warnings against mixing heroin and alcohol. One pamphlet put out
by New York State, which warns against mixing alcohol with a long
list of drugs, fails to mention heroin." 1 Apparently, heroin users are
expected to peruse medical journals to learn a crucial life-saving
fact, Finally, Brecher points out that drug users often alternate alcohol with heroin as a result of high heroin prices.392 In contrast, when
inexpensive opiates are available, the tendency to use both drugs is
reduced, even among former alcoholics. 93
There is no doubt that even after receiving warnings and reliable information, some reckless individuals will continue to mix heroin
and alcohol. This is no argument against legalization. Individuals
who would destroy themselves even when full information is available are certainly already destroying themselves. Legalization, leading
to the free flow of reliable drug information, will save the lives of
many other users who simply do not know that mixing alcohol and
heroin can be deadly.
The presence of quinine in the blood of heroin "overdose" victims has often been noted.394 Quinine, which has long been used as
an adulterant in heroin street bags,395 is known to cause rapid death
due to pulmonary edema (fluid in the lungs). 39 Brecher urged in
1972 that researchers study whether quinine could be the cause of
many heroin-related deaths. 7 In 1983, eleven years and thousands
of deaths later, a Centers for Disease Control report stated, "The
association between quinine and [heroin-related deaths] ...conflicts

' A 1984 artiwith past reports and merits further consideration." 398
cle "suggest[ed] the potential lethality of the quinine injected by de-

cedents in this epidemic . . . -39" In 1985, another report stated,
"[T]he relatively high occurrence of. . . quinine in narcotism cases is
391.

DIVISION OF SUBSTANCE ABUSE SERVS., STATE OF N.Y., CAUTION: DRUGS & ALCO-

HOL DON'T MIX! (1984).

392. See E. BRECHER, supra note 28, at 8-12.
393. Id.
394. See id. at 110 (noting that quinine is the standard adulterent of heroin sold in New

York City).
395. Id.

396. Id.
397. Id. at 114.
398. CENTERS FOR DISEASE CONTROL, Heroin-Related Deaths-Districtof Columbia,
1980-1982, 32 MORBIDITY AND MORTALITY WEEKLY REP. 321, 323 (1983).
399. Ruttenber & Luke, Heroin-Related Deaths: New Epidemiologic Insights, 226 Sci.
14, 19 (1984).
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also noteworthy. 40 0
From these facts, three important lessons can be drawn. First, it
is difficult and time-consuming to gain accurate knowledge about illegal drug deaths. Second, there is virtually no political or social
pressure to determine the causes of illegal drug deaths or to do anything about them. Finally, even if we had perfect knowledge of the
causes of illegal drug deaths and the will to do something about
them, so long as the drugs in question remain illegal, no legal or
social structure will exist within which to act. Quality control over
an illegal drug is an oxymoron.
The other major cause of heroin-related deaths is the variable
potency of the heroin street mixture. "Heroin-related deaths are associated with the amount of heroin and quinine in street packages. 40 1 In the black market, the buyer can never be certain what
that amount is.
An examination of the patterns of heroin deaths over the years
confirms that the bulk of these deaths are the result of unpredictable
changes in the heroin street mixture. For example, heroin deaths in
New York City were steady and low until the 1950's, when they
started to rise much faster than heroin use increased. 0 2 This sharp
rise in deaths must be attributable to a factor other than heroin consumption. Similarly, the pattern of heroin deaths in the District of
Columbia from 1971 through 1982 is so unusual that it could not
possibly correlate with the level of heroin use. In the third quarter of
1972, no deaths occurred, but in the second quarter of 1981, 42
deaths were reported. 3 Varying and unknown potency of drugs is
the most likely explanation for such widely varying mortality rates.
There is no evidence that the low price of heroin (or cocaine) under
legalization would lead users to keep consuming the drug until death
ensues.
Finally, there is a well known antidote to narcotics overdose-naloxone.0 4 Whether there is some way to reduce the risk of
overdose by putting naloxone or another narcotic antagonist into the
400. Caplan, Ottinger, Park & Smith, Drug and Chemical Related Deaths: Incidence in
the State of Maryland-1975 to 1980, 30 J.FORENSIC SCI. 1012, 1018 (1985).

401.

Ruttenber & Luke, supra note 399, at 17.

402.

See E. BRECHER, supra note 28, at 103 (showing graphically the number of deaths

caused by the use of narcotics (mostly heroin) in New York City from 1918-1971).
403. See Centers for Disease Control, supra note 398, at 322 (charting the number of
heroin deaths in the District of Columbia between 1971-1982 inclusive).
404. See E. BRECHER, supra note 28, at 159. Another drug that is an effective antidote
is nalorphine. Id. at 102.
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heroin mixture is a possibility which is likely to be explored by pharmaceutical companies under legalization. While such companies
should be immune from suit for any side effects which are fully disclosed on labels, they would, nevertheless, attempt to make their
products as safe as possible to avoid the high costs of even spurious
lawsuits (and to avoid losing customers). Naturally, such a strategy
would work only if the antidote did not block the euphoric effect of
the drug, thus forcing the drug user back to the black market.
Many will be outraged at the notion of making drugs safer.
They will argue that we should not make drugs safer because more
people will use them. Such an argument is nonsensical: we should
not eliminate the danger of drug use because people should not use
dangerous drugs. A sizable number of human beings are going to use
drugs whetherwe want them to or not. It is inhumane to support a
policy which greatly increases the hazards of drug use. Ultimately,
the argument for making drugs safer is simple: drugs should be
made safer because, as New York Governor Mario Cuomo stated in
his landmark speech: "life is better than death. 4 °5
B.

Cocaine
There is abundant evidence in the medical literature that a
large number of cocaine-related deaths are traceable to the side effects of drug prohibition:
•"On the street, [cocaine's] purity is highly variable (up to 95 percent) and reflects 'cutting' with various sugars, local anesthetics,
caffeine, amphetamines, heroin, phencyclidine, and quinidine....
Most of these [77 cocaine] fatalities were due to nonspecific pulmonary edema believed secondary to either an anaphylactic reaction
to impurities or rapid absorption of the drug .... [e]ither cocaine

or one of its contaminants could contribute to [coronary
thrombosis] ."406
*"No cases were encountered where sudden death occurred following the medical administration of cocaine. Hence, cocaine, in this
presentation, actually refers to the illicit street drug of variable purity and usually diluted ("cut") with mannitol. The preparation
may also contain
other additives such as procaine, lidocaine, or
4 0' 7
amphetamine.
405. Keynote address by Mario Cuomo, Governor of New York State, 1984 Democratic
Convention at San Francisco, California (July 16, 1984).
406. Mathias, Cocaine-Associated Myocardial Ischemia, 81 AM. J. MED. 675-77
(1986).
407. Mittleman & Welti, Cocaine and Sudden 'NaturalDeath, 32 J. FORENSIC SCI. 1,
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-"The purity of cocaine purchased on the40 8street may vary from
25% to 90%, with unpredictable effects.
*"[T]he relative purity of street cocaine has increased from about
10% to nearly 35% over
the time when these cases [cocaine
'40 9
deaths] were identified.
Thus, as with heroin, it appears that adulterants and uncertain
potencies play a major role in cocaine-related deaths. Also, the occurrence of cocaine epidemics limited in time and place, such as a
1985 epidemic in Utah,4 10 tends to confirm the quality control thesis.
Certain beliefs about cocaine militate against the notion that
cocaine can ever be made safe even under legal quality controls.
These include the interrelated beliefs that some people have a particular sensitivity to cocaine and that even a small amount of cocaine
can be deadly. While it is true that cocaine cannot be made safe
under legalization, it can be made safer, probably much safer.
It is difficult to gather accurate information about cocaine
deaths because cocaine is illegal; evidence is destroyed, witnesses lie
and no labeled containers remain. There is a general tendency to
understate the amount of cocaine which caused a death because cocaine is broken down quickly by the body and is metabolized even
after death. 1 Once cocaine use is legalized, this information gap
can be substantially closed.
There is speculation that a relatively small number of persons
are particularly sensitive to cocaine because they lack the enzymes
needed to metabolize the drug. 412 Persons with liver disease may be
unknowingly at risk for cocaine overdose.41 3 Under prohibition, no
12 (1987).
408. Cregler & Mark, Cardiovascular Dangers of Cocaine Abuse, 57 AM. J. CARDIOLOGY 1185, 1185 (1986).
409. Welti & Fishbain, Cocaine-Induced Psychosis and Sudden Death in Recreational
Cocaine Users, 30 J. FORENSIC ScI. 873, 879 (1985).
410. Sanders, Ryser, Lamoreaux, & Raleigh An Epidemic of Cocaine Associated
Deaths in Utah, 30 J. FORENSIC ScL 478 (1985) (characterizing this particular cocaine epidemic as the establishment and dismantling of a single large cocaine operation)
411. Tazelaar & Karch, Stephens & Billingham, Cocaine and the Heart, 18 HUM. PATHOLOGY

195, 196 (1987).

412. Loveys, Physiologic Effects of Cocaine with Particular Reference to the Cardiovascular System, 16 HEART & LUNG 175, 176 (Mar. 1987) (stating that individuals with a
deficiency of pseudocholinesteras, one of the enzymes that breaks down cocaine, may experience more prolonged or toxic effects from cocaine use); Devenyi, Cocaine Complications and

Pseudocholinesterase, 110 (No. 2) ANNALS OF INTERNAL MED. 167 (1989) (advocating the
study of cocaine patients to determine the effect of enzyme deficiency).
413. See Loveys, supra note 412, at 176 (placing the metabolism of cocaine largely
within the liver).
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structure or incentives exist to determine, in advance of tragic death,
just who these people are. Under legalization, common sense and humane values would again prevail. Tests for sensitivity to cocaine
would probably be developed and available to those who choose to
use the drug.
Finally, as with heroin, antidotes to the lethal effects of cocaine
now exist. The most effective of these antitoxins appears to be nitrendipine.414 When administered to rats concurrently with cocaine,
this drug increased the animals' survival time four-fold and also increased the lethal dose of cocaine four-fold (meaning it took four
times as much cocaine to kill the rats). 415 The authors of the experiment conclude: "[t]his study illustrates the protective effects of nitrendipine on the cardiotoxicity of cocaine and also indicates that
nitrendipine is an anti-dote to the lethal toxicity of cocaine.... Nitrendipine also appears to antagonize some of the effects of cocaine
on the central nervous system."4 "
Approximately three million Americans are using cocaine in
spite of our best efforts to stop them.411 At the same time, a drug
exists that could substantially reduce the danger of using cocaine.
Just as black market drug sellers "cut" cocaine with adulterants,
perhaps legal drug manufacturers could "cut" cocaine with protective agents such as nitrendipine.418
C. Alcohol
As previously discussed, the chronic effects of heavy alcohol
consumption are devastating.4 19 These effects are not cured by legalization and quality controls. However, the acute effects of alcohol
were directly affected by Prohibition. During alcohol prohibition,
about 40 Americans per million died from acute alcohol poisoning. 20
414.

Trouve & Nahas, Nitrendipine: An Antidote to Cardiac and Lethal Toxicity of

Cocaine, 183 PROC. Soc'Y
415.

EXPERIMENTAL BIOLOGY AND MED.

392, 395 (1986).

Id. at 392.

416. Id. at 395.
417.

See supra note 324.

418. As with heroin, any antidote which completely blocks the "high" from the drug is
pointless as no one would leave the black market to buy such a drug. "There is no clear

answer" to whether nitrendipine would block the cocaine high. Interview with Dr. Renaud
Trouve, (Apr. 27, 1988), one of the authors of the nitrendipine study, see Trouve & Nahas,
supra note 414.
419. See supra note 384 and accompanying text.
420. T. SZASZ, supra note 62, at 200, (citing A. SINCLAIR, ERA OF ExcEss: A SOCIAL
HISTORY OF THE PROHIBITION MOVEMENT 201 (1964)); see also J. MENDELSON & N. MELLO,
ALCOHOL: USE AND ABUSE IN AMERICA

87 (1985) (stating that in 1927, there were almost
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In contrast, the acute alcohol death rate is about 4 per million,"' a
reduction in deaths at a ratio of 10 to 1. In the Soviet Union, in
1979, there were about 56,000 cases of acute alcohol poisoning,
about 200 per million, over 50 times the U.S. rate.422 Although
heavy alcohol consumption has traditionally been a problem in the
Soviet Union, by and large these deaths are the result of widespread
moonshining stimulated by high alcohol prices and low wages in that
country.423
D. Designer Drugs
Deaths from designer drugs are almost exclusively the result of
prohibition. Designer drugs are powerful synthetic drugs originally
designed to take advantage of chemical loopholes in federal and state
criminal drug laws.424 Their other function was to compete with natural opiates and cocaine made expensive by prohibition. 425 Designer
drugs can be as much as 6,000 times more potent than natural drugs
and are usually indistinguishable from them. 426 The lethal amount of
427
these drugs is so small that medical examiners often cannot find it.
Additionally, designer drugs may cause physiological harm with unforeseeable effects. Laws prohibiting the use of particular drugs foster the development of other drugs not yet prohibited, which drugs
may be potentially more dangerous than the known and prohibited
drugs.
Conclusion: It can be reasonably estimated that at least 80 per12,000 deaths from acute alcohol poisoning)
421. Acute alcohol poisonings averaged 380 per year from 1980 to 1983. See 35

MOR-

BIDITY AND MORTALITY WEEKLY REP. 3ss (Aug. 1986).

422. Kirn, In Time of Change, USSR Seeks to End Tradition of Extensive Alcohol Use
by Majority of Citizens, 258 J. A.M.A. 883, 883 (1987).
423. Id. at 884-85.
424. See supra note 225.
425,

By definition, the dealers of designer drugs do not have to compete with natural

opiates and cocaine. They are made from ordinary chemical compounds. See, e.g., Baum, New
Variety of Street Drugs Poses Growing Problem, 63

CHEM.

& ENG'G. NEws 7, 8 (Sept. 9,

1985). Baum stated the following:
The biggest motivation [of bucket chemists who produce designer drugs] is pure
profit. According to

...

a chemist ...

in Washington, D.C., in rough numbers a

$2,000 investment will yield about a kilogram of heroin worth about $1 million on
the street. A similar $2,000 investment in glassware and chemicals can be turned

into a kilogram of 3-methyl fentanyl, currently the most common fentanyl analog
being sold, worth about $1 billion (yes, billion!) on the street.
Id.
426. See Henderson, supra note 225, at 572-73.
427.

See Baum, supra note 425, at 9 (describing the process to develop the radioimmu-

noassay which can detect low concentrations of designer drugs in blood and urine).
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cent of current illegal drug deaths are attributable to the effects of
drug prohibition.
III. THE NUMBERS
The following chart presents the estimated per capita death
rates for each drug. Although a number of persons have died as a
result of marijuana enforcement, there are no confirmed deaths
traceable to marijuana use.428 The figures for cocaine and heroin
have been adjusted downward in accordance with the previous analysis to reflect only those deaths due to drug use per se and not to
prohibition. The unadjusted death rate for these drugs is in
parentheses.
DRUG

USERS

DEATHS PER
YEAR

DEATHS PER
10,000

Tobacco

60M

390,000429

650

Alcohol

looM

150,000430

150

Heroin

500,000

400431

80 (400)

Cocaine

5M

200432

4 (20)

Thus, for every death caused by the intrinsic effects of cocaine,
heroin kills 20, alcohol kills 37 and tobacco kills 132.
These numbers raise the interesting prospect that if tobacco and
428. See Nadelman, Drug Prohibitionin the United States: Costs, Consequences and
Alternatives, 245 Sci. 939, 943 (1989).
429.

U.S. SURGEON GENERAL, DEP'T OF HEALTH, EDUC. & WELFARE, REDUCING THE

HEALTH CONSEQUENCES OF SMOKING: 25 YEARS OF PROGRESS (1989).
430. See SECRETARY OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVS., SIXTH SPECIAL REPORT TO THE
U.S. CONGRESS ON ALCHOL AND HEALTH 11-12. Estimates vary greatly, depending upon

whether all health consequences are considered (for example, cancer, heart problems), or only
those traditionally associated with alcoholism (for example, cirrhosis of the liver, psychosis due
to brain damage). Id. at 9-10.
431. The number of deaths were determined as follows: Drug Abuse Warning Network
(DAWN) heroin and cocaine fatalities for 1984, 1985, and 1986 were averaged. See NATIONAL INST. ON DRUG ABUSE, U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH AND HUM. SERV., ANNUAL DATA 1986,
SERIES 1, No. 6 63-67. Suicides were subtracted since these represent a problem entirely different from accidental death from recreational drug use. Id. Figures were discounted to account for deaths in which both heroin and cocaine played a role. Since the DAWN system
covers about one-third of the nation's population, but almost all major urban areas where drug
use flourishes, the DAWN totals were doubled to arrive at the following yearly estimates:
heroin deaths-2,000; cocaine deaths-I,000. Finally, these figures were discounted by 80 percent in accordance with the analysis of the previous discussion. Id.
432. Id.
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alcohol users switched to narcotics or cocaine under legalization, a
substantial reduction in deaths would occur. 433 Furthermore, if the
manner of using opium and coca derivatives returned to pre-prohibition practice-drinking low-dose cocaine and drinking or smoking
opium or morphine (each weaker than heroin)-the death rate
would decline even further below that of alcohol and tobacco.
IV. POPULARITY AND ADDICTIVENESS

To complete the analysis, two additional factors must be considered. First, not only are the two legal drugs more dangerous than the
illegal drugs on a pro rata basis, but because they are also more
popular, their danger is magnified. The greater popularity of alcohol
and tobacco, at least in the Western world, as has been demonstrated over the centuries, was manifest in pre-prohibition days and
continues today. (The fact that alcohol and tobacco use, unlike the
use of some of the more potent illegal drugs, can be easily integrated
into a person's daily routine is often offered as a justification for
their legality. This very characteristic is what encourages heavy use
and causes the problems that result from such use.) If we assume
that alcohol and tobacco are only five times more popular than their
illegal counterparts, we can conclude that, in practice, the ratio of
deaths caused will be tobacco--i,620; alcohol-370; heroin-20 and
cocaine-1.
As for addictiveness, a recent study of 160 cocaine users in the
Netherlands concluded that only 20 percent of the random sample
reached high levels of use (2.5 grams/week), and that 90 percent of
high level users were able to return to moderate use or abstinence
without seeking treatment. 34 Dr. Peter Cohen, who conducted the
study, notes that when users use too much, "the mind and body protest," and in most cases, this reaction leads to successful efforts to
reduce consumption.4 35 A recent study of American cocaine users
reached similar results.436
"[T]he most detailed longitudinal report on the natural history
of drug involvement that charts changes in the use of a variety of
433. See supra notes 293-330 and accompanying text (discussing "The Consequences of
Legalization").
434. Speech given by Dr. Peter Cohen, University of Amsterdam, The Netherlands, at
the 1989 International Conference on Drug Policy Reform, Washington, D.C. (awaiting publication in the United States and on file at the Hofstra Law Review).
435. Id.
436. Murphy, Reinarman, Waldorf, supra note 65, at 427.
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[legal and illegal] drugs [including cocaine and heroin] by a general
population sample in their late twenties, 437 concluded that
"[a]lcohol shows by far the most persistence, followed by cigarette
smoking. ' 43 Any doubts that nicotine is an addictive drug were put
to rest in 1988 by the Surgeon General's report on nicotine addiction.4 39 "The pharmacologic and behavioral processes that determine
tobacco addiction are similar to those that determine addiction to
drugs such as heroin and cocaine. ' 440 The following chart, based on
a 1988 survey of young adults by the National Institute on Drug
Abuse, reaches a similar conclusion. 41
DRUG

% WHO EVER USED % WHO USED IN
LAST MONTH

Alcohol
Tobacco
Cocaine

90.0
75.0
19.7

65.0
35.0
4.5

Thus, the percentage of repeat users for alcohol is 72 percent,
for tobacco-47 percent and for cocaine-23 percent. Data on heroin was not available, but on the basis of one survey which stated
that about two and one-half million people have tried heroin,442 we
can estimate that heroin's recidivism rate is 20 percent. These results
confirm Stanton Peele's claim that "no data of any sort support the
idea that addiction is a characteristic of some mood-altering substances and not of others. 443
These studies cannot be explained away by pointing to the illegal status of heroin and cocaine-the surveys consider only those
who were willing to violate prohibition to try illegal drugs initially.
The better explanation is that tobacco and alcohol are simply very
attractive and physically addicting drugs. Referring to tobacco,
Brecher writes, "No other substance known to man is used with such
remarkable frequency. 444
437. Raveis & Kandel, Changes in Drug Behaviorfrom the Middle to the Late Twenties: Initiation, Persistence,and Cessation of Use, 77 Am. J. PUB. HEALTH 607, 607 (1987).

438.

Id. at 609.

439.

See generally U.S.

& HUMAN SERV., THE HEALTH CONSEA REPORT OF THE SURGEON GENERAL (1988).
GENERAL, supra note 429, at 9.
supra note 301, at 2-4.
DEP'T OF HEALTH

QUENCES OF SMOKING, NICOTINE ADDICTION,

440. See U.S. SURGEON
441. NIDA OVERVIEW,
442. See id. at 102.
443. Peele, supra note 55, at 200 (emphasis in original).
444. ' E. BRECHER, supra note 28, at 223.
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"CRACK"

In recent years, the cocaine derivative "crack" has become the
drug of the moment. In spite of the fact that crack is a more pure
and potent form of cocaine; there is little evidence that its use has
increased cocaine fatalities. The author was unable to obtain statistical information about crack fatalities in phone calls to the National
Institute on Drug Abuse, the 1-800-Cocaine Hotline or the New
York State Division of Substance Abuse Services. NIDA does not
separately record crack deaths-they are included in overall cocaine
figures.
There is no doubt that crack is a potentially dangerous drug
which can disturb the chemistry in the human brain. The important
point to remember is that the drug laws have completely failed to
stop the use of crack. They have only allowed a profitable and violent black market to develop around this drug. It is arguable that
crack exists because of our drug laws; "[the iron law of drug prohibition is that the more intense the law enforcement, the more potent
the drugs will become. The latest stage of this cycle has brought us
'44 5
the crack epidemic.
Many fallacies about crack were exploded in a front page article in the New York Times in August 1989 which summarized what
4 46
is known about crack:
(1) Difficulties in treating crack users "stem far more from
of the users than the biochemical rethe setting and circumstances
44 7
action the drug produces."
448
(2) Crack addiction can be successfully treated.
(3) "Some studies suggest that crack is no more intrinsically
addictive than other drugs addicts have been able to quit." 449
(4) "[Crack] seems to addict people faster than any other
'450
known substance, with the [possible] exception of cigarettes.
(5) Monkeys will press a lever to get an injection of cocaine,
amphetamine and nicotine until they die.. Heroin and alcohol were
also demanded but not so intensely. 45'
445. Cowan, How the Narcs Create Crack, NAT'L REv. Dec. 5, 1986, at 26.
446. Kolata, Experts Finding New Hope on Treating Crack Addicts: In Shift, Importance of Users' Environment is Stressed Over the Drug's Attributes, N.Y. Times, Aug. 24,

1989, at Al, col. 1.
447. Id. at col. 5.
448. Id.
449. Id.
450. Id. at B7, col. 1.
451.

Id.

http://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/hlr/vol18/iss3/5

94

Ostrowski: The Moral and Practical Case for Drug Legalization
1990]

MORAL AND PRACTICAL CASE

(6) Intravenous cocaine is the rough equivalent of crack in addictive potential.4 52
(7) NIDA studies indicate that addicts appear to have found
crack less addictive than nicotine and more addictive than
453
alcohol.
(8) 9 of 10 people who tried cigarettes became addicted; I of
6 who tried crack became addicted; 1 of 10 became addicted to
alcohol.454

(9) One study showed that addicts consider heroin more addicting than cocaine. 55
(10) In another study, addicts listed the most addicting drugs
in order of heroin, cigarettes, alcohol, cocaine. These findings are
consistent with numerous other studies. 5"
(11) There are drugs which can block the effects of cocaine
and drugs which can combat the depression caused by cocaine
(desipramine).457
A careful review of these findings will bring the truth about crack
closer than a review of all the sensationalist stories the media has
been running for the last four years. 58 How then did we arrive at'
the stage where many people believe that anyone who uses crack
would kill and prostitute their children? Peele answers:
452. Id.
453. Id.
454. Id.
455. Id.
456. Id.
457. Id. at col. 2.
458. Consider the following passage:
The desire for [crack] runs wild and takes madness into its service; any opinions or
desires with a decent reputation and any feelings of shame still left are killed or
thrown out, until all discipline is swept away, and madness usurps its place ...
When [crack] has absolute control of a man's mind... life is a round of orgies and
sex and so on ....

So that whatever income he has will soon be expended ...

and

next of course he'll start borrowing and drawing upon capital ... When he comes to
the end of his father's and mother's resources ... he'll start by burglaring a house
or holding someone up at night, or go to clean out a church. Meanwhile, the older
beliefs about honor and dishonor, which he was brought upon to accept as right, will
be overcome by others, once held in restraint but now freed to become the bodyguard of his desire for [crack] ... Under the tyranny of his desire for [crack] he
becomes in his waking life what he was once only occasionally in his dreams, and
there's nothing, no taboo, no murder, however terrible, from which he will shrink.
His desire tyrannizes over him, a despot without restraint or law.
PLATO, THE REPUBLIC, BOOK NINE (Middlesex ed. 1955) (deleting some archaic terms from
the passage). This sad story sounds so familiar and could easily have been lifted from the
latest magazine article on crack. However, the passage has been edited to substitute "desire
for crack" for the author's term "master passion." The author was Plato, writing more than
two thousand years before the invention of crack.
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These claims are preposterous, the scientists and clinicians who encourage them are misrepresenting the facts, and we have reached a
strange impasse in our civilization when we rely for information
and moral guidance about habits on the most debilitated segments
of our population-groups who attribute to addiction and drugs what
are actually their personal problems.45
VI.

CONCLUSION

The prohibition of cocaine and heroin is not justified by their
greater deadlines or addictiveness than alcohol and tobacco. In fact,
these legal drugs considered together are more deadly and addicting
than heroin and cocaine.

459.

Peele, Control Yourself,

REASON,

February 1990, at 23-25.
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